360. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 19, 1957, 3:45 p.m.1
PRESENT
- [Secretary Dulles]
- The Under Secretary
- G—Mr. Murphy
- O—Mr. Henderson
- NEA—Mr. Rountree
- NEA—Mr. Rockwell
- Ambassador Moose
- Ambassador Richards
- R—Mr. Cumming
- U—Mr. Reams
- S/S—Mr. Howe
- CIA—Mr. Archie Roosevelt
- CIA—Mr. Frank Wisner
- CIA-General Cabell
Mr. Rountree reviewed for the Secretary the situation as it has developed over the course of last week, including the PNG of the US officials and the most recent take-over by the Communist Chief of Staff.
He then reviewed the possible courses of action in the current situation along the general lines of the enclosed “talking paper.”2
In the hour-long discussion which ensued, the various aspects of the problem were gone over thoroughly, including particularly an appraisal of the various personalities presently involved in the situation or who might be involved. The attitudes and possible actions by the various other Middle Eastern countries was also canvassed. No action resulted other than for the Secretary to ask Mr. Rountree to prepare for him, the Secretary, to review a briefing statement on the Syrian problem for the President’s press conference.
The CIA representatives discussed the situation as they saw it… .
Ambassador Richards cautioned not to move too fast in a situation which might well change character and ease off in a few days or weeks.
Ambassador Moose noted that while the situation was very serious, the most powerful man in Syria, Serraj, was still in place and apparently not yet touched by the new regime.
[Page 641]. . . . . . .
The Secretary concluded that we must view the situation as wholly unacceptable. This did not mean that any particular course of action should be taken either immediately or in the next weeks but that all of our effort should be directed on the basis that we could not afford to have exist a Soviet satellite not contiguous to the Soviet border and in the midst of the already delicate Middle East situation. He also agreed that we should capitalize on the present alarm felt by our friends over the situation in Syria, an alarm which tends to subside over a period of time. We could not consider that time is on our side and we should be particularly careful that more violent action, especially on the part of Israel, was not precipitated.