428. Editorial Note
Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Prime Minister Nuri and other Iraqi military and political officials December 20–21, during a trip through the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far Fast. In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, February 13, 1956, Radford covered the highlights of this trip. In the section of the memorandum concerning with Iraq, Radford described these meetings:
“On my first evening in Iraq, I met with His Excellency Nuri As-Said, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Iraq. My subsequent meetings with Iraqi military and political leaders simply amplified what Prime Minister Nuri discussed with me at this initial meeting. In his meeting with me the Prime Minister particularly stressed two points. First, it was essential that Iraq know in advance what the U.S. aid program was to include for several years in advance (at least three) in order that the Iraqi could properly plan and implement their own budgetary and training efforts so as to dovetail them with the aid program. Second, it was highly desirable that the U.S. join the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible.
“In connection with the need for long-term planning of our aid program, Nuri pointed out that the Iraqi budget was neither large enough nor flexible enough to undertake sizeable projects to be ready to utilize U.S. aid matériel which did not arrive on schedule. He said that the principal problem of the Iraqi in connection with our aid program was not concerned so much with the total amount of the program, but with the lack of a definite timetable to which Iraqi planning could be tied.
“In discussing the desirability of the U.S. joining the Baghdad Pact, Nuri said that Iraq was in disfavor in the Arab world for having been the first and only Arab state to join the Pact. He felt that Iraq was on trial before the Arab world for having taken this step, and that the Arab world in general felt that the Pact was nothing more than a ‘soap bubble organization.’ U.S. adherence to the Pact would give it strength and substance, and would do much to answer the Arab nation critics.
“In Iraq I also met with His Majesty King Faisal II and with the Crown Prince Abdul Ilah. No matters of substance were discussed at either meeting. Certainly nothing in these meetings tended to invalidate the impression Ambassador Gallman had given me that King Faisal II was a nice youngster, but had as yet no real ability to govern his country, nor even a good understanding of the problems with which Iraq is faced.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5890/ 2–1356)
In a message of December 24, 1955, MAAG Chief Colonel Hannah gave a more detailed account of Radford’s December 21 meetings with the Iraqi General Staff. According to Hannah, the Iraqis briefed Radford on their defense plans for the Zagros Mountain passes and their 5-year reorganization plan for the Iraqi Army. They also reportedly stressed the delay in MDAP shipments, and other questions [Page 988] of specific aid requirements. Hannah stated that Radford indicated he would look into the delays in shipments in the approved military aid program, particularly the offshore procurement items. (National Archives and Records Administration JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) Sec. 21) In telegram 616 from Baghdad, December 21, Ambassador Gallman reported a conversation on a similar subject with General Rafiq Arif, Iraqi Chief of Staff, during which Arif raised questions about the inadequate delivery of military assistance items to Iraq. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/12–2155)