Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

140. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, July 31, 1957.

RATIONS PLAN FOR THE LEBANON (NSC 5428)²

Introduction

A. References:

1. “U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East”, approved by the President, July 23, 1954.

2. “Basic National Security Policy”, NSC 5707/8, approved by the President, June 3, 1957.³

B. U.S. Objectives Regarding the Near East are:

3. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

4. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

5. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

6. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

7. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

8. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally.

C. Special Operating Guidance:

U.S. programs in The Lebanon are carried out by State, ICA, USIA and Defense, the latter through Military Attachés. In pursuing the policy objectives set forth above, U.S. actions in The Lebanon should be guided by the following:

9. The U.S. should support The Lebanon in its efforts to preserve its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity whether against aggression from without or subversion from within. U.S. programs and actions should be designed to strengthen the Lebanese Government’s capacities for resisting aggression and subversion by increasing the strength, efficiency and loyalty of the Lebanese armed forces and internal security forces; to encourage the will to resist aggression and subversion on the part of those elements already so inclined by evidencing full and continuous support for Lebanese independence; and to stimulate in the minds of Lebanese in general an awareness that the maintenance of a free and independent Lebanon is the best possible guarantee for the eventual satisfaction of their political, social and economic aspirations.

10. U.S. programs should likewise be designed to demonstrate concretely and conclusively that a free and independent Lebanon and its people stand to gain most in political, social and economic terms by maintaining and broadening the traditional ties and inter-dependencies which have characterized Lebanese relations in the past with the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Efforts along these lines at the moment should be directed particularly toward the Moslem population which has been more responsive to frequently irresponsible and emotional ideas emanating from within the Arab world than to those originating in the West. In pursuing such efforts, the U.S. should avoid any action which might contribute to a deepening or solidifying of existing religious differences and should demonstrate publicly scrupulous respect for Lebanese independence and sovereignty.

11. Of equal importance, the full weight of U.S. influence should be brought to bear on the Lebanese Government to induce it to undertake or continue programs which are responsive to the needs and hopes of the Lebanese people. Such programs, with U.S. assistance where appropriate, must eventually produce tangible economic and social benefits if the Lebanese Government is to receive the wholehearted and broadly-based public support which is essential to the continued existence of The Lebanon as a stable, prosperous and independent state.

12. While the influence of any Lebanese Government on important Middle Eastern issues is necessarily limited by The Lebanon’s small size, limited military potential and non-Moslems of approximately 50 percent, the Lebanese Government should be encouraged to continue to exercize a moderating influence in meetings of the Arab powers and, through personal diplomacy on the part of its leaders, with other Arab world leaders.

13. While U.S. actions in The Lebanon will be important for the effect they will have in The Lebanon itself, they may in the long run have an equally important effect area-wide. Effective implementation of U.S. programs could make of The Lebanon an example of U.S.-Arab cooperation, the tangible benefits of which could be expected in the long run to stimulate more favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and U.S. policies elsewhere in the Arab world. Specifically, it should be possible to demonstrate through our programs in The Lebanon that an Arab country without any infringement of its sovereignty or limitation on its freedom of action as an independent state can collaborate with the U.S. to achieve security and to advance the well-being of its people.

D. Selected U.S. Arrangements With or Pertaining to The Lebanon:

14. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees:

a. The United States, by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The resolution declared that the U.S. is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, whenever a victim requests such aid.

15. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services:

a. Ambassador Richards informed the Lebanese Government on March 16, 1957 as follows:

(1) The U.S. would provide grant economic assistance, up to $10 million, for imports of commodities such as reinforcing steel, copper wire, asphalt, pipes, pumps and transformers which are needed in the Lebanon’s development program. The Government of The Lebanon in turn agreed to deposit the equivalent of $10 million in Lebanese pounds in a special counterpart account to be used in construction of mutually agreed upon development programs such as low cost housing, highway construction, irrigation, flood control, rural electrification, village water supply and airport expansion.

(2) The U.S. would provide defensive military assistance consisting of anti-tank weapons, light artillery, motor transport, engineering equipment, demolition equipment, fortification material and electronic equipment amounting to approximately $2.2 million.

b. The Lebanese Government was informed in February 1957 that the U.S. would provide on a grant basis signal corps and engineer equipment for use by the Lebanese armed forces amounting to approximately $1.6 million.

c. For FY 1957 the U.S. is committed to a Technical Cooperation program in The Lebanon amounting to slightly more than two million dollars, and a $10 million development assistance program as described in a (1) above.

16. Other Arrangements:

a. Technical Cooperation Agreement—1952.⁴

b. Military Assistance Agreement for cash sales—1953.⁵

c. Developmental Assistance Agreement—1954.⁶

d. Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy—1955.⁷

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

[Here follow individual action items in the political, economic, military, and information and cultural areas.]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East, January–July 1957. Secret. A covering note by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant to the OCB, indicates that this operations plan, a revised version of the plan dated July 12, was concurred in by the OCB at its July 31 meeting, for implementation by the responsible agencies of the actions and programs contained therein. The previous (July 12) draft was authorized for destruction.
2. For text of NSC 5428, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.
3. Scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.
4. For text of this agreement, which entered into force on January 5, 1952, see TIAS No. 2639 printed in 3 UST (pt. 4) 4751.
5. For text, see TIAS No. 3147 printed in 5 UST (pt. 3) 2908.
6. For text, see TIAS No. 3009 printed in 5 UST (pt. 2) 1392.
7. For text, see TIAS No. 3313 printed in 6 UST (pt. 2) 2653.