Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 288
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (MacArthur)
Participants:
- France
- Mr. Bidault
- Mr. Chauvel
- US
- Secretary Dulles
- General Smith
- Mr. MacArthur
- UK
- Mr. Eden
- Lord Reading
- Mr. Shuckburgh
Time: 12:15 p.m., May 1, 1954
Place: Bidault’s Residence, Joli–Port, in Versoix
The Secretary opened the discussion by outlining his talk with Molotov this morning on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. After giving them a full account of his talk with Molotov this morning, the Secretary read to Messrs. Eden and Bidault the paper which he had read to Molotov this morning. Both Eden and Bidault asked if they could have copies, and the Secretary said that he had only his reading copy with him but would send them copies.1
Mr. Bidault then said that Molotov has something on his mind. When Bidault saw Molotov yesterday, Molotov asked him when he (Bidault) was leaving. Mr. Bidault replied that he probably would be going to Paris sometime Monday2 evening so that he could be there when the Assembly reconvenes on Tuesday, but would of course be returning to Geneva. Molotov had then said that Secretary Dulles was leaving on Monday and complained that this was supposed to be a Foreign Ministers meeting. Mr. Bidault said that in his judgment Molotov thinks that his only peer and equal is the Secretary, and he is probably saying to himself, “How can I stay on with inferiors when my only equal, the American Secretary of State, is leaving?” Mr. Bidault said that Molotov does have a problem of how long he remains in Geneva in the form of Chou En-lai. However, he felt Molotov’s unhappiness about Secretary Dulles’ leaving was because [Page 642] Molotov “does not like to negotiate with persons whom he considers inferior in status to himself”.
Mr. Bidault then said to the Secretary that he had sent the new note to Bao Dai regarding Vietnam participation at the Geneva Conference and that the original letter which he, Eden, and the Secretary had signed had been retrieved.3 He said that Bao Dai’s Foreign Minister would be arriving at the Swiss frontier at about 2:30 or three o’clock this afternoon with, he understood, Bao Dai’s approval for the Vietnamese to participate in the Geneva Conference even if the Vietminh is present.
Mr. Bidault then said that it was important to try to get the Indochina phase of the conference started on Monday or Tuesday. With Bao Dai’s approval of Vietminh participation, either he (Bidault) would approach Molotov today, or Chauvel would see Gromyko, to inform them that the Vietnamese accepted Vietminh participation. Mr. Bidault said that it was Molotov’s turn to come and see him, but he was somewhat reluctant to ask him to come to see him so quickly. The Secretary asked Bidault if he meant that he might invite Molotov to dinner tonight, and Mr. Bidault replied that he would not invite him because it was too soon after Molotov’s dinner for him. If he invited Molotov tonight, Molotov would invite him back tomorrow for another meal, and he did not wish to get involved with him in too many bilateral dinners.
Mr. Bidault said that when they communicated Bao Dai’s positive reply to Molotov later today, two questions would come almost at once. The first was chairmanship of the Indochina phase and the second was composition. Regarding chairmanship, Mr. Bidault hazarded that Molotov might propose an Indian chairman, and would probably have in mind Krishna Menon. After some discussion, it was agreed that India would be very unsuitable under almost any circumstances, although Mr. Bidault said that Madame Pandit would not make a bad chairman, if it was to be an Indian. However, he reiterated that India was unsuitable. Mr. Bidault said that the only chairman of the three rotating chairmen of the Conference that might be acceptable would be Eden. Mr. Eden immediately interjected saying that he really did not want to be the chairman. He had thought about suggesting the idea of having Mike Pearson4 as permanent chairman for the Indochina phase but if this were done Molotov would immediately reply that this was an Asiatic conference and would then probably suggest an Asian, such as Krishna Menon. Mr. Eden said another possibility which had occurred to him was to ask the chairman of the Colombo [Page 643] Conference (the Prime Minister of Ceylon)5 to chair the meeting. Secretary Dulles said he did not see why the present three chairmen could not continue for the Indochina phase. He had worded his proposal for chairmanship carefully so that it could be construed that the three present rotating chairmen were chairmen of the conference rather than just of the Korean phase. Mr. Bidault and Mr. Eden were both enthusiastic and said this was a good idea. They had not been aware of the way the Secretary’s proposal, which the conference had accepted, had been worded.
Mr. Bidault said that Molotov had suggested that “the two permament chairmen” chair the Indochina phase. This meant the UK and the USSR. He was not happy about this idea as he did not like the thought of having the chairmen rotate on a 50–50 basis. He mentioned preferring the two–for–one basis which would result if the present chairmen were continued. Mr. Eden became somewhat confused and raised a question as to Prince Wan’s continuing as one of the rotating chairmen if Thailand was not a participant. The Secretary pointed out that Eden’s proposal for the chairman of the Colombo Conference to chair the Indochina phase called for an outsider whose country would not participate in the discussions. With respect to chairmanship, it was agreed that when the French see the Russians later today, they would put forward the position that the three present rotating chairmen should continue. If the Russians refused this, consideration should be given to having a single chairman, but no definite agreement on who that chairman should be was reached. The Prime Minister of Ceylon as chairman of the Colombo Conference was a possibility which should be kept in mind. It was also agreed that Prince Wan or Mike Pearson would be acceptable in the role of a single chairman.
The discussion then turned to composition of the Indochina phase of the conference, and it was agreed that Bidault would stand fast on the proposal that there be 9 participants (US, UK, France, USSR, Communist China, the three Associated States, and the Vietminh). It was agreed that this should be the initial composition of the conference, although the possibility was not excluded that this group might add additional members later. However, for the purposes of the French discussion with Molotov later today, the French should stand on the nine.
Mr. Bidault then inquired what the purpose of this afternoon’s restricted meeting on Korea at 3:30 p.m. was.6 The Secretary explained that he planned to table a paper containing four points which were
- 1.
- Elections to be under UN auspices
- 2.
- The scope and character of the elections
- 3.
- Disposition of foreign troops
- 4.
- Provision to protect Korean independence, including demilitarized border areas.
The Secretary indicated that he did not expect there would be substantive discussion this afternoon of these points and believed that the discussion this afternoon would cover the procedural aspect of how the conference would deal with such points. For example, should they be discussed in plenary or restricted sessions, etc.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Bidault said that he would endeavor to get Molotov’s acceptance today that there should be 9 participants for the Indochina phase which had been agreed above and that the present chairmen should continue to chair the Indochina discussions. He promised to keep both the Secretary and Mr. Eden fully informed. The Secretary and Mr. Eden indicated approval of this position, and the Secretary said that while we recognized that France had primary responsibility in connection with the Indochina discussions, the US would find it very difficult to accept an Indian chairman such as Krishna Menon. Mr. Bidault reiterated that an Indian chairman would certainly not do, although if deadlock were reached on the Western proposal for the present chairmen to continue, there was merit in having an outside chairman, such as the Prime Minister of Ceylon or Prince Wan or Mike Pearson. Mr. Bidault concluded by saying that he did not exclude the possibility that Molotov might even suggest that France and Communist China alternate in the chair for the Indochina discussions or that even the Vietnamese and Vietminh alternate the chair. This was just a possibility which had occurred to him while the present discussion was going on and one that possibly might be put forward by the Soviets.