Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

291. British Minutes of a Meeting of Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, Foreign Office, London, September 21, 1955, 3:30 p.m.¹

London, September 21, 1955, 3:30 p.m.

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

• United Kingdom
• Mr. Shuckburgh
• Mr. Arthur
• United States
• Mr. Russell
• Mr. Wilson
• Mr. Mak

Mr.Shuckburgh said that the Foreign Office had received a telegram from H.M. Ambassador in Cairo, who had seen Nasser on September 20.² It was unfortunately evident that Nasser was not behind what Fawzi had said to our Ambassadors. He had told Sir H. Trevelyan that Egyptian public opinion and his own thinking was dominated by fear of Israeli expansion and a feeling of insecurity. The present was therefore no time for a Palestine settlement. When Sir H. Trevelyan had pointed out that the way to remove the feeling of fear and insecurity was through a settlement,Nasser had changed his ground and said that he feared that the other Arab states would conduct a political attack on Egypt if she took the lead towards a settlement: he feared such attacks on account of Egyptian leadership on the Johnston plan. Even if this went well, he thought that a settlement now was impossible and emphasised the great strategic importance of the Negev to Egypt. He did not favour an approach to Israel by us at this stage, but he would be prepared to listen to our more detailed ideas on the strict understanding that the conversations would remain entirely confidential and not come to the ears of other Arab states.

Mr.Russell considered that it would be unwise to allow Nasser’s statements to stand for long without comment. He thought that Mr.Byroade should be instructed to point out to Nasser that his attitude amounted in effect to the first negative response we had had from any government to Mr.Dulles’s statement; and that if this continued to be Nasser’s position the United States Government, who had not expected this of Egypt, were seriously disturbed and might be forced to reconsider their whole policy in the Middle East.

Mr.Shuckburgh agreed that we could not let Nasser’s remarks pass. But he wondered whether it was wise to tackle him immediately. Whilst it was desirable to maintain the impetus which Mr.Dulles’s statement had given, it might be better to wait until we saw what happened to Mr.Johnston’s negotiations. The surest way of convincing Nasser that his leadership would not be attacked would be to wait until we could show him that he had not suffered for his attitude on the Jordan Waters question. We might then more reasonably expect from him a new act of leadership. But we were perhaps expecting too much of him in present circumstances, and it might be better not to press him for the time being.

Mr.Russell wondered whether Nasser was really under any special pressures at present. If so, we should understand his position. But Egyptian leadership on the matter of Jordan Waters was no new thing, and far from resenting it more than in the past, the general attitude of the other Arab states on Palestine affairs seemed nowadays to be more reasonable than usual.Nasser’s fears might simply be an excuse for further postponement, and what he had told Sir H. Trevelyan might well be the expression of a deep and enduring reluctance to make any move towards a settlement. If he continued to say “not now”, we should sooner or later have to meet him head on; and the present was probably the time for this, since he was holding up our efforts at the most propitious moment. If we lost our present momentum it was doubtful whether we would be able to recover it. If the Arabs refused to move, the position of the United States Administration on the guarantee to Israel would be weakened.

Mr.Shuckburgh agreed, but thought that it was dangerous to threaten a reappraisal of our policies in the Middle East. If that was meant to imply that we would transfer our support to the Israelis, we could not carry it out. Our interests would not permit us to coerce or blackmail the Arabs into peace, and Nasser knew this.

Mr.Russell agreed, so far as the Arab world as a whole was concerned. But it might be possible to withdraw support from Egypt alone.

Mr.Shuckburgh, reverting to the question of timing, pointed out that Mr.Johnston hoped to meet the Arab Foreign Ministers in Cairo on October 1. If he got them to accept his plan, it would be a most important achievement in itself and have a favourable effect on the prospects for Alpha. With that possibility in mind, we should not press Nasser too much for the next ten days. Afterwards we could tackle him strongly on the acceptance of an agenda for the Alpha negotiations.

Mr.Russell agreed that we should await the conclusion of Mr.Johnston’s talks next week, especially since Mr.Johnston was fairly hopeful of getting Arab agreement to the main lines of his proposals. But immediately after the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers to discuss the Johnston plan, there was to be a meeting of the Arab League Council which would probably discuss Mr.Dulles’s statement whether the Egyptians wanted [to] or not. We ought to make some attempt to prevent Nasser’s attitude from hardening; otherwise we might find that the Arab League would be affected by it and slip into opposition to Mr.Dulles’s statement.

It was agreed that Mr.Russell should recommend that Mr.Byroade should be instructed to tell Nasser soon that we were disappointed at his attitude as expressed to Sir H. Trevelyan, and that he (Mr.Byroade) would wish to talk to him further about it in a fortnight or so. Meanwhile the United States Government counted on Nasser to ensure that the Arab League meeting, if it should discuss Mr.Dulles’s statement, left the door open for further discussions.

It was agreed that Mr.Byroade should not make a further positive approach on Alpha until after the meeting to determine the Arab attitude to the Johnston plan. When he did so, he would do his utmost to get Nasser’s acceptance of an agenda for discussions, explaining the advantage to Egypt of an agenda which included the Negev.³

1. Source: Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Minutes of London Talks held Sept. 20 and 21, 1955. Top Secret.
2. No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.
3. In a September 26 letter to Russell enclosing copies of the minutes of this meeting,Wilson noted that Russell had not submitted this recommendation because it had been overtaken by events “in the form of the Soviet arms deal.”Wilson also stated that he and Shuckburgh had agreed that Russell’s discussions on September 22 and 23 were “of such a nature that it was impracticable to write up any minutes.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684a.86/9–2655) Regarding Russell’s September 22 meeting with Shuckburgh, see Document 296.