158. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State1
4953. 1. As reported part III (1) Embtel 4926 rptd Paris 12702 there is no longer any common ground on understanding between Diem and Ely. Ely has not seen Diem or any of his Ministers since April 15, having used Wintrebert as go-between. Ely states one reason for this is that his presence is like red flag to bull with Diem.
2. French, in their anxiety avoid bloodshed in Saigon–Cholon and protect French lives and property, have understandably used all influence restrain Diem from taking any action wich would lead to violence on part of Binh Xuyen and sect front. This fact, plus decision withdraw support from Diem, has brought them to position where their neutrality can be fairly described as being favorable to Binh Xuyen whom we regard as rebels against legitimate government. They hindered National Army reaction to Binh Xuyen attack on March 29, and while they have not taken comparable action in present episode, they have tended lay major, if not full, blame on Diem, continuing to regard struggle as one between equals.
3. This represents fundamental difference of opinion between Ely and myself.
4. We here have consistently supported and followed policy of close collaboration with Ely in support of Diem government, believing it necessary if Free Vietnam to be saved. Carrying out that policy in present circumstances where there is fundamental difference of opinion, combined with necessity of preserving best possible relations with Ely pending Collins’ return, has dictated my actions during last few days. I have not failed make clear to Ely that I disagree with him, but I have felt it wise to avoid extended discussion of issues. Based on my own conviction, I have emphasized to Diem the serious nature of the actions which he has proposed take in defying Bao Dai, and fact that full responsibility will be placed on his shoulders. I have not been willing, nor has British Ambassador Stephenson, join with Ely in joint approach to Diem seeking cease-fire. Ely, April 29, proposed to Stephenson and me following press release: “At end of morning and beginning of afternoon, Chargé d’Affaires of US, Ambassador of Great Britain, and finally representative General Ely visited President Ngo Dinh Diem to inform him of common desire of 3 govts that end be made to bloodshed, conforming to instructions of Chief of State. They informed President Diem, [Page 328] in course of same démarche, they hoped mission confided to General Ely by His Majesty Bao Dai would permit prompt re-establishment of order.”
5. Stephenson and I stated that we could not agree to release of any such statement. I pointed out it was not factual as regards actions that I had taken or expected to take.
6. While fully appreciating Ely’s loyal cooperation in past, and continuing necessity of close US-French collaboration, I believe we must review our position with regard to Ely himself in light recent developments. I do not think I exaggerate when I say that if Diem should be retained as PriMin, Ely’s usefulness to France in Vietnam and indirectly to ourselves will have been seriously compromised, if not finished, by his profound reaction against Diem. Rightly or wrongly Diem and many other Vietnamese consider French flag is nailed to Binh Xuyen masthead. This factor can dangerously jeopardize French influence and position in Free Vietnam in future.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–3055. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.↩
- Document 152.↩