Office of the Historian

110.11 DU/5–154: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Geneva1

top secret
niact
Washington, May 1, 1954—9:44 a.m.

Tedul 26. Dept has received following message from President for immediate transmission to Secretary:2

“My Friday evening paper indicates that great distortion occurred in the reporting in Geneva of a statement I made at Thursday’s press conference.3

“I was emphasizing the complexities and difficulties of your task at Geneva. In doing so, I pointed out that you had to steer a course between the unattainable and the unacceptable. The former I defined as a general Asian peace in which the free world could have real confidence. This I said was too much to hope for at present. The unacceptable I did not attempt to define because in it could be described an almost infinite number of hypothetical arrangements. Consequently I said that if any arrangement whatsoever was made at Geneva, it could scarcely be viewed as more than a modus vivendi or something of that sort. I then stated that because of the delicacy and difficulties of your task, I would not comment further on the Geneva Conference and its aims or on this government’s suggestions and proposals. However, another question did allow me to state that any division or partition of Indo–China was not included in what I considered acceptable.

“The New York Times reported this part of my press conference accurately, so I am at a loss to understand why it should have been so completely twisted in the reports sent to Geneva.

“I am sure that you and this Administration are correct in the approach we have taken to the Indo–China problem. I have heard that New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines agree with us. They are [Page 641] more realistic and possibly more courageous than those who are apparently willing to accept any arrangement that allows them by sufference and for such time as may be permitted by the Chinese Reds to save a bit of face and possibly a couple of miserable trading posts in the Far East.

“With warm regards to you and all members of your party, As ever, D. D. E.”

Murphy
  1. Drafted by Gilman of S/S.↩

  2. Secretary Dulles in turn on May 1 passed the President’s message to Eden and Bidault, stating that he had received a telegram “from the President which expresses concern about the misinterpretations given to his last Thursday’s press conference.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Korea—Political Conference—Geneva 1954”) In an additional note to Bidault the Secretary enclosed a transcript of portions of the President’s press conference dealing with Indochina and stated that “You will see that it does not in any way bear out the press interpretations which in some quarters were placed upon it.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Korea—Political Conference—Geneva 1954”)

    Chauvel subsequently informed the U.S. Delegation that “Bidault encouraged by … President’s clarification of April 29 press conference given in Secretary’s letter of May 1.” Telegram Secto 120 from Geneva, May 6. (396.1 GE/5–654)

    ↩
  3. Apr. 29. For summary of the President’s press conference, see editorial note, p. 604.↩