214. Memorandum of a Conversation, Cabinet Room, White House, Washington, January 31, 1956, 2:40 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- President Eisenhower
(where indicated) - Secretary Dulles
- Under Secretary Hoover
- Ambassador Aldrich
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Prochnow
- Governor Stassen
- Mr. Reuben Robertson
- Admiral Radford
- Mr. MacArthur
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Wilcox
- Mr. Allen
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Hagerty (in part)
- Mr. Goodkind
- Mr. Timmons
- Mr. Lister
- Mr. Gottman
- President Eisenhower
- UK
- Prime Minister Eden
- Foreign Secretary Lloyd
- Ambassador Makins
- Sir Harold Caccia
- Sir Leslie Rowan
- Sir Hubert Graves
- Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
- Mr. Ian Samuel
[Here follows discussion of disarmament, support costs for Allied troops in Germany, Berlin, Pakistan–Afghanistan relations, the [Page 335] long–range proving ground in the South Atlantic, the International Labor Office proposed convention on forced labor, China trade controls, and the Arab–Israeli dispute.]
Saudi Arabia and the Buraimi Problem
Mr. Lloyd noted that one of the first questions to be answered was whether the King would receive the British Ambassador. To do so at this stage might possibly mean loss of face to the Saudis, and he raised the possibility of inviting Prince Faisal to London. It might be possible in this case for him to meet the British Ambassador there.
The Under Secretary suggested that it might be useful to explore with Azzam Pasha his idea of how far the Saudis might be prepared to go. He said it would be desirable to look into all possible aspects of the problem before actual negotiations were undertaken and before a face–to–face meeting with Saudis. The Under Secretary said he felt quite certain that there was considerable room for maneuvering in this situation.
Mr. Lloyd said … that he agreed there was considerable room for maneuver with respect to the over–all problem.
The President said it appeared to be a question of contact—how to get together with the Saudis. It appears that there was not much hope of resuming arbitration, however, in view of the resignations from the arbitration tribunal. Mr. Lloyd said that perhaps as a first step the United States might suggest to the Saudis that they receive the British Ambassador.
The President said that perhaps Ambassador Wadsworth could go to the King and say, “We have talked this matter over with the British, now will you receive their Ambassador?”
The Under Secretary referred to the difficulty of sitting down and thrashing things out in the Court, in view of its medieval character.
Mr. Lloyd stated that the British had sent a friendly message to the Saudis through the Saudi representative in Bahrein. He noted, however, that this representative had not returned from Saudi Arabia to Bahrein.
The Prime Minister expressed the view that another look at the problem of access to the King should be taken.
Mr. Lloyd noted that the oil people seem to have come to believe that there was not as much oil in the area as they had at first thought.
Mr. Shuckburgh said that the British would be glad to discuss the question of providing the Saudis with means of access to ship their oil out through the Sheikhdoms.
[Page 336]The President indicated that the US Ambassador should have some ammunition to use in approaching the King on the subject.
The Prime Minister stated that what the United States representative might say to the King, with particular reference to what the United Kingdom is prepared to do, would have to be worked out.
The Under Secretary said it was important to avoid a situation where the US was placed in the position of becoming an intermediary between the British and the Saudis. This view received general agreement.
The President asked whether the key to the problem was access to the King.
The Under Secretary replied that this was definitely the case.
Mr. Lloyd expressed the view that contact should be established somehow, and repeated his earlier proposal that the British consider the possibility of having Prince Faisal come to London.
The Under Secretary said the US believed that Azzam Pasha was the only man who could get to the King for a frank discussion of the situation.
The Prime Minister said the Cabinet would have to know of the proposed courses of action discussed here, and said he would cable further word from London on his return. This would probably include the views that might be expressed in any approach to the King.
Mr. Lloyd said the British wished to prevent this problem being brought before the Security Council.
Mr. Allen pointed out that no one could tell how long it would be possible to restrain the Saudis from such action. They had agreed to hold off only until after the talks between the President and the Prime Minister.
The President said every effort should be made to restrain them. “We can point out to the Saudis that we have been discussing this problem with the British and should now be given time to work out necessary action.”
The Prime Minister said the British definitely did not want rumors with respect to this situation coming out…. They would rather risk the matter being brought before the Security Council.
Mr. Lloyd expressed the hope that if the Saudis did submit the question to the Security Council, the US and UK would work and vote together for postponement of consideration. With the USSR in the chair, delaying tactics should be worked out.
The Under Secretary expressed the thought that the only place for maneuver at the moment was probably with respect to establishment of a neutral zone. The Saudis must have some formula to permit them to save face and this might be found in establishment [Page 337] of such a zone. He did not believe it was so much a question of oil as of maintaining tribal support.
. . . . . . .
The Under Secretary referred to the two principal sources of income enjoyed by the Saudis, royalties and advances. There was some misconception, he said, that the oil company was responsible for cash advances. However, the Saudis obtain bank loans on the basis of royalties due them in subsequent months… .
. . . . . . .
The Under Secretary expressed the view that the only way to achieve satisfactory progress on this problem was to “get close to the Saudis”. He thought improved relationship between the US and UK on the one hand and the Saudis on the other would lead to settlement of other questions.
The Prime Minister asked whether Israel would not raise strong objections to the sale of arms to the Saudis.
The Secretary replied that he thought the Israelis would not register strong objections. He pointed out that in connection with the provision of the sale of arms to any country, the US obtained a guarantee that they will not be transferred to another country without our consent, and the Saudis themselves could not utilize great quantities of arms.
The President said that the Saudis would probably act quickly to spend considerable sums on arms if made available. He pointed out that the use of arms was limited to the supply of ammunition and spare parts. Perhaps the Saudis should be allowed to obtain limited arms and then be urged to start a program of public works.
Ambassador Aldrich noted that Mr. Follis, the President of the Standard Oil Company of California, had told him that the Saudis were fearful of Egyptian activities and intentions in the area.
The Under Secretary suggested that trouble might be aroused between the Saudis and Egyptians apart.
The Prime Minister said he thought this aspect was worth looking into.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted on February 7 but no other drafting information is given on the source text. The record of the President’s Daily Appointments, 1956, indicates that the President did not join the meeting until 3:52 p.m. The Daily Appointment Record also indicates that Gordon Gray and Carl W. McCardle were also present at this time. (Ibid.) According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need–to–know basis.↩