426. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State1
547. Eyes only for Assistant Secretary Allen. Reply your letter of October 282 being pouched November 30.3 Summary requested your telegram 402 November 284 follows:
Study of your letter indicates USAF wants combination of transit rights and base rights. Transit rights desired by USAF appear to include: (1) right of transit for military aircraft in peace-time and (2) right to base aircraft limited periods peace-time to meet ordinary maintenance needs. Base rights seem to require (1) right to base aircraft for short periods in peace-time in case of emergencies and (2) transit rights for strategic aircraft during hostilities.
Under existing circumstances do not think USAF could obtain any rights from Iraqi greater than those enjoyed by British or at lesser price. British rights are specified in special Anglo-Iraqi agreement April 4, 1955 and supplementary documents:5 (1) staging and overflying facilities in each other’s territory; (2) RAF flying units in Habbaniya and Shaiba to be withdrawn progressively and completely within 1 [Page 978] year; (3) existing procedures and facilities for RAF to overfly, land, refuel and be serviced in Iraq to be continued with reciprocity in UK and dependent territories.
British payments for above rights specified in special Anglo-Iraqi agreement include certain service and training facilities by UK to RIAF representing outgrowth of defense relationship between UK and Iraq. Real quid-pro-quo given by British embodied in articles 1 and 8 of special agreement. Former commits 2 contracting governments to “cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with pact of mutual cooperation”. Latter commits UK at request of Iraq to make available armed forces to defend Iraq against armed attack. Obviously provision of UK armed forces would probably include RAF units.
Right of transit for military aircraft in peace-time desired by USAF is similar that enjoyed by British. Right to base aircraft for short periods in peace-time for necessary maintenance might logically be construed to come within scope British rights. But British accord reciprocity which we have no indication USAF prepared to do. While perhaps more nominal than real reciprocity, clause is politically important to make arrangement palatable to Iraq public.
Base rights apparently desired by USAF raise question of Iraq internal politics. In light of attempts by successive Iraqi Governments to remove British troops from Iraqi bases Iraqis would not welcome granting US base rights in peace-time. While it is conceivable Iraqis would invite USAF use Iraqi airfields in certain emergencies or in event of hostilities involving Iraq this is far cry from granting USAF base rights in advance.
In brief we believe “transit rights” (which we should probably call “transit privileges”) could conceivably be obtained from GOI provided we are willing to pay price. “Base rights” could probably not be obtained in peace-time.
Necessary quid-pro-quo for USAF obtain transit rights previously defined would not be provided by available type US aid for Iraqi air force. Offer of US aid on cash reimbursable basis provided British agree might prove useful preliminary to request for transit rights. Principal price GOI likely to ask in exchange for USAF transit rights as in case of British is active US participation in defense of Iraq. Iraqis would like most of all see early US adherence Baghdad Pact. Should we adhere Iraqis would doubtless make available same overflying and staging rights enjoyed by British. If adherence is not possible Iraqis may accept bilateral defense arrangement calling for US assistance in event of attack upon Iraq. We do not believe we can obtain useful USAF transit rights for anything less.
Re timing any approach to Iraqis, should be in 2 phases: (1) preliminary offer supply aid for RIAF on cash reimbursable basis and (2) request transit rights for USAF aircraft in peace-time together with [Page 979] indication of what we may be willing to pay. From latter, question should emerge of basing aircraft for short periods in emergencies or longer periods in hostilities.
In recent conversation in which Prime Minister voiced concern over Saudi Arabian intrigue in Syria Nuri said “remember if you ever have any trouble with the Saudis over your base at Dhahran you can always use Habbaniya”. He quickly added this proviso: “Join the Baghdad Pact and Habbaniya is open to you”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5411/11–2955. Secret.↩
- Assistant Secretary Allen’s letter of October 28 to Ambassador Gallman notified Gallman of the U.S. Air Force’s informal indication of a desire for base rights in Iraq similar to the rights enjoyed when the British controlled the bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, before the Anglo-Iraqi agreement of April 4, 1955. Allen informed Gallman that the United States was “not likely to be in a position to offer the Iraqis any substantial quid pro quo for such rights in addition to grant military aid already programmed for the ground forces,” in part because the United States still considered the policies set forth in the February 26, 1954, Memorandum of Understanding with the United Kingdom to be in force. Allen requested Gallman’s comments on the nature and timing of an approach to the Iraqis for such rights. (Ibid., NEA Files: Lot 58 D 332, Iraq–1955–Baghdad Embassy Administration)↩
- Gallman’s letter to Allen, November 28, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 402, Allen requested a summary of Gallman’s reply to Allen’s October 28 letter for the Secretary of the Air Force. (Ibid., Central Files, 787.5411/11–1955)↩
- The Anglo-Iraqi agreement of April 4, 1955, is printed in 233 UNTS 218.↩