372. Telegram From the Consulate General in Istanbul to the Department of State1
190. From Henderson. 1. At suggestion made to me by Esenbel, Secretary General Foreign Office, this morning I requested audience through Jordan Ambassador Haydar for Ambassador Warren and myself with King Hussein. Esenbel had informed me that King was [Page 654] departing early afternoon for Spain and would be pleased to receive me on my request.
2. Jordan Ambassador told us King desired talk not only re problem Syria but re other matters pertaining US—Jordan relations.
3. I told King I would have brought personal messages for him if Washington had known prior my departure that he would be in Istanbul. In any event I would like to tell him how much he was admired in US for courage and wisdom which he had displayed in preventing developments from taking place which would have ruined his country and done great damage to Arab and free world.
4. King asked if I could tell him what US thinking was re Syria and purpose my present mission. I told him we looked with just as much concern upon recent developments in Syria as we understood did Syria’s neighbors. Before my departure from Washington we had received messages from our Embassies in Amman, Beirut, Ankara and Baghdad describing how disturbed Near Eastern countries were re Syria. Also message from Embassy Ankara referred to certain conversations which had taken place between Iraqis and Turks in Istanbul. In view urgency situation and difficulties in clarifying our views by written exchanges, we decided that I should expedite my visit to Near East so I could without delay consult personally with our Ambassador and with Prime Minister Menderes. I then gave him analysis of the Syrian situation as we saw it, emphasizing that we were prepared to give appropriate support to Syria’s Moslem neighbors in case Syrian provocations would force them to take some kind defensive action. I pointed out that we were not urging any particular type of action. We felt that Syria’s Moslem neighbors could best decide among themselves what they could and should do. It was important however that no action by Syria’s neighbors be taken except in circumstances which would enable them to defend themselves before UN.
5. King said he fully agreed with our analysis re Syria. He convinced that if present Syrian Government remained in power for several months it would be so firmly entrenched it would be almost impossible dislodge it. He did not however indicate that his government was prepared to take immediate action. He asked whether in our opinion Iraq was pre[pared] to do anything. I replied I had not yet had opportunity to talk with Iraqis… .
He doubted whether Syrians had as yet learned to handle this equipment. It is possible Soviet technicians in Syria would man this equipment themselves. I asked him whether in his opinion Jordan Army was superior to that of Syria. He replied Syrians far better equipped although Jordanese had advantage in training, organization and morale. King inquired what in our opinion attitude Saud would be. I said I thought he might know answer to that better than I. He [Page 655] said he had sent message to Saud and had reason believe Saud would be sympathetic to Jordan in case of dispute between Jordan and Syria but he had not as yet received reply. He had also no reply as yet to messages he had sent to Arab countries in North Africa. He thought however that governments these countries were quite disgusted with Egypt and Syria.
6. King expressed concern re Israel and Soviet Union. He said that if Israel should attack any Arab country it would be playing into hands of Communists since all Arab countries would immediately unite against Israel. Furthermore if there should be armed hostilities involving Jordanese troops, Jordan would be seriously weakened militarily even in case of Syrian defeat and might become easy victim for Israel. Soviet intervention might also result in disaster for those struggling against communism.
7. I told King that in my opinion Israel would not attack Arab countries in present circumstances since Israel fully aware that such move could lead only to its ruin. We had already communicated with Israel pointing out necessity for it to exercise utmost restraint. We also appreciated problem re Soviet Union and were determined not to allow Soviet Union to decide fate of ME either by threat or by actual intervention.
8. I asked what in his opinion Turkey should do. He said Turkey should not participate in fighting. It … could give diplomatic support but it would be unwise for Turks to become involved in hostilities in Arab World… .
9. King said he was handicapped because he had no member of his government with him. He might however arrange for certain consultations even before his return to Jordan. His plans had called for ten days absence from Jordan. He was proceeding this afternoon to Italy where he would remain one day and thence to Madrid. If we wanted to get in touch with him in Rome we could do so through his Legation. I expressed concern that he should be absent from Jordan just at this time. He said that his trip had been planned some time ago but in case situation should warrant he could return Amman on short notice.
10. King said that unfortunately Jordan was handicapped in radio duel with Syria because lack equipment. He understood five more months would elapse before radio equipment he was receiving from US could be installed. Furthermore some time ago Jordan had requested sorely needed arms from US. No favorable action had thus far been taken on his request. He hoped this matter would be looked into urgently. He also referred to Jordan’s present financial situation. [Page 656] He thought with financial aid being given to him by US he could carry on during this year. He had sought financial assistance from Iraq but his efforts in this direction had thus far not been successful. I promised to bring these two matters to immediate attention Washington.
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Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 5:43 p.m. A notation on the source text indicates that it was read by Cabell and A. Roosevelt.
Howe forwarded a copy of telegram 190 along with four other messages from Henderson (telegrams 191, 192, 193, and 197) to the White House on August 26 under cover of a note indicating that Secretary Dulles had asked that President Eisenhower be shown the telegrams. Howe’s covering note and its attachments are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Material.
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