Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Indochina”

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Stelle) to the Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bowie)

top secret

[Geneva,] April 30, 1954.

Subject:

• The Nehru Proposal on Indochina¹

Substance of Proposal

Nehru, speaking in the House of People on April 24, made a proposal with regard to Indochina as follows:

1. A climate of peace has to be promoted and the atmosphere of threats that prevails ought to be dissipated. To this end the government of India appeals to all concerned to desist from threats and to the combatants to refrain from stepping up the tempo of the war.

2. The item of a cease–fire should be given priority on the Indochina conference agenda. The cease–fire group should consist of the actual belligerents, that is, France, the three Associated States, and the Vietminh.

3. The Conference should decide to proclaim that the essential solution to the conflict is the complete independence of Indochina and that termination of French sovereignty should be placed beyond all doubt by an unequivocal commitment by the Government of France.

4. The Conference should initiate negotiations between the parties directly and principally concerned and should give them all possible assistance. Such direct negotiations would assist in keeping the Indochina question limited to the issues which concern and involve Indochina directly. These parties would be the same as would constitute the cease–fire group.

5. A solemn agreement of non–intervention, denying aid direct or indirect with troops or war material to the combatants for purposes of war, to which the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and China shall be the primary parties, should be brought about by the Conference. The United Nations, to which the decision of the Conference shall be reported, shall be requested to formulate the convention of non–intervention in Indochina embodying the aforesaid agreement and including provisions for its enforcement under United Nations auspices. Other states should be invited by the United Nations to adhere to this convention of non–intervention.

6. Nehru stated that the United Nations should be informed of the progress of the Conference.

Analysis of Proposal

a. The Indian proposal does not provide for any particular type of political settlement to follow a cease–fire. At Colombo Nehru has said that he carefully avoided saying to whom and in what form French sovereignty should be transferred, feeling that this should be left for negotiation among the parties concerned.²

b. The Indian proposal is ambiguous as to whether the “Conference” on Indochina should be conducted at Geneva or separately from the Geneva Conference. Nehru, at Colombo, has said that he was not advocating that a settlement in Indochina should be completely divorced from the Geneva Conference but that he visualized the machinery for direct negotiation between the belligerents as being a sort of subcommittee of the Geneva Conference.

c. The Indian proposal pointedly excludes both the United States and Communist China as parties at interest in negotiations for an Indochina settlement. Nehru rationalizes this on the grounds that only by limiting participation to actual belligerents can the Indochina issue be separated out from other Far Eastern issues. Nehru thus arrives at a recommendation for direct negotiations between the French and the Vietminh which has been repeatedly urged by the Russians and the French Communists for some time.

d. A primary element of the Indian proposal is that there should be an immediate cease–fire. According to the proposal this cease–fire should be arranged by the actual belligerents as a matter of priority. In this respect Nehru also echoes earlier Communist recommendations. He does not, however, call for immediate withdrawal of French troops, an item which has hitherto been a constant element in Communist propaganda. The Indian proposal does not provide for any external enforcement of a cease–fire.

e. Another primary element of the Indian proposal is the advocacy of agreement by the U.S., USSR, UK and Communist China to abstain from intervention in Indochina or from rendering any help of a military nature to any of the belligerents. The proposal does provide that this agreement should be enforced by the UN.

Disadvantages of the Indian Proposal

The Indian proposal has been picked up by parts of both the British and French press and will probably have to be dealt with in some form at Geneva. From the U.S. point of view it has the following disadvantages:

a. Given the obvious eagerness of the French to reach some sort of an agreement and the disinclination of the French to reckon the costs too carefully, exclusion of the U.S. from negotiations for an Indochina settlement would undoubtedly tend to weaken the Western position in the negotiations. On the other hand, since the Vietminh are apt to be more interested in immediate complete victory than either the Russians or the Chinese exclusion of the other Communists from the negotiations would tend to harden the Communist negotiating position.

b. An immediate cease–fire, without any agreed terms for a political settlement, would redound greatly to Communist advantage. The local population would understand this to be a clear victory for the Vietminh and a signal that the Communists were about to achieve political control. Accordingly such local support as the French now have would quickly disintegrate. The French would be in no position to renew hostilities again, even in the face of utmost recalcitrance on the part of the Communists in political negotiations.

c. The absence of any provisions for enforcement of a cease–fire would also work to the advantage of the Communists. The French, being so inclined, would probably observe an agreement fairly strictly, while the Communists would undoubtedly continue to exert forceful measures, if not against the French, at least against the local population.

d. The provisions for a cessation of all outside military assistance would clearly be disadvantageous to the U.S. and the French. The French Union forces depend completely on U.S. military assistance and would be drastically weakened by its cessation. Although the Vietminh are importantly assisted by Chinese Communist matériel, the quantity does not compare with what the U.S. is providing the French, the Vietminh are not nearly as dependent on outside assistance as are the French, and in any case, on the basis of Korean experience, there could be no expectation that Chinese Communist assistance would in fact cease, regardless of any UN enforcement machinery.

In sum the Indian proposal picks up those items of the Communist position—direct negotiation, cease–fire, and non–intervention—which have a dangerous appeal to the French public, and which in themselves would be damaging to the Western position, and neglects any of the safeguards—political settlement, and controls—which might be calculated to make the non–Communist position in Indochina tenable.

1. See footnote 8, p. 625.
2. For a summary of Prime Minister Nehru’s statement at the Colombo Conference, see telegram 339 from Colombo, Apr. 29, p. 610.