144. Memorandum by the Secretary of State1
I still have grave reservations as to the desirability of the United States joining the Baghdad Pact. I continue to feel that it is largely an instrument of U.K.-Arab politics; that under the Pact the British are trying to use Iraq to advance their interests in the Middle East and that the Pact thereby becomes confused with Iraq’s violently anti-Israel attitude and also Iraq’s ambitions vis-à-vis Syria, Jordan and Saudia Arabia. Furthermore, the status of the Pact seems peculiarly obscure at [Page 331] the moment as I understand that the Moslem countries have agreed not to meet, at least for the time being, with the United Kingdom because of their resentment at the United Kingdom attack on Egypt in collusion with that of Israel.
I believe that for the United States to enter a pact which guarantees the frontiers of Iraq would lead to irresistible pressure for a similar guarantee of Israel, and that this, if it came, would greatly embarrass us in our Arab relations.
I see advantages in a United States commitment to the “northern tier” concept. This, it seems to me, could be accomplished by Iran joining SEATO. Then there would be a solid United States guaranteed line from Turkey to Pakistan. Iraq would be protected because it does not itself directly abut on the Soviet Union. Thus Iraq would get automatic protection against invasion from the Soviet Union and we would stay clear of Arab and Israeli politics now incident to Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact.
If for any reason we would decide to back Iraq, we could do so on an ad hoc basis.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1756. Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and sent under cover of a letter of November 17 from Murphy to Radford that reads as follows: “Confirming our telephone conversation this morning, I attach for your personal information a copy of the Secretary’s comments of November 16, 1956, regarding the Baghdad Pact.” (Ibid., 780.5/11–1756)↩