Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 298

United States Delegation Memorandum1

top secret
USDel/9
Geneva, May 3, 1954.

An Emergency Program For Indochina

The purpose of this memorandum is to present a checklist of the various actions which might be taken by France, Vietnam and the United States (short of outright U.S. intervention) to meet the grave political and military emergency:

By France

(1)
An announcement of an intention to continue the struggle in accordance with France’s French Union obligations.
(2)
Certain concrete measures of a military nature including
(a)
Completion of prompt despatch of two parachute battalions already earmarked.
(b)
Further reinforcements including but not limited to Groupe Mobile and armoured elements already earmarked.
(c)
Speeding up of program for air force reinforcements including personnel, planes and airfields.
(d)
Announcement of U.S. participation in training and supply program involving specific Vietnamese units (say three Groupes Mobiles to start). This would involve Franco-Vietnamese agreement to permit direct U.S.-Vietnamese relationship in limited aspects of military program.
(3)
Rapid conclusion of political negotiations with Vietnam and Cambodia and implementation thereof at all levels.

By Vietnam

(1)
An announcement of a determination to continue the struggle to guarantee Vietnamese independence and territorial integrity including emphasis on support being received from France in accordance with French Union obligations and from the United States and other nations in accordance with free world solidarity and security interests.
(2)
Military measures designed to increase the tempo and the [Page 681] efficacy of the build-up of the Vietnamese National Army. Among these measures would be included the announcement of a U.S.-Vietnamese agreement for the training by the U.S. of, say, three Groupes Mobiles to be ready for active combat duty November 1, for example.
(3)
A statement of political principles and intentions including an appeal for national unity based on complete independence, and, perhaps, an announcement of an intention to hold national elections as rapidly as possible after the war.

By the United States

(1)
Reiteration of intention to support Franco-Vietnamese war effort by all possible means, including emergency airlift, planes, added technical personnel, etc., as needed.
(2)
Negotiation, after consultation with French of agreement with Vietnamese Government providing for U.S. sponsored training program designed to produce by a certain date, say November 1, three or more new combat-worthy Groupes Mobiles.
(3)
Direct U.S.-Vietnamese arrangements for covert operations and psychological warfare.
(4)
Strong approval of new Franco-Vietnamese political arrangements.
(5)
Continued energetic leadership in forging of “united action” concept into an effective instrument for use, if necessary, in attaining free world goals in Southeast Asia in the event Geneva Conference proves fruitless.
(6)
Appointment of a U.S. Ambassador in Cambodia and a U.S. Minister in Laos replacing present arrangement whereby these two positions are filled by U.S. Ambassador [in] Vietnam. This measure would be politically helpful in Cambodia and Laos.
  1. Name of the drafting officer was not indicated on the source text.↩