Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

451. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957¹

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

• Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

VII. BAGHDAD PACT

[Here follows the same list of participants as Document 445.]

Although time had about run out, the Secretary stated that he wished to add a few words to what the President had discussed with the Prince earlier in the day on the subject of our general relationship to the Baghdad Pact.

We are very sympathetic to the Pact. It represents in part a development of a policy which the Secretary had initiated after his return from the Middle East in 1953. We have been concerned over divisive elements within the Pact. The actions of some Pact members, not Iraq, could be so interpreted. We had again indicated in November our strong support of the Pact.² We have joined its Economic and Counter Subversion Committees. When Congress acts on the President’s proposal,³ we hope to be able to go much further in our participation in the Pact’s Military Committee, as well as in all activities of the Pact directed against communism.

We do not wish to become involved in anything that might hurt our friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. We hope that the Saudi attitude toward the Pact may change. When we are convinced that United States adherence to the Pact may have a solidifying influence in the area rather than a divisive one, we are prepared to reconsider the matter of adherence. In the meantime, we propose to give increasing support to Pact activities.

The Prince opined that if the United States had joined the Pact at the outset, much of the opposition to it would never have developed. The Secretary merely stated that developments had moved so fast that we could not be certain.

Dr. Jamali thought we should join the Baghdad Pact and develop thereby a single belt, consisting of NATO, the Pact and SEATO, to contain Communism.

Mr. Rountree observed that the President had stated earlier that we were perhaps not always fully accurate in our assessment of the Middle East situation. We could claim, however, that one assessment was entirely valid, viz: the importance of bringing unity to the Middle East rather than fostering divisions.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.
2. On November 29, 1956, the United States issued a statement reaffirming its support of the collective efforts of the Baghdad Pact nations to maintain their independence. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 10, 1956, p. 918.
3. On January 5, President Eisenhower submitted a resolution for economic and military cooperation with the nations of the Middle East (House Joint Resolution 117, Senate Joint Resolution 19). See Documents 183 ff.