Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

138. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Sebald) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 27, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam Situation, Noon, April 27, 1955

1. The situation remains very tense in Saigon with both the Binh Xuyen and the Army alerted and prepared. The truce is presumed to continue to May 1. All elements sense that the situation is approaching some new turn. Bao Dai has told us he intends to take action not later than Thursday, April 28, to remove Diem and appoint a new Prime Minister, but so far we have urged him to wait.

2. Diem appears determined to hold out. He has issued a decree relieving the Binh Xuyen police chief and installing his own man as successor.² However, he has made no move to seize the National Police Building, where the Binh Xuyen continue to operate. So far there has been no overt Binh Xuyen reaction. Although Diem appears to be operating a one-man government and his government programs are at a standstill, there have been some very recent slight indications that certain elements of importance in the local political scene are tending to move away from the “united front” of the sects and to Diem. Presumably, United States delay in acceding to a removal of Diem may be having some effect in the latter’s favor. Nevertheless, his political position seems to deteriorate steadily.

3. The French continue, both in Paris and in Saigon, to favor the removal of Diem as soon as possible. However, they are apparently unwilling to indicate a choice for a successor without prior consultation with us. They may wish to defer decisions on a successor to joint Ely–Collins recommendation. There are some indications that an increasingly influential French element now considers the Sainteny policy in the North to have been a failure, and this element may be gradual, more amenable, to the objectives of building a strong government in the South and delaying the 1956 elections as long as possible.

4. Our present course of action in outgoing telegrams is (a) accept General Collins estimate Diem cannot be supported any longer (b) new government would have fair prospects and chance is worth taking (c) obtain assurances from French, and (d) authorize Collins with Ely help resolve political crisis.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5519 Series. Secret. Drafted by Young in response to a memorandum by Sturgill of S/S to FE, April 25, attached to the source text, in which Sturgill requested a one-page briefing memorandum for use by Dulles in preparation for the NSC meeting on April 28.
2. According to telegram 4844 from Saigon, April 27, Diem’s office issued a communiqué on April 26 replacing Lai Van Sang, Director General of National Police and Sûreté, with Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Le. Telegram 4844 also reported that Sang declared over United Front radio on the evening of April 26 that he would stay on at his post since he could only be removed by Bao Dai. (Ibid., Central Files, 751G.00/4–2755)