Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

163. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 1, 1955—11 p.m.

4988. Department’s telegram to Saigon 4826, Paris 3888, London 5597.²

1. At 1337 May 1 I called on Ely to deliver message contained reference telegram. Knowing bitterness with which Ely regards Diem, I had thought it might be better deliver message to De Rougemont and not again incite Ely’s anger but De Rougemont not available. In talking with Ely, I found my worst fears fully justified. Not giving me opportunity explain why I had asked see him, he inquired whether I had seen Diem and what Diem had said. I outlined to Ely Diem’s account of the events of April 30 and morning May 1 (Embassy telegrams 4957³ and 4951⁴) and Diem’s apprehension regarding possibility of trouble between French and Vietnamese. I said Diem particularly feared continued presence armed Binh Xuyen units in French security zone creates potentially explosive situation.

2. Upon my mentioning possibility of trouble between French and Vietnamese, Ely immediately launched upon what can only be described as violent tirade. He said it obvious Diem had called me in for express purpose of warning me against possibility of trouble and I would be naive if I did not realize this meant that Diem was planning trouble and covering himself in advance. Pointing his finger at me and speaking with extreme severity Ely said that as representative of the only country which could have any influence on Diem I should immediately go to Diem and tell him that if any trouble should occur tonight, responsiblity would be solely Diem’s. I protested that Diem himself had told me he feared incidents with French and that they must be prevented at all costs. If I should then go to him and tell him he would be responsible for any trouble that might take place I would to all intents and purposes be calling him a liar. Ely’s reply was, “He is a liar and you should tell him exactly that.” I replied I shared both Ely’s and Diem’s apprehension. I said I would see Diem and would, after referring to Diem’s apprehensions, urge Diem take every possible action, including public appeal for calm and issuance of orders to his soldiers to avoid any action which might provoke incidents. I said, however, I would not and could not tell Diem in advance of any incident that such incident was his full responsibility or that he was lying. Ely’s only reply was to reiterate his previous statement with great vehemence.

3. Ely asked me if I realized depths to which Diem going in spreading lies about French. I told him I was aware of extent of anti-French propaganda but that I did not know who was responsible for it but did not believe that Diem himself was. Ely is convinced that, if Diem himself is not responsible, at least someone close to him is. (Comment: This is doubtless true.) He showed me copy of tract issued by “Les Nationalistes Militaires de la Juste Cause Nationale”, which states in part, “French colonialists go home. French military have been found on side Binh Xuyen pirates fighting against Vietnamese National Army. Stop your double game which consists of holding hand with Viet Minh in north and passing yourself off officially as friends of Vietnamese nationalists in south … Vietnamese Army has nothing to fear from those who lost battle of Dien Bien Phu …⁵”

4. Comment: It is quite understandable that man of such strict honor as Ely has become enraged and, in my judgment, has become so personally and emotionally involved that the more unrestrained of his comments must be taken with a certain reserve. His personal sense of insult, added to extremely grave responsibility resting on his shoulders, makes dealing with him delicate matter.

5. Ely became extremely bitter and commented that he had thought our governments were following joint policy. I felt obligated at that juncture to affirm that I am under instructions to do everything I can to cooperate with French in joint policy, objective of which is support of legal government of Vietnam of which head is Diem but that I must point out in all frankness that our government continues to support Diem whereas French do not. Here, I said, is basic divergence in policy. Ely must realize, I added, that in addition to my responsibility for close cooperation with French, a policy I fully approve of and to which I have consistently given my best support, I was also under obligation to support Diem Government. I reiterated that I could not do as Ely requested. Ely retorted in some anger that there is involved more than a question of incidents which he expects Diem to instigate during coming night, with danger not only to French lives but to American. Protection of interests of free world and the fight against communism is at stake. If present situation is allowed continue, he said, Viet Minh will have control of Saigon in matter of days. He said French have proof Viet Minh play important role in revolutionary committee and have infiltrated Diem’s entourage. In interest free world I was under obligation, he said, go beyond any instructions I may have.

6. Van Laethem, who was with Ely during entire interview and joined in extreme pressure on me, then stated, speaking vehemently, that all this bloodshed could have been avoided if US had taken some action to find political solution in concert with French three or four weeks ago after French decided impossible work any further with Diem. Ely commented that he had thought we had had joint policy when Collins left for Washington, as he and Collins had then agreed Diem must go. I told Ely and Van Laethem that I could not accept what appeared to me to be their attempt saddle US with full responsibility for present situation and that they must have misunderstood Ambassador Collins’ position. I said that Collins had agreed with Ely that situation extremely serious, that Diem prestige and position had been deteriorating rapidly, that our support of Diem must be reviewed and alternate solutions thoroughly canvassed. I pointed out that at end of last interview with Ely prior Collins’ departure, Collins had carefully reiterated that he had no authority state that our position with regard to support of Diem had changed as that was not the case. At this point I delivered message contained Department telegram 4826. Ely so concerned about possibility incidents between French and Vietnamese he seemed scarcely take in message. He did however comment bitterly on influence of people like Senator Mansfield. I do not believe Ely has any concept of public opinion in US as it affects Diem problem. I have attempted remedy this failing.

7. I decided it was time break up interview but before I departed Ely restated very emphatically that I must realize the very grave responsibility resting on my shoulders as representative in Vietnam of US and that if I did not do as he, Ely, had suggested, responsibility for what might happen during coming night would be mine. I replied again that I could not accept any such statement but that in our common interest I would see Diem and talk with him along lines I had outlined earlier in our talk.

8. During my conversation with Diem, reported Embassy telegram 4984,⁶ I did exactly what I had committed myself to Ely to do. I told Diem that, worried by what he had said regarding his fears of trouble with French, I had gone directly to Ely and that I could assure him, Diem, that Ely was taking all possible precautions avoid incidents and that I hoped Diem was acting similarly. Trouble between French and Vietnamese could redound only to advantage of Viet Minh and would have serious, if not tragic, effects on position of not only France and Vietnam, but US in Free Vietnam. I suggested that Diem issue explicit orders to all troops to take special precautions avoid any actions which might provoke trouble and that he might consider issuing general appeal to people explaining necessity avoid incidents. Diem replied that it might be worthwhile if he and French could get together on some type declaration. I asked if he had been in touch with French regarding this problem. When he said he had not, I urged him make contact with French as soon as possible, pointing out that when both sides are apprehensive, frictions may occur much more easily when there has been a failure both sides discuss their mutual problem and seek joint solution.

9. After talk with Diem I requested De Rougemont to call, as I did not wish again become involved in fruitless polemic with Ely. I told De Rougemont what had transpired and suggested that if Diem, already preoccupied by numerous other problems, did not get in touch with French that French themselves should take initiative and that I thought they had responsibility so to do. De Rougemont said he would transmit my information and suggestions to Ely.

10. Following my talk with Ely and before my conversation with Diem, reported above, British Ambassador Stephenson and Australian Minister McNicol called. After I had left Ely, latter had called in Stephenson and had outlined to him something of his conversation with me. Stephenson and McNicol, fully realizing importance of problem, wished discuss with me possible approach to Diem. Their suggestions were definitely helpful to me in subsequent talk with Diem and both of them agreed with me in my suggested approach. Stephenson had already been apprised of contents of Department telegram to Saigon 4826 and I gave McNicol gist of message, as he has been consistently extremely helpful throughout current crisis.

11. I should like add my deep appreciation thoughtfulness and support expressed Department telegram 4822.⁷

Kidder

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–155. Secret; Niact. Repeated for information to Paris niact and to London.
2. Supra.
3. Dated May 1, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–155)
4. Dated April 30, not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–3055)
5. Ellipses in the source text.
6. Dated May 1, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–155)
7. Dated April 30, this telegram reads as follows: “Department commends you for your cool and capable handling of delicate situation under tense and critical conditions. We are particularly impressed with your stand taken in your 4929 repeated Paris 1272. We also appreciate your clear and timely reporting of fast-moving events.” (Ibid., 123 Kidder, Randolph A.) For telegram 4929, see Document 153.