Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

444. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, February 5, 1957¹

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

• Discussion of Middle East Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Iraq
  • His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdul Ilah
  • Ambassador Al-Shabandar
• United States
  • The President
  • Assistant Secretary William M. Rountree

The President expressed his pleasure that the Crown Prince’s visit was taking place at a time when the American Government and people were thinking so much about the problems of the Middle East. He commented that his talks with King Saud had been very good.² He felt that King Saud really wanted to cooperate with the West.

The Prince agreed that the King’s attitude was favorable, but said he was concerned that there were so many bad influences in his entourage.

The President commented that the Syrian situation disturbed him more than most others in the area. He realized that Turkey and Iraq, for example, felt that the situation in Syria posed a danger for them. Also, he observed, Egypt and Yemen had given some indication of their willingness to play with the Soviets. They seemed to believe that they could do this without danger to themselves, and that belief was hard to combat. The President was amazed that the leaders of those countries seemed to think that they could let the communists come and go without seriously jeopardizing their security.

The Prince recalled that in 1938 and 1939, when the United States interest in the Middle East was not as great as now, the Nazis had concentrated upon propaganda and interference in the area. The good elements were strongly backing the democratic system. The Prince and others had urged that the British do more to provide propaganda and material assistance to put the countries in a position to fight for what they thought was right. However, although the British wanted them to be on their side they provided no arms, and other necessary help. This, the Prince said, should not be repeated in the present critical situation. Through propaganda and material assistance the public must be persuaded to line up with the Western world.

The President said the question was not so simple. Theoretically it might be possible to give as many arms as a population could operate, but that would break a country’s economy. The job was to find out what each country could be expected to support in the long run. The present threat may go on for as long as thirty years. The impact of a military program must therefore be viewed in the long-term context. Also, he said, the United States could not be expected to take on the job of arming countries throughout the world and maintaining a high level of arms for years to come.

The Prince said he was interested in arms, but also in the development of his country’s economy. Economic progress must be made. The situation cannot be met merely by putting people in jail. Some might have to be jailed, but the masses will have to be persuaded that the policies being pursued are the correct ones.

The President said he was not referring particularly to Iraq, but many countries, in their enthusiasm to become well armed, endeavor to acquire too many arms. He felt, of course, that every nation should have an ample force for its particular purposes; that was one reason why we had gone to Congress to obtain greater flexibility in assisting countries in the area which wished to maintain their independence. Another and important reason was to bring the problems of the Middle East before the American people so that they would back up what we were trying to do.

The Prince hoped that too much would not be given to those countries which were not friendly to the West; otherwise it would be difficult to demonstrate to the true friends of the West the benefits of that friendship.

The President agreed. He observed that one point not generally recognized was that when countries acquired large quantities of arms from another nation, they thereby assumed a dependence upon the supplier for spare parts and replacements unless they had the capability of producing the equipment themselves.

The Prince, reverting to the situation in Syria, said the Government had gone so far to the left that it had permitted the development of a “base” in North Syria. This had been most disturbing to the Iraqi Government. He said the whole territory surrounding the base had been proclaimed a military area, as had the Port of Lattaquie, and travel to it was prohibited.

The President said this was quite disturbing. He would find out what we knew of the situation and would let the Prince know. It was important to find out who our friends were. We hoped that Iraq and Saudi Arabia, both friendly to the United States and to the West, would be able to get together.

The Prince responded that there were no ill feelings between the two countries. Difficulties had been created, however, by others who were trying to cause trouble. The Syrians and Egyptians were opposed to close relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The President expressed the hope that improved relations between those two countries would help to keep down Syrian influences. Eventually the situation in Syria might change to our advantage.

The Prince commented that the Syrian people were all right, but that a small number of Syrian leaders were communist and were exploiting the situation to their advantage. They were making the most of the Israeli question to get a solid foothold in Syria.

The President said that one of the great problems was to find a solution to the Israeli question. This was difficult in the highly emotional state now existing in the area. He said the Secretary of State had been extremely patient and had worked hard in this connection. The Secretary had by no means given up hope. He had the complete confidence of the President. Not twice in his term of office had the President disagreed with the Secretary on major political questions. He was a very wise man. The President hoped that before this year was out the Middle Eastern situation would look better. Once the resolution being sought in Congress was passed, we could move forward with bilateral talks with the countries of the area and find out what their needs were—technical assistance, financial aid, arms, etc. He expected that we would be able to work out schemes to inspire hope among the peoples of the area, and with greater hope the situation would improve.

The Prince said that during the meeting in Ankara of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact,³ they had asked him to urge the President to adhere to the Pact. They thought that if the United States did not do so the Pact would be of no importance. The British position in the Middle East had been destroyed and the Pact badly needed a big power as a member if it were to be an effective arrangement.

The President said he was aware of the attitude of the members of the Pact. He had of course given the matter continuous thought. However, we believed it important that someone, who was a friend of all the nations in the area, be available to work toward bringing the region as a whole together. This was important to preserve the political independence of the nations and to provide an economic base for their operation. The Israeli problem was more critical in the short-term than the Soviet threat. While the latter in the long-term loomed much larger, the Israeli question served to keep many of the nations of the area apart. We supported the Baghdad Pact but wanted to keep on a basis with, say, Saudi Arabia which would retain them on our side. We were anxious not to take a step which would serve to divide the area, because until it is brought together we could not find permanent solutions to the problems.

The Prince thought we could not get together with the present regimes in Syria and Egypt since both were committed so fully against the Baghdad Pact and against cooperation with nations outspokenly in favor of free world association. The President agreed that the Syrian situation looked bad in terms of the present regime, but wondered if the Egyptian were quite so hopeless. He thought there might be some better prospect for improvement there.

The Prince reported that the Turks and Pakistanis thought that if the United States had joined the Baghdad Pact in the beginning, Syria and Egypt would not have attacked it as much as they did. Opposition in the early days would have placed them in a position of appearing to be pro-communist.

The President responded that he would be the last to claim that we had always made perfect guesses. He could, however, claim that the objective which we have had, of endeavoring to bring the countries of the area together to maintain their independence and security, was a proper one. If the area were divided, it could not be strong and stable. If it were strong and free the United States would have all that it sought. In those circumstances we could maintain our mutually beneficial trade, participate in the development of oil resources, etc, and in doing this we would seek no special benefits. He thought that that, in the long run, was what our objective must be, and felt that our joining the Baghdad Pact would have impaired that objective. For example, he said, the British wanted us to join the Baghdad Pact and were themselves a member; but they were involved in disputes with Saudi Arabia.

The Prince asked, if the United States could not join the Baghdad Pact, whether it might join the military committee. Mr. Rountree recalled that in supporting the Baghdad Pact, we had also joined the economic committee and the counter-subversive committee and provided liaison with the military committee; however, actual membership in the military committee had presented a problem as between members and a non-member. This was a matter which was under continuing review.

The President observed again that Syria at the moment was a serious obstacle to our effort to bring the area together. However, if the present regime in Syria did not truly represent the will of the people, it probably would not stand.

The Prince said the big question related to the building of a communist base there. There were recent reports of a substantial number of Soviet officers and men having arrived in Syria. His inference was that it might soon be too late to contemplate a change of government in Syria responsive to the will of the people. The Ambassador said that the present Syrian behavior made it appear that they felt very strong and confident. A short while ago they would not have dared blow up the IPC pipelines because they would be fearful of the Iraqi reaction.⁴ Currently they were poisoning local sentiment in Iraq through their propaganda against the Baghdad Pact and against the Iraqi regime.

The President was disturbed to learn of the strength of the Syrian propaganda. He wondered if something should not be done to counteract it. Mr. Rountree said that the members of the Baghdad Pact were doing something along these lines through the Pact committees, and that independently programs were underway in several countries. The question of informational activities might be one which could very usefully be discussed at greater length with the Prince and our other Iraqi friends.

The President repeated that he was very glad that the Prince had come at this time. The President had been giving much thought to the problems which they had discussed. In fact, if he could do so he would be glad to go to the Middle East and discuss these matters directly with the Government. Unfortunately that was not possible. Thus, since we needed the clearest possible picture of the facts and of the views of the people of the area, such visits as that of the Prince were of great benefit to us. He referred to Mr. Nehru’s visit and said the latter thought that Egypt was not as bad as we believed it to be. He considered the Egyptians emotional and strongly anti-British, but had observed that Nasser could have gone much further than he did and still be supported by his own people. On the other hand, the President had thought that the policies of Nasser had been extremely harmful. For example, the Fedayeen activities in other countries, including even other Arab states, had caused great difficulty. The Prince agreed that the Egyptian Fedayeen operations had been shocking and said that they had been carried out in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia and elsewhere, as well as in Israel.

The President concluded by saying that he was pleased that the Prince would be meeting with the Secretary of State and other officials to go into these matters in greater detail.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.
2. See supra.
3. The four Muslim member states of the Baghdad Pact met in Ankara on January 19.
4. On November 3, 1956, the Iraq Petroleum Company’s oil pipeline through Syria was damaged, and the flow of oil stopped. For documentation on the subject, see vol. XIII, pp. 594 ff.