162. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Middle East
I have initialed a document prepared in NEA2 describing a plan for the Middle East which would include what might be called a charter of relations between the Middle East and the West. I have initialed this document with two reservations: (1) I would prefer for us to move forward in the Middle East by joining the Baghdad Pact and by endeavoring at the same time to strengthen our relations with those Arab countries which show a sincere willingness to have close relations with us. (2) In case our decision not to join the Baghdad Pact is firm, we might try out the plan proposed. My reservation is that it will [Page 388] probably be extremely difficult to succeed in carrying out the plan and that we should engage in considerable exploratory work before embarking upon it.
Baghdad Pact
I realize that the Baghdad Pact is in a feeble condition. It is being attacked by Moscow, the anti-West Arabs, and by the neutralists led by Nehru. One of its weaknesses is that is has the reputation of being a British instrument. It will continue to have that reputation unless we join it and begin to play a more vigorous role with regard to it. I do not think that we should be unduly worried merely because the British are in it. We must at some time or other have a rapprochement with the British in the Middle East. I believe it would be short-sighted of us to proceed on the basis that the British are “done for” in the Middle East. If, for instance, the United Kingdom should make a sharp change in British attitude with regard to the Middle East, a change comparable to that made in India in 1946, I believe that in a short time we would see British prestige and strength improve in that area. It would be unfortunate if the British should reappear in the Middle East full of bitterness stemming from the fact that when they seemed to be down and out in that area we treated them as pariahs and did nothing to help them again to become respectable.
We have a reputation, which I believe is unearned, in the Middle East of lack of stability in our relations with that area. We are said to grow hot and cold, to be uncertain of ourselves, to take certain positions for a time only to abandon them, leaving those who are supporting us out on a limb. There is now a feeling among the supporters of the Baghdad Pact that we may be about to leave them out on such a limb.
Take Iran for example. For years we have been endeavoring to persuade the Iranians that it would be impossible for Iran to continue as an independent state if it should try to play the role of a neutral as between the free world and the Soviet bloc. In 1955 we actually brought pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. At the last moment, however, when Iran had already decided to join the Pact, we suddenly drew back and advised the Iranian Government that it must follow its best judgment. Iran, therefore, joined the Pact somewhat puzzled as to what our real feelings were with respect to the Pact.
Last spring when I attended the Baghdad Pact Conference in Tehran, I pledged the support of the United States for the Pact. We agreed to participate in most activities of the Pact but not to join it. I believe that our position of giving support to the Baghdad Pact, while hesitating to join it, creates a lack of respect for us among both the supporters and the enemies of the Pact. It seems to me that we would be in a stronger position if we should go forward firmly and join the [Page 389] Baghdad Pact; if we should give more generous support to the nations which are members of the Baghdad Pact; and if we should treat them frankly as allies. We should, of course, not act in a provocative manner. We should, for instance, make it clear that we have no intention in time of peace of installing military bases in Iran. We should stress that our membership in the Pact does not mean that in the future we shall not continue to take a position with regard to disputes in the area on the basis of merit.
I believe that before joining the Baghdad Pact we should send a special emissary to Ibn Saud explaining why we are doing so and we should do our utmost to persuade Saudi Arabia to join with us. We should do likewise with regard to Lebanon. It might also be helpful for us to notify Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in advance of our intentions and to point out that we hope eventually they will join the Pact. We should also inform the governments of North Africa of our reasons for joining the Pact and elicit their support.
I realize that we must take the Senate into consideration. The leaders in both Houses should be consulted in advance. If we can convince them of the desirability of our adhering to the Pact, we should join and put our adherence up to the Senate for ratification.
If we are to act we should do so quickly. It might even be possible for the President to prepare Mr. Nehru for such action when the latter visits Washington. He might tell Nehru that we are considering adherence, and that our decision to join would not mean that we are taking sides with Pakistan against India or that we are trying to form a Moslem bloc which could be injurious to the interests of India. It might be made clear to Nehru that this Pact in our opinion gives the best promise of stability in the Middle East and that without stability the situation in the Middle East is certain to degenerate further with consequent bad effects upon India itself.
The question will, of course, arise with regard to how our adherence would be received by Israel and the supporters of Israel. It seems to me that simultaneously with our joining the Pact, we should make an all-out determined effort to bring about a settlement of the Israel problem. I believe NEA has some recommendations in this regard. I assume that the President will endeavor to obtain the support of Nehru in connection with our efforts to find a solution of this dangerous dispute.
- Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Baghdad Pact, 1956. Secret.↩
- Document 160.↩