274. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
461.Fawzi and I discussed at length yesterday combined subject of Alpha and Secretary’s speech. He said in his opinion speech was being considered in sober fashion in Arab world, even though we might disagree on various points. (While there have been some fairly jarring editorials and cartoons, am inclined to agree with him that press criticism could be labeled “moderate”, all things considered.) He agreed that it would be unwise for the Arabs collectively to formally and publicly answer speech. He agreed it was far better that matter be kept under consideration and followed up by secret discussions.
As to substance, he felt it was time to have further discussions provided they could be in utmost informality and that number of persons involved be as small as possible. He made point however that talks should be held in Tel Aviv as well as Cairo. Queried him considerably on this point as we had agreed several months ago best approach was for US and Egypt try to reach general meeting of minds prior to approaching Israelis. He said he thought that had been good start but it probably time now see what Israelis had in mind and we had discussed substance enough to know that there probably no insurmountable obstacle between our views except as regards Negev. Egypt could hardly be expected to bargain away her position without every conceivable effort being made to change Israeli’s position, as well as that of Egypt, on Negev.
Fawzi reiterated most adamantly that they would never accept corridor type arrangement and there must become actual transfer of defensible territory to establish continuity of Arab world. Told him again it inconceivable to me that any Israeli Government could come even near to meeting Egyptian position of all of Negev. He admitted he believed this probably true. Therefore real effort should be made to see how much gap could be narrowed between present positions. If gap could not be substantially narrowed then he supposed we would all have to conclude settlement impossible. On other hand if gap could be made small enough, perhaps then it could be cut in half by efforts of outsiders and a solution could be arrived at which neither would readily accept but which they could both acquiesce in.
In answer to query,Fawzi stated he believed matter should be kept in normal diplomatic channels at this stage and as secret as [Page 469] possible. Stated British Ambassador2 had asked his view as to whether US and UK should make joint approaches in Cairo and Tel Aviv.Fawzi said he had told Trevelyan he thought formalities of joint approach highly undesirable at this stage. (Trevelyan later confirmed this to me and stated he thought Fawzi probably correct.)
Believe this conversation calls for alteration past Alpha procedure and Fawzi probably right that next move should be with Israel. He said Egypt could hardly play role we envisaged unless it could be convinced what it would consider as minimum position could be substantially met. Only then could it be expected to take leadership on Arab side and stick out its neck on this problem. Am encouraged somewhat also that this the first hint there could be some concession on Negev, but not in continued one-sided discussions. Under circumstances doubt there much more that we can do here by merely expressing our view as to Israeli attitudes.
If Department decides take matter up with Israel without delay, would think it most unfortunate that cross-triangle solution be suggested to them, as do not conceive this particular solution would ever be accepted here. Would suggest our approach be a general one stressing utmost importance from their own point of view finding solution to Negev problem with statement that we do not believe Arabs will accept a corridor. Perhaps it would be wise to seek Israeli’s reactions on Negev in context of general review with them of important elements entire Alpha plan.
Fawzi stated we must remember there no significant body of opinion in Arab world seeking immediate settlement. Almost everyone was of two minds about problem. There was general feeling that time was essentially now on the side of the Arabs and many people believe that there should be delay until such time as the Arabs could negotiate from a better basis of strength. He himself had feeling that if real progress could not be made in next few months, Arab attitude might well harden for such delay. He wished stress he was not talking about eventual use of force but the psychology of wishing to negotiate from position of greater strength.
Department may wish consider passing this message Tel Aviv.