381. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State1
228. 1. I did not have opportunity talk with Crown Prince Iraq (Consulate General telegram 226)2 alone during course of day. However, he participated in 2-hour discussion this evening with Prime Minister Menderes, Minister State Zorlu, Ambassador Warren and myself.
[Page 671]2. Conversation was frank and in my opinion helpful. Crown Prince said he having difficulty with Iraq Government. Prime Minister Jaydat kind, helpful sort of person averse to making difficult decisions and to assuming serious responsibilities. His Foreign Minister Ali Mumtaz also indecisive person preferring drift to action. There must be shifts in government if successful action to be taken…. Crown Prince said he intended send telegram immediately asking Nuri Said return to Baghdad where he would probably be made Deputy Prime Minister. Crown Prince said he might also bring Tewfik Suedi into Cabinet as Minister of State and Jamali to handle propaganda.
3. I said my return stop in Istanbul was prompted in part by my hope that while here I would obtain information which would permit me report to Washington attitude which Iraq had decided to assume. I would regret in making my report to leave blank space when referring to Iraq. I asked Crown Prince whether or not Iraq had yet assumed definite attitude. Crown Prince said he regretted it had not. Its indecision was primarily due to weak Prime Minister. In absence King Feisal, Crown Prince had hesitated give categoric orders to Prime Minister. He was certain, however, that when King returned Baghdad in few days appropriate orders would be given…. He had already spoken to Ambassador Gallman re some of Iraq’s military needs. Iraq Chief of Staff3 was now in Istanbul. They would like talk with me. I told him I had just received telegram from Ambassador Gallman that he was arriving later in evening. At Crown Prince’s suggestion it was agreed that he, his Chief of Staff, Ambassador Gallman and I would have discussion re some of Iraq’s problems shortly before midnight tonight. It also agreed that early tomorrow morning (September 3) there should be another meeting which would include three American Ambassadors, Turks, and Iraqis. This meeting must be short since I departing for airport shortly before 10 o’clock.
4. Crown Prince said he had sent message to King Saud expressing concern re Syria and suggesting he might visit King in order discuss matter personally. Early this morning Saudi Ambassador to Baghdad had given him Saud’s reply. Saud had also expressed concern at Syrian developments and intimated Nasser largely to blame. Saud also indicated that there should be no resort to arms but other methods should be used to bring about changes with Syria. Saud also said that in his opinion visit Crown Prince just now to Saudi Arabia might be misunderstood and should therefore be postponed. Crown Prince stated that he intended to write another [Page 672] letter to Saud giving in more detail reasons why Iraq could not afford remain inactive… .
5. Considerable discussion re Jordan. Both Menderes and I did our best to persuade Crown Prince to make every effort effect improvement relations between King Hussein and himself and between Jordan and Iraq. Crown Prince admitted lack of mutual trust between Hussein and himself. Although he did not promise to undertake heal breach he nevertheless seemed impressed. It seems to us close cooperation between Jordan and Iraq necessary if any effective action to be taken re Syria. It appears easier, for instance, for Iraqi troops to penetrate Syria through Jordan than to cover vast roadless distance lying along Iraqi-Syrian borders.
6. Menderes reminded Crown Prince that Turks and Iraqis had sent message to US asking that US give its view re Syrian problem. US Government had sent me here to present these views. It would be too bad if I should be compelled to return US with report Iraq still had not decided what to do. He hoped Crown Prince would discuss this matter at once with King. King and Crown Prince enjoyed such position in Iraq that if they should make firm decision any Iraq Government would follow it. Turkey had been informed by its friends, the Arabs and US, that since Syrian problem primarily Arab affair Turkey should not intervene. However, existence of Communist-controlled Syria represented so grave threat Turkish security that if Arabs unable take action themselves Turkey would be compelled to consult with US re what it should do.
7. Warren and I had feeling Crown Prince left our meeting determined to talk with King and to take more positive line in dealing with Iraqi Government re Syrian danger.
8. Both Turks and Iraqis stressed how important it was that American military advisers or “commission” be sent this area urgently authorized to give advice from strategic and tactical point of view and to assist and make recommendation re needs for arms. I told Crown Prince that it would be useless to consider sending such mission to this area before Iraq had decided what its course of action would be.
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 3:04 a.m., September 3. Forwarded to General Goodpaster at the White House on September 3 under cover of a note from Howe. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material)↩
- Telegram 226 from Istanbul, September 1, contained an account of a conversation between Henderson and Menderes. The Turkish Prime Minister had suggested that Henderson might be able to talk with Abdul-illah shortly after his arrival in Istanbul on September 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123)↩
- General Rafiq.↩