Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

433. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, March 28, 1956—2 p.m.

1007. Eyes only Acting Secretary. My comments on Department’s niact 753, March 27,² follow:

1. As reported in Embassy’s 692, January 15,³ opposition to Nuri greater this year than it was last. I feel, neverthess, that today Nuri still retains control of country and that police and army are loyal to him. While some Iraqi political leaders would like to see Nuri leave now, others, even though they feel he has overstayed his usefulness as Prime Minister, maintain that he should not retire in face Egyptian pressure. Significance Nuri’s bout with ex-Prime Ministers mentioned by Lloyd should not be overstressed. Meeting was of nature he frequently holds to brief ex-Prime Ministers, and was called specifically to hear report on Hussain–Faisal talks. Those who requested he resign are those who have been opposing him for past eight months or more. Meeting reported in Embassy’s despatch 765, March 24,⁴ which has already been air pouched to Department.

2. While present likelihood forcing Nuri out is not great, unless situation in Jordan gets out of hand, possibility his resigning of his own volition cannot be discounted. He has used this political tactic in past to meet mounting criticism and to demonstrate that no successor can hope succeed without his support. Some of his closest advisers have lately again advised him adopt this tactic.

3. Nuri’s departure would be most unfortunate from point of view Western objectives, but I feel that consequences as expressed by Lloyd are somewhat overstated. If Nuri leaves now, it is quite likely his successor will be pro-Western too. I doubt, therefore, that our joint oil interests in Iraq would at once be as seriously threatened as British seem to suggest. I agree, however, that Nuri’s departure may very well have deleterious effect on Baghdad Pact.

No successor, even though pro-Western in outlook, would I feel show as keen interest as Nuri has in pact. If someone like Jabr were to come in, for example, price he likely demand for continued Iraqi active interest in Baghdad Pact might well be pro-Arab settlement of Arab-Israeli issue. If this price too high, we might find ourselves no longer as welcome as a prospective member of the Pact as now.

Nor should we overlook fact that any successor governments are likely have only limited tenure in office. Pattern of Iraqi governments in past has been five to six months. Such constant turnover of governments, even if every one of them pro-Western, must inevitably retard Iraqi role in pact. With Baghdad as operational center of pact, any suggestion that GOI lukewarm or hesitant on pact matters will almost certainly affect other member governments as well.

4. I agree fully that if Jordan lost, reaction within Iraq likely be strong. Its loss could topple Nuri government and would probably result in shifting of emphasis in Iraqi foreign policy from northern tier defense to frantic effort rehabilitation within Arab world. We should not overlook strong pull of Arabism on Iraq and dangers which any threatened Iraqi isolation from Arab circles likely have upon long term Iraqi cooperation in achieving US–UK objectives.

5. I have most recently emphasized importance of pact, as I see it, in final paragraph Embassy’s telegram 933, March 13.⁵ Since possibility persuading other Arab governments join pact seems out of question at present time, only feasible alternative, it seems to me, is to strengthen pact by our immediate adherence. We could refer to groundwork which has already been laid and point out that real work can now begin at forthcoming Tehran meetings. Our adherence at this time is bound to bolster position of Nuri government and assist it in continuing concentrate on objectives of pact. It would give much needed increased momentum to Baghdad Pact planning. It would, obviously, have heartening effect in Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.

Gallman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/3–2856. Top Secret; Niact.
2. Telegram 753 repeated the text of telegram 4228 from London, March 26, which contained a report of British concerns about the current Middle Eastern situation. In the sections that dealt with Iraq, it noted the British concern over a report of a meeting of “elder Iraqi statesmen” in Iraq during which Nuri Said’s position was challenged, suggesting to the British that the Prime Minister’s control of Iraq was precarious. [4 lines of text not declassified] (Ibid., 674.84A/3–2656)
3. Document 429.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.13/3–2456)
5. In telegram 933, Gallman told the Department, among other things, that the if the United States or the United Kingdom appeared to be uncertain in support of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq would be unlikely to stand firm. “We should also be fully alive,” Gallman added, “to the fact that if pact breaks up because of this or any similar reason involving lukewarm support on part of Western states possibility reviving something comparable in area is likely be slim for a long time to come.” (“Ibid.,” 780.5/3–1356)