371. Letter to the Secretary of State1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I have just received the following message from [name deleted] which he suggested I pass on to you as representing his personal views.
“Jernegan and I met with Loy last night during brief Rome stopover and learned nature his mission. My views follow:
Syrian developments have followed predicted trends. I have felt for some time that situation there would get worse before we would have much chance of bringing about improvement. Fact that this trend dramatized by publicity, charges and counter charges and by rapid deterioration is probably not what Soviet wishes as USSR probably hoped for a quieter and slower takeover.
Syria is weak militarily and inept politically. No amount of Soviet arms or advisers will quickly alter this situation. I doubt Soviets will try to send volunteers in any large numbers and to do so covertly is extremely difficult. If they should attempt this and be caught out the basis for our action is much clearer.
. . . . . . .
I feel we still have substantial assets for longer range fresh approach to situation:
- A.
- All border states of Syria are hostile to present Syrian regime. (I recognize that both Jordan and Iraq will be subject to new pressures from Syrians and Egyptians and may need more bolstering from us.) This hostility over period of time should produce pressures, economic and other, border incidents, sabotage, etc.
- B.
- Soviet has never had experience with geographically isolated satellite such as Syria.
- C.
- My info is that result of break with USA has been considerable shock to Syrian people and that we are not wholly without friends within Syria or without Syrian friends abroad… .
- D.
- As long as Syria permits Aramco and IPC pipelines to function it is evidence that Syria has not wholly gone over to Soviets. Interruption by Syrians in addition to alienating both Saudis and Iraqis would give us better position for action and these lines are therefore a kind of hostage in reverse. If action started against Syria from outside we must reckon that both lines would go.
- E.
- Economic pressures should be available if all border states cooperate. While Soviet could supply Syria’s basic economic needs it could not do much for the small local traders whose lines of foreign trade are established.
6. [Sic] To summarize:
- A.
-
I do not view Syrian situation as necessarily wholly irremediable over long run… .
. . . . . . .
- C.
- If we encourage others to move we must be ready either to go to their aid or face possibility of their failure.
- D.
- I do not feel Soviet would now risk war over Syria if it had any other acceptable way out.
7…. Suggest you pass this to the Secretary of State as my personal views. Since I am not in possession of all the available facts though I have followed situation quite closely, suggest you add your comment if my analysis differs from that taken by the …. Recognize that this presents somewhat ambiguous situation but assume from request that I meet with Loy and from what he said to me that my personal views desired.”
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Secret. A note attached to the source text from the duty officer in S/S, R.A. McKinnon, to Howe, August 24, indicates that the letter was delivered to Rountree at 2:45 p.m. on August 24 in Berry’s presence and that Rountree said he would deliver the letter to Secretary Dulles later in the afternoon.↩