Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

288. British Minutes of Meetings of Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, Foreign Office, London, September 20, 1955, 10:45 a.m. and 4 p.m.¹

London, September 20, 1955, 10:45 a.m. and September 20, 1955, 4 p.m.

PALESTINE SETTLEMENT

• United Kingdom
• Mr. Shuckburgh
• Mr. Arthur
• United States
• Mr. Russell
• Mr. Wilson
• Mr. Mak

A. Next Steps

Mr.Shuckburgh suggested that the meeting should begin by discussing the next steps. Mr.Dulles’s statement had been received as well as we could possibly have expected in the countries concerned: no government was publicly committed against it. We knew that the Israelis were willing to talk to us about a settlement; and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated his position in general terms, and whilst emphasising that we must next sound out the attitude of the Israeli Government, he had given us to understand that we were at liberty to put our more specific ideas to Colonel Nasser and him whenever we wished. We had thus made a start, and we must proceed as quickly as possible. He would be suggesting that after assuring ourselves that Colonel Nasser was fully behind what his Foreign Minister had said to us, we should next approach the Israelis. We should explain to them that the Egyptians were ready to discuss the possibility of a settlement but had put a high price—the whole of the Negev—on their readiness. We could then try to elicit some kind of counter-offer from the Israelis.

2. Mr. Russell said that he took a rather less optimistic view of Dr.Fawzi’s talks to our Ambassadors in Cairo. Our first objective must be to find some Arab country, which we thought would have to be Egypt, to take the lead in moving towards a settlement. It looked as though Dr.Fawzi was simply trying to postpone the day when Egypt would have to make that move by transferring the onus of starting concrete negotiations to the Israelis. We must first get the Egyptian Government to say definitely that they were prepared to exchange ideas, directly or indirectly, with the Israelis with a view to reaching a settlement. The Egyptians had not yet gone as far as this.

3. Meanwhile, the Israelis were trying to dislodge the United States Government from the position that a settlement must precede a guarantee. Their latest proposal was that the United States should announce that they would give the guarantee either at the end of a fixed period, or as soon as it became clear that the Arabs would not cooperate in the achievement of a settlement. They were also trying to find out what kind of settlement the United States Government had in mind. In order to keep them at arm’s length whilst we tried to bring the Egyptians to the point, he suggested that we should now formulate a set of questions through which we could seek the views of both sides on certain specific questions, such as the magnitude and method of distribution of compensation. This would engage the Israelis’ attention for some time; and meanwhile we might be able to get Colonel Nasser to designate some person or body to exchange views with the Israelis through an intermediary. Only then should we be certain that the Egyptians were willing to negotiate without pre-conditions.

4. Mr. Shuckburgh suggested that our tactics depended on whether we regarded the Negev difficulty as being in a different category from the other elements of a settlement. The Egyptian Foreign Minister had given us the impression that the other issues were capable of solution, but he had emphasised the Egyptian determination to secure the Negev. It was unlikely that we should be able to make any further progress with the Egyptians until we could show them some counter-proposal on the Negev. There was much to be said for tackling this problem first. Our past experience indicated that Colonel Nasser would simply refuse to discuss other problems until he was convinced that he would get some satisfaction on the Negev; and there was little else that we could discuss with the Egyptians without bringing in other Arab states. Until we felt fairly certain that agreement on the Negev was possible, we should be unwise to show our hand on other matters. In the end everything would turn on a solution for the Negev; and if we failed on that, our other proposals, by then known to all the parties, would collapse and be discredited. By starting with the Negev we could keep these intact.

5. Mr. Russell agreed that the Negev was the most difficult problem. If we tried to deal with it at the beginning, we should find it very hard to make any progress. The Israelis felt that they had little room to manoeuvre: there were few things on which they could make concessions, and they would not make so important a sacrifice until right at the end of negotiations. They might possibly accept our idea of triangles as a final concession to clinch agreement, but they would need to be sure that they would get a settlement before they abandoned their present position on the Negev. The same consideration might weigh with the Egyptians also: if we could get negotiations started and create an atmosphere of progress on other issues, we might in the end be able to induce both the Egyptians and the Israelis to give up their dreams of possessing the whole of the Negev. But we could not expect to do so immediately. Before approaching the Israelis we must get Nasser to accept the idea of negotiations unconditionally.

6. Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that from the Egyptian point of view the idea of moving towards a settlement with Israel was the first concession.Nasser would be reluctant to make it unless he received something in return, that is to say an assurance that Israel would be ready to make some concession on the Negev during the negotiations. Only if we could show him that he would get something out of Israel could we expect to move him from that position.

7. Mr. Russell said that it seemed that what Colonel Nasser most wanted was arms supplies. But he could not pay; and it might be possible for the United States to give him a long-term credit if he was ready to commit himself formally to negotiations with Israel through an intermediary. By this means Nasser would be able to safeguard his internal position, and we should have obtained from him the starting point for the Alpha negotiations.

8. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he did not like the idea of offering arms to the Egyptians at the present time. Since Egypt was not cooperating with us over defence matters, the normal justification for the offer would be lacking; and it would look as though we were rewarding Nasser for an agreement to betray the whole Arab position over Palestine. However, we must certainly try to move Nasser from the position that the acquisition of the Negev was acondition for negotiations at least to the point at which his claim would appear aspart of negotiations which he had already accepted in principle. Putting the matter simply and bluntly, it seemed that Mr.Russell’s idea was to induce Nasser to make that move by the prospect of arms supplies; whilst his (Mr.Shuckburgh’s) idea amounted to a proposal that we should first get some concession out of the Israelis and use that as the lever to shift Nasser.

9. Mr. Russell said that the State Department had not arrived at the idea of an arms offer as a result of a search for an appropriate inducement. It was rather that they were being pressed to help Nasser with arms in any case; and they did not wish to do so unless they got something more concrete from him on Alpha.

10. In discussion, itwas recognised that the difficulty was that neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis were prepared to be first in the field with concessions. The situation resembled an oriental bazaar bargain in which neither vendor nor purchaser would name the starting price. We should have to point out to both sides that they had taken positions over the Negev that made any kind of negotiation for a settlement impossible. The only way out of this deadlock was to induce both sides to admit that the Negev was a subject for discussion: each side should receive and give an assurance on this point.

11. It was agreed that we should seek Nasser’s agreement to an agenda for negotiations which contained among the other elements of a settlement the Egyptian claim for a land link with Jordan across the Negev. We should ask him whether he was prepared to start discussions on condition that the Israelis accepted this agenda. If so, we would try to get the Israelis to accept it.

B. Inducements to Nasser

12. Mr. Russell wondered what we should do if Nasser refused to accept the idea of proceeding through an agreed agenda. With regard to the possibility of offering material inducements, he explained that the offer of arms, to which he had referred before, had not in the first place been connected with Alpha. It had been proposed quite independently as a means of strengthening Nasser’s position. The State Department’s idea was not to use arms as a bribe in connection with Alpha, but simply to delay an offer which was being considered on other grounds until Nasser was ready to make a move on Alpha.

13. Mr. Shuckburgh agreed that the offer of arms to Nasser was premature. The mere acceptance of the agenda would not be sufficient to justify it: such an offer should only be made in return for real progress in the Alpha negotiations. In any case it was open to the following objections:

(a) It would mean that the West was aiding a country which was not cooperating in defence matters.

(b) The Egyptians were already doing well over arms: they had already obtained the release of 32 Centurions from the United Kingdom, and they had asked for a further 32 which we could not let them have.

(c) It was doubtful whether an offer of arms would make any difference to Nasser’s attitude at this stage.

14. It was agreed that we should not offer Nasser arms in the mere hope that he would thereafter cooperate on Alpha. We should require evidence of real progress.

15. Turning to political inducements, Mr.Russell said that Mr.Byroade had pointed out that Egypt’s rôle on Alpha could not be divorced from the general policy of the United States Government in the Middle East. Mr.Byroade’s view was that we should relax our efforts to seek new members for the Turco-Iraqi Pact and encourage Egypt to take the lead in the formation of an Arab pact which would fit into the “defence in depth” of the Middle East. He thought that if the Egyptians saw that this was Western policy, they would be ready to cooperate on Alpha. The State Department intended to explain to Mr.Byroade that the Northern Tier concept, which they supported, must be promoted, though they were not making any effort to get additional Arab members for the Turco-Iraqi Pact now. They hoped that some rôle might be found for Egypt in the defence of the area, but they could not agree to abandon their support of the Turco-Iraqi Pact merely in order to allow Egypt to recover her leadership.

16. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he was glad to hear that the State Department agreed that we should not say anything to Nasser which was inconsistent with the support of the United States and the United Kingdom for the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

C. Mechanics of Negotiation

17. It was recognized that when we presented the agenda to Nasser we might also have to give him some indication of our ideas on the methods of negotiation. It was likely that he would demand complete secrecy: he would not wish the other Arab states, particularly Iraq, to know that he was entering on negotiations with Israel. Another difficulty was that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had told us that he did not want joint Anglo-American approaches: we must put our ideas to him separately.

18. In discussion the following pointswere agreed:

(a) Up to the stage at which the agenda was agreed we could maintain complete secrecy: we should work through our representatives in Cairo and Tel Aviv.

(b) Dr.Fawzi had insisted on dealing with either the United Kingdom or the United States Ambassador alone. The lead should be taken by Mr.Byroade, who would of course keep Sir H. Trevelyan fully informed.

(c) In Israel joint approaches would probably be best: the Israelis must know that we were in full agreement.

(d) In Jordan and Iraq H.M. Representatives would take the lead when the time came.

(e) Once the agenda had been agreed and negotiations on matters which were of concern to the other Arab states were ready to start, we should have to bring in Jordan at least. We could not discuss Jordan’s interests behind her back.

(f) We should discuss the best means of bringing other Arab states in with Nasser. We could counter his objections by explaining that this would spread the burden of negotiations. We hoped Egypt would take the lead, but we were not asking her to accept the responsibility of negotiating alone those parts of a settlement which touched other parties.

19. It was agreed that once the agenda had been accepted we should not long be able to carry on negotiations through our representatives in the Middle East. It would indeed be easier to avoid the appearance of breakdowns that way; but the best hope of reconciling the positions of the parties, as Mr.Johnston’s negotiations showed, was to have a person or group who could talk to both sides. We could not conduct the early stages of the negotiations with the plenipotentiaries of all the parties in London and Washington: where important matters of principle were concerned, the Arab representatives would neither enjoy the full confidence of their Governments nor have the authority or the courage to make any concessions. We must get at the leaders who would have to take the decisions. But once the main lines of a settlement had been agreed, negotiations on matters of detail could most conveniently be conducted with representatives of both sides in London or Washington.

20. It was recognized that the employment of mediators would involve publicity, and by arousing excitement defeat its own ends, and perhaps expose us to the charge of usurping the functions of the United Nations. We should not take up a rigid position on that yet, but await developments and arrange mediation ad hoc at first. For example, after the acceptance of the agenda and the preliminary exchange of views, British and American representatives might make a tour of the Middle Eastern capitals for some other ostensible purpose and start the reconciliation process: if the Governments concerned wanted secrecy it could easily be maintained at any rate for one such visit. As regards the United Nations, we should do well to keep the Secretary General (who had supported Mr.Dulles’s statement) informed of our progress.

21. It was agreed therefore that the negotiations would fall into three main stages:

(a) Up to the acceptance of the agenda and the preliminary exchanges of views: to be conducted through H.M. and U.S. Representatives in the countries concerned.

(b) The attempt to reconcile the views of the parties and secure agreement on broad principles: special representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department would visit the Middle East and talk to both sides.

(c) Negotiation of details: the parties would designate representatives to meet negotiators from the Foreign Office and State Department, either in London or Washington or in some other suitable capital.

22. It was agreed that if real progress could be made and a settlement seemed possible, we should recommend to our Secretaries of State that they should consider taking a personal share in the final negotiations in order to clinch the agreement. If they saw Dr.Fawziand Mr.Sharett in New York during the present session of the Assembly, it would help if they showed a strong personal interest in Alpha and urged the two Ministers in the direction we want them to take. But the real decision in Egypt would lie with Colonel Nasser, and in Israel probably with Mr.Ben Gurion.

D. Interim Dealings With the Israelis

23. It was recognized that we must soon expect further questions, and perhaps some specific proposals from the Israelis. As it might take some time to bring the Egyptians to the point, we should have to be prepared to make some non-committal response to Israeli initiatives.

24. It was agreed that we should say that we had so far received no response from the Arabs: our offers to help in finding a solution were dependent on the request of both sides. The Israelis must be patient, for it was encouraging that for the first time the Arabs had not rejected the idea of a settlement out of hand. Meanwhile, we were quite ready to listen to their views on the refugees, which was the least contentious yet the most complicated part of a settlement.

1. Source: Department fo State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Minutes of London Talks held Sept. 20 and 21, 1955. Top Secret.