407. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 18, 1957, 10:15 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- Syrian Item in the United Nations
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The Secretary
- Mr. W. M. Rountree,
- NEA Mr. S. W. Rockwell,
- NE Mr. J. Dorman, NE
- UK
- Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
- Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
- Viscount Samuel Hood, Minister, British Embassy
- Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy
The Secretary suggested that the Syrian complaint in the United Nations be discussed first. He said the United States had proposed to amend the title of the item to read “…2 threat to the independence and integrity of Syria,” a phrase which had been lifted from the original Syrian note. The Secretary hoped that the UK Delegation could support this wording. Mr. Lloyd said that the UK could certainly support the title as amended. He would support the US position in the debate and would point out that the entire item was merely a Soviet propaganda gambit.
The Secretary felt that we should avoid a resolution of a nature which would put Turkey on the spot. We did not want to be put in the position of appearing to support a move against our staunchest Middle East ally. The Turks, the Secretary said, might counter the Syrian complaint with their own request for an investigating commission to report on the Russian build-up along the Turkish-Soviet border. Any resolution of this kind would certainly be rejected by the USSR and would give Turkey a precedent for similar action with respect to any resolution calling for an investigation in Turkey. Mr. Lloyd suggested that the Turks might also ask for a UN-sponsored investigation along the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier along which there had been recent reports of military activity.
Mr. Lloyd felt that the appointment of an investigating commission by the General Assembly would set a dangerous precedent and yet he could not readily see how it could be avoided…
Mr. Rountree indicated that whatever tactic we might use in the United Nations, we should make a careful assessment of the general atmosphere as it exists today and carefully weigh in advance the support which a US-sponsored resolution regarding a Russian military build-up might receive. It was entirely possible that such a resolution might be defeated. Mr. Lloyd concurred.
In reply to a question from the Secretary, Mr. Rountree indicated that while we had no definite word on the Turkish position, the Turks had left with us the impression that they could not accept an investigating commission. Both the Secretary and Mr. Lloyd agreed that Turkey would be in a very difficult position if it ignored a resolution which had been passed by the UN.
The Secretary pointed out that Turkey was far from being the only country in the area which had received arms, since this was true also of Jordan, Iraq, and especially Syria.
[Page 722]Mr. Lloyd felt that the best possible solution was a resolution in the General Assembly which would refer the matter for prompt consideration to the Security Council. The Secretary agreed, citing the UN provision that the General Assembly should refer to the Security Council any action on an item constituting a threat to the peace.
Mr. Lloyd suggested that a resolution might be presented in the Security Council calling for the establishment of an investigating commission. We might then broaden the terms of such a resolution to include an investigation of the Russian frontier. The Russians would, of course, veto any such resolution.
(At this point the Secretary called Mr. Wadsworth at the USUN and established that the Turks might have no strong objection to a resolution calling for the creation of an investigating commission to look into the alleged military build-up along the Turkish-Syrian frontier.)
Lord Hood felt that following a General Assembly discussion we should recommend that the Security Council appoint an investigating commission, determining its terms of reference. Mr. Rountree observed that this had been our previous position. In considering the possibility of broadening the investigating commission’s terms of reference to include the Russian and Bulgarian frontiers, Mr. Rockwell suggested that a possible division of votes might result in the defeat of the resolution. The Secretary said that if a resolution was killed in the Security Council we could return the item to the General Assembly.
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