215. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 2, 19561
SUBJECT
- The Buraimi Dispute
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Abdullah al–Khayyal of Saudi Arabia
- Mr. George V. Allen, NEA
- Mr. Donald C. Bergus, NE
- Mr. David D. Newsom, NE
The Ambassador said he had come to learn the results of the consideration of the Buraimi dispute in the talks between the President and Mr. Eden.2
Mr. Allen said the talks had included serious discussions of the Buraimi matter. The President, himself, participated and spoke strongly in expressing the hope and belief that the matter could be settled by peaceful means. He was firmly supported by the Secretary of State and Mr. Hoover.
The British were told, said Mr. Allen, that they had a heavy responsibility to find a peaceful means of settlement. He stressed that the United States emphasized its strong ties and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.
As a consequence of the talks, said Mr. Allen, the British have agreed to re–examine the situation to try again to find some means of settlement, either by direct or third party discussions. The United States, he said, did not wish to remain in the center in this matter, but would continue to do what it could, for the present, to facilitate the finding of a solution to the problem.
For the moment, then, he continued, the United States is awaiting a further urgent examination of the problem by Prime [Page 339] Minister Eden and his Cabinet. The Prime Minister, he said, returns to London on Monday.
Mr. Allen said he had no fixed opinion of what might be the result of the further British consideration. If the British arrive at a proposal which the United States feels it can appropriately pass on to Saudi Arabia, it will do so. The British were told that when Saudi Arabia asked U.S. advice on the matter the U.S. expressed to Saudi Arabia the hope that neither Security Council action nor force would be undertaken, at least, until the problem could be thoroughly examined. The United States further told the British that Saudi Arabia cannot be asked to continue to delay other action on the basis of vague hopes.
The Ambassador asked whether the United States had made any concrete proposals. Mr. Allen said various methods of settlement had been discussed. He thought it likely that the British might be willing to enter into direct discussions in order to show that some of the impressions the Saudi Arabians have of British policy are not correct. He explained that the British did not believe arbitration could be resumed because they felt the people of the area had been won away from their previous loyalties by Saudi Arabian favors.
The Ambassador asked about the evacuation of the British from the area. Mr. Allen said he believed some sort of control in the area would have to be arranged first. He posed informally the possibility of a neutral zone.
The Ambassador emphasized that Saudi Arabia had had sovereignty over the area for two hundred years. He said the British had brought the quarrel and if the British would leave the area, Saudi Arabia could make a satisfactory settlement with the Sultan of Muscat and other rulers as they had made one with Kuwait.
As he departed, the Ambassador referred back to the above discussion and said he presumed there was nothing to do but to await the answer of the British following the Cabinet consideration.3
[Here follows a brief discussion of the Arab–Israeli question and the Baghdad Pact.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2–256. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom.↩
- On February 3, the Department notified Wadsworth that it was informing the Saudi Ambassador of the results of the Eden–Eisenhower talks and instructed Wadsworth to notify the King that the Department believed it had impressed the British with the “gravity and urgency” of the Buraimi problem. The Department added that the United Kingdom was now considering its position in light of the talks. The Department concluded that while the United States appreciated the pressures on Saudi Arabia, the parties involved should be given time to work out the necessary course of action. (Telegram 370 to Jidda; ibid., 611.41/2–356) The text of the joint declaration by Eden and Eisenhower, issued in a White House press release of February 1, contained the following sentence on Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf: “We reviewed the situation in Arabia and the Persian Gulf, with particular reference to current disputes and differences in that area. We believe that these differences can be resolved through friendly discussions.” For text of the joint statement, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1956, pp. 232–233.↩
- According to Newsom, following Khayyal’s conversation with Allen, the Department learned that the Ambassador had recommended to the King that he delay submission of the Buraimi issue to the Security Council for the present. (Memorandum of conversation by Newsom, February 6; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2–656)↩