Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 298

Memorandum by Joseph A. Yager of the United States Delegation¹

secret
USDel/10

Geneva, May 3, 1954.

Arguments Against Partition, Coalition Government, Plebiscite, And Immediate Elections In Indochina

A number of types of political settlement in Indochina that may be proposed at the conference must be viewed as unacceptable in that they would probably lead to the eventual loss of the area to the Communists. This paper presents the arguments against: 1) partition, 2) coalition government, 3) plebiscite, and 4) immediate elections.

i. partition

The immediate adverse consequences of any type of partition are obvious. The area under Communist control would be expanded, anti-Communist populations would be abandoned to Communist rule, and French and US prestige would suffer. The secondary effects of partition upon areas left initially under non-Communist control are, however, equally serious. The nature of these secondary effects may be explored by considering three hypothetical cases representing different methods of partitioning Indochina:

(a) Partition of Vietnam at the 16th parallel

(b) Partition of Laos as well as Vietnam at the 16th parallel

(c) Separation of all of Vietnam from Laos and Cambodia

In each case, it is assumed that French Union forces would be withdrawn shortly after partition.

A. Partition of Vietnam at the 16th Parallel

Partition of Vietnam at the 16th parallel would give the Communists unchallenged control over more than half of Vietnam’s population, including the more energetic and virile segment of the nation’s people. Economically, the Communists would gain control of Vietnam’s major mineral resources, although they might encounter some minor difficulty in meeting their food deficit. Both the Chinese Communists and the Vietminh would benefit from use of the port of Haiphong.

Politically and militarily, partition would leave the Communist regime in the north at a considerable advantage relative to the non-Communist government in the south. The Communists already firmly control the bulk of the population that they would receive under the partition, and they would encounter little difficulty in consolidating their hold over their entire area. They would claim credit for the cessation of hostilities, launch a propaganda campaign for unification, and apply maximum efforts toward the overturn of the non-Communist government in the south.

In contrast to the situation in the north, the non-Communist government in south Vietnam would be hard pressed to deal with popular demoralization resulting from partition. The general public in the south would view partition as a betrayal, would be fearful of Communist military strength, and would be convinced that partition was merely the prelude to Communist control over the entire country. Even many anti-Communist politicians would believe that prudence required them to avoid identification with the non-Communist government of the south.

Communist subversive operations would find a fertile field in the south and in time the Communists would probably be able to reestablish the civil war south of the 16th parallel. Eventual destruction of the government of south Vietnam from within would be likely. A possible Communist decision to hasten the fall of the southern government by external attack cannot be excluded, although it would probably be viewed as involving unnecessary risks.

B. Partition of Vietnam and Laos at the 16th Parallel

Partition of Laos, as well as Vietnam, at the 16th parallel would amount to the virtual destruction of the former nation. Only about one-fifth of the land area of Laos and one-fourth of its population would remain in non-Communist hands. The area which would be left to the government of Laos by partition is a rugged and insecure region in which dissident pro-Communist Vietnamese and Laotian guerillas have been active for year. It is doubtful that any Laotian government could long rule this insignificant and insecure area.

The principal consequences of extending the partition line across Laos, however, would be the effect on Thailand. A long stretch of the Thai border would be thrown open to Communist military pressure and subversion. The danger to the Thais would be increased by the existence immediately across the border of a sizeable Vietnamese minority which already sympathizes with the Viet Minh.

The position of Cambodia would also be markedly worsened, even though Cambodia would be temporarily separated from the Communist zone by the remnant of Laos south of the 16th parallel.

The Communists would also achieve the incidental advantage of extending a buffer zone across the entire length of Communist China’s border with Indochina.

C. Separation of Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos

If the Communists were to gain all of Vietnam in a negotiated settlement, they would control roughly five-sixths of the entire population of Indochina. The process of extending Communist control throughout the large areas of central and southern Vietnam now held by the French Union would presumably take somewhat longer than consolidation of the northern portion alone. There would be some opposition, particularly in South Vietnam, to Communist efforts to consolidate control, based as much on regional animosities as on ideology. It is probable, however, considering the powerful military and political organization that the DRV could apply to these problems, that they could establish control over the entire country in a relatively short period of time.

The political pressures that a Communist Vietnam would apply against the smaller and weaker Laos and Cambodia would be great. There would be little prospect, barring extensive foreign assistance, that Laos and Cambodia would be able long to withstand the pressure of a Communist Vietnam.

ii. coalition government

Little basis exists for formation of coalition governments in Laos and Cambodia. Therefore, examination of this type of settlement may be confined to Vietnam.

A coalition government in Vietnam might take one of two general forms: a) inclusion of non-Communists in the Ho government or, b) inclusion of Communists in the Bao Dai government.

The former arrangement would at best create a “democratic” facade for a thoroughly Communist regime. The insignificant role played by the so-called democratic personages in Peiping serves to illustrate the best that non-Communist ministers could hope for in the Ho government. At worst, and this result would appear the more likely, the fate of the non-Communist members of the Ho government would be similar to that of non-Communist members of the post war governments in Eastern Europe.

If coalition government took the form of bringing Communists into the Bao Dai government, complete Communist control of Vietnam would not come about immediately but would almost certainly result eventually. The number and nature of the ministries assigned to Communists in the coalition government would make little difference. By the mere fact of forming a coalition government most military and police restrictions on Communist activities would be removed. The Communists with their efficient political organization would soon overcome their relatively disorganized adversaries. A “legal” Communist takeover by means of “elections” or through a Czech-style coup would probably follow. In the unlikely event that political means proved insufficient to achieve their objectives, the Communists could at any time employ their overwhelming military and paramilitary superiority to seize power by force.

iii. plebiscite

If a plebiscite were held to permit a popular choice between the Communist and non-Communist regimes in the Associated States, the Communists would probably lose in Laos and Cambodia, but would almost certainly win in Vietnam. In the two smaller states, the absence of strong indigenous Communist organizations and the popular prestige of the two royal houses would probably insure a non-Communist result. In Vietnam, however, the general acceptance of Ho Chi Minh as the standard bearer of Vietnamese nationalism, and, even more important, the extensive and efficient Communist organization would make Communist victory in a plebiscite almost certain.

If a plebiscite were held without effective outside supervision, the Communists would return virtually 100% of the vote in the areas that they now control. Since Communist areas now probably contain 60% of the population of Vietnam, the Communists could muster a majority, irrespective of the large vote that they might expect to obtain in non-Communist areas. Outside supervision might reduce the margin of Communist victory, but even in the best of circumstances could not be expected to change the final result.

iv. immediate elections

As in the case of plebiscite, immediate elections for national assemblies in each of the Associated States would probably result in non-Communist victories in Laos and Cambodia and in a Communist victory in Vietnam. The result of such an election in Vietnam is, however, somewhat less predictable than is the result of a plebiscite. Local issues and the personalities of candidates would complicate the situation, and non-Communist nationals who might vote for the Ho regime in a plebiscite would find other choices open to them in an election. Nevertheless, it appears likely that superior Communist organization would achieve at least a plurality of seats in an assembly election in Vietnam. Any government formed in these circumstances would probably contain Communist ministers, with consequences discussed above under the heading “coalition government”. If a government was formed without Communist participation—which appears most unlikely—the Communists would still be in a position to exercise their formidable political and paramilitary potentials and would constitute a serious threat to the new government.

1. Joseph A. Yager, Research and Reference Officer to the U.S. Delegation.