Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, November 20, 1956—9:16 p.m.

872. Baghdad Pact. Re Baghdad 890.² FYI Although Dept appreciates anxiety BP Prime Ministers which led to electing Iraqi Crown Prince come to Washington to present plea of four govts for early US adherence to BP, Dept doubts wisdom of visit at this time. Dept and NSC Planning Board now giving question US adherence BP intensive study. From discussions and review to date it seems highly unlikely Dept will recommend US adherence BP in immediate future. This of course does not eliminate possibility US adherence later. Consequently it seems inadvisable for Crown Prince to make what would probably be utterly unproductive visit to US particularly since failure of mission would greatly exacerbate situation. It would therefore appear far wiser for Abdulla Illah to defer trip.

Following among principal reasons which Dept considers militate against early US adherence BP:

1. US has given full support UN effort stabilize delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from British French and Israeli military action. Any change in current US relationship with powers in area might seriously jeopardize these efforts. US joining Pact in which British a partner would pose especially difficult problem this regard.

2. US adherence might be taken as pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against West and Pact powers in NE particularly if there any speculation that next stop would be establishment US bases in Iran.

3. In framing policy US must consider that throughout NE uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to Pact and are being threatened from within by Soviet exploitation of British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve US more directly in Hashemite-Saudi Arabia where US has special interests.

4. While public support remains strong for BP in Turkey and Iran, Anglo-French action in Egypt has weakened public support for Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. A serious doubt remains re advisability of adhering to Pact which has lost strong measure of support in two of its important members. Should US adhere and Pact continue disintegrate, US prestige would suffer severe blow and other security arrangements in which US involved might suffer.

5. While US might gain some psychological benefit from adherence this step might well be followed by strong demands for further US aid to member countries on ground that as member we should demonstrate even more dramatically our material support for these nations.

6. Original US concept of “Northern Tier” was one of an indigenous organization. BP unfortunately has been regarded by non-member states of area as Western-inspired and in large part UK-dominated. There is no doubt therefore whether US adherence would alter prevailing view and muster for Pact the necessary additional membership and widespread public support necessary to make it effective instrument for furtherance US objectives in area.

7. US might strengthen security of BP countries through its present membership BP Economic Committee and through bilateral military and economic programs without risking serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to Pact itself.

8. Problem of obtaining Senate ratification US adherence BP particularly without concurrently extending security guarantee to Israel is still with us. Recent developments in NE have eased problem but we have no evidence that Congress would be amenable our adherence BP.

While question US adherence being reviewed Washington, Dept studying ways in which it can best express support for continued cooperation BP nations. You will be kept informed of progress planning on this aspect. End FYI.

In discussing with Crown Prince and other appropriate officials proposed mission to Washington, you should state your frank opinion that visit would involve grave risk of consequences detrimental to Pact and to mutual objectives of members and US. Early adherence by US unlikely for several reasons, none of which connote any lack interest in Pact, and abortive effort persuade US to join would be seized by enemies of Pact to endeavor seriously to embarrass present members. Prince’s own position domestically would suffer if he should return with no tangible results. If he nevertheless insists on coming, USG would be happy to receive him.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2056. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rountree and Memminger and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.
2. Telegram 890, November 20, reported that the leaders of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, who were then meeting in Baghdad, had decided to send Iraqi Crown Prince Abdul Ilah to the United States to present a plea for early U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. (Ibid., 780.5/11–2056)