Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

152. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 29, 1955—8 p.m.

4926. Part I.

1. I called on Diem noon April 29, arriving immediately after Cabinet meeting. While waiting for Diem I had conversation with [name and title deleted].

2. [Name deleted] informed me that at Cabinet meeting, Cabinet unanimously counseled Diem not transfer high military command to Vy.² [Name deleted] most contemptuous regarding General Vy, who he states sent special message Bao Dai via Imperial Cabinet approximately week ago protesting his desire for peace when [name deleted] had previously forbidden him to send any such message. After [name deleted] tried to get explanation from Vy regarding “numerous army officers” associating themselves with Vy in his message, Vy fled to Dalat where he has remained until this morning. With regard Bao Dai’s instructions Diem come to Paris, [name deleted] said no one willing accept responsibilities of interim government during Diem’s absence and Cabinet had therefore counseled Diem remain. He stated that if Bao Dai wished make change he should have made clean break and named somebody else. In reply my question, however, [name deleted] said he did not believe it would be in “national interest” for Diem to go even under such circumstances and Diem would probably resist.

3. [Name deleted] expressed violently anti-French sentiments accusing French colonialists of being responsible for present imbroglio.

Part II.

1. Diem in obviously troubled yet calm mood confirmed what [name deleted] had said regarding Vy and Cabinet advice. He added situation would become hopelessly out of hand if he, Diem, left country. He put particular emphasis on support renewed to him this morning by Cao Dai Generals Phuong and Trinh Minh The and Hoa Hao General Nguyen Giac Ngo (Embtel 4895 Paris 1263³), stating they in highly excitable mood and they would resort to armed action should Vy be named Commander in Chief or should Diem be replaced. He stated that to remove Ty at this time would be regarded by Vietnamese soldiers as insult and installation of Vy would most certainly mean civil war. Asked regarding Ty’s views, he said Ty would stay as long as Diem refrained from officially passing military powers to Vy ([name deleted] had not been so sure of this as Diem professed to be).

2. While not as bitterly anti-French as [name deleted], Diem stated his firm conviction French are supporting Binh Xuyen, both morally and with munitions. He states French provided six helicopters for evacuation Binh Xuyen wounded and that FAVN troops night April 28 captured two armed French soldiers in Binh Xuyen post. He states French-inspired truce has given Binh Xuyen chance to reinforce their positions. (In this regard Ely morning April 29 took attitude Diem acting illegally because he had broken truce. When I asked Ely whether Binh Xuyen had not been breaking truce through introduction additional troops and armaments he made no reply.)

3. Diem states he intends send message Bao Dai pointing out removal Ty in favor Vy at this time would create impossible situation within army and that no one is willing take over Prime Ministership should Diem leave country. Diem will say, he says, that at present crucial juncture it is absolutely essential for nation that he remain in Vietnam. Diem adds that should Bao Dai nevertheless insist, it might well mean end of Bao Dai, although Diem says he thinks “he might perhaps stop any revolt against His Majesty.” While dictating this telegram I have been informed Diem has issued public statement saying he will decline transfer military authority to General Vy and will not comply Bao Dai’s instructions proceed to France.

4. Diem, referring to transfer of police powers, pointed out he had been asked time and again to wait while political solution found. No solution was upcoming and in order retain his authority as Prime Minister it was essential he act. He said he had told Bao Dai he had no choice but to change Chief of Police and Bao Dai had not replied until after action was taken (we are not unaware that this if factual might have been deliberate timing on Diem’s part).

Part III.

1. Diem states Binh Xuyen are organ of French colonialism. Ely, on other hand, states Diem is “irresponsible madman” and merely chief of band. There is total lack of common ground between two points of view. Diem indicates he will resist Bao Dai’s instructions. Ely states that if Diem remains he, Ely, will wash his hands of responsibility.

2. Diem, in our conversation, asked me nothing regarding US policy and I limited my comments to pointing out that in not obeying Bao Dai’s order he would be undertaking an extremely grave responsibility and that it was certain French would lay blame on him, Diem, for what might follow.

3. Ely asked me call this morning and I found British Ambassador Stephenson with him. Ely apparently extremely anxious to get my support in counseling Diem to negotiate cease fire and my agreement to Ely’s version of sequence military events precipitating developments of April 28 (Embtel 4882, Paris 1262⁴).

Part IV.

1. French info service officer, briefing press this morning, stated I had met this morning with Ely and that we had made joint US-French attempt obtain cease fire which had failed. French official on being asked about French policy stated that it is to get cease fire and that it has US support. These allegations are without foundation and I have so informed Time representative who queried me.

Kidder

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2955. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information niact to Paris.

2. As reported in telegram 4917 from Saigon, April 29, Bao Dai issued a decree on April 28 naming General Nguyen Van Vy as Supreme Commander of the Vietnamese National Armed Forces and empowering him to take all necessary measures to avoid armed conflict between the national army, the police forces, and the sects. (ibid.)

   Prior to receipt of this telegram in Washington, Dulles learned of this move on the news ticker and immediately telephoned the French Ambassador in Washington, Couve de Murville. The conversation, as transcribed in Dulles’s office, was as follows:

   “The Sec. said there is a ticker report that Ely has recognized Vy as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The Amb. said he has not heard anything about it. The Sec. said he hopes it is not true as if, in the middle of this battle when it looks as if the forces of law and order are gaining the ascendancy, the army is taken away from the head of government, it will look as though Bao Dai and the French are really supporting Binh Xuyen, and not the legal government. If that impression got around, the Sec. would think it was hopeless to expect further backing from the US. The Sec. asked him to find out if it is true, and the Amb. said he would right away.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

3. Dated April 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2955)
4. Document 146.