Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Bonsal Memoranda”

Memorandum by the Adviser to the United States Delegation (Bonsal)

top secret

[Geneva,] April 30, 1954.

Geneva Conference, April 1954 Indochina Phase

possible western proposal for “restoring peace in indochina”

The purpose of this memorandum is to examine a possible Western proposal for “restoring peace in Indochina” which might be made at the Geneva Conference either in anticipation of or as a reply to an expected Communist proposal. The Western proposal must be acceptable to the United States and appear reasonable to world opinion. Also, in the unlikely event it was seriously considered by the Communists, it should provide some face–saving elements (not of substance) to facilitate acceptance by them. The Communists will, it is expected, make a proposal of their own including such features as the withdrawal of foreign troops, the holding of “free elections” and the recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The negotiating position of the two sides at Geneva will depend upon the following major factors:

(1) The military situation and prospects, including especially the outcome of Dien Bien Phu and its effect on French and Vietnamese official, public and military opinion.

(2) Franco–Vietnamese relations including the result of current negotiations and their impact on French and Vietnamese official and public opinion.

(3) The degree to which the United States is successful in forging a “united action” concept which the Communists as well as the French and the Vietnamese believe gives promise of contributing overwhelming added military assets on our side in Indochina in the event of a breakdown at Geneva.

(4) Development of US position regarding intervention in Indochina.

(5) The extent to which the Russians and the Chinese Communists are ready to risk World War III in order to hold the Communist position in Indochina.

(6) The risks which our side is willing to take to preserve Indochina from the Communists.

The following considerations seem basic to the formulation of our position:

(1) Any settlement which leaves Ho Chi Minh’s regular divisions intact and undefeated will result in a turn–over of the country sooner or later to the Communists.

(2) It is essential from the point of view of French public and official opinion that our side at Geneva make what appears to be a constructive and united attempt to end the fighting in Indochina. If such an attempt is made sincerely, and fails, the chances that the Franco-Vietnamese military effort will be continued will at least be improved.

(3) It is also essential from the point of view of French public and official opinion that nothing be done or said at Geneva to indicate that we do not understand that the French Union concept as a free association of equal, sovereign states is what justifies the heavy French contribution to our common objective of keeping Indochina from Communist control. (There appears to be no need to insist on a spelled out right of withdrawal at a time when the very existence of the new states is being assured only because of their membership in the French Union; the relationship between them will be an evolving one in accordance with circumstances.)

(4) In the case of Cambodia and of Laos, all that is required is a withdrawal of Vietminh invading forces in order to leave the administration of their countries to governments enjoying a satisfactory degree of popular support. Neither elections nor plebiscites are needed except as provided by the functioning constitutional machinery in the two states. We should emphasize our own sense of the “separateness” of Cambodia and Laos from Vietnam by promptly appointing a resident Ambassador in Phnom Penh and a resident Minister in Vientiane.

In view of the above summary analysis, a program for restoring peace to Indochina might be envisaged which would include:

(a) On the military side, (1) In Cambodia and Laos: a withdrawal of Vietminh troops and the establishment, perhaps under UN auspices of peace observation machinery which will guarantee the security and territorial integrity of these two states. (2) In Vietnam, a cease fire followed by progressive demobilization of indigenous forces and a phased withdrawal of foreign forces to specified areas and their gradual reduction. The current French concept of a cease fire first with all other military and political factors in an eventual settlement to be deferred until later, seems a highly dangerous one. (The question of the impact of a demobilization proposal in Indochina on the situation in Korea would require careful consideration, nevertheless, where, as in Vietnam, the opposing armed forces and zones of influences are inextricably mixed and confused, the urgency of demobilization immediately following a cease fire is very much greater than in Korea, where there is one accepted dividing line between the opposing forces.)

(b) On the political side, a plan for the restoration of normal conditions looking toward the holding of elections after a transitional period of perhaps three years.

(c) On the economic side, the undertaking of prompt and energetic measures for the restoration of war damaged roads, railroads, other utilities and for general reconstruction activities on a large scale. This program should be so designed as to have a major political impact.

The rationale for any plan which our side might propose would be that, in view of the eight years of civil war which have taken place, it is essential that a transition period of military deflation, political pacification and economic restoration occur before there can be envisaged the creation of a responsible representative regime for the entire area. The details of any plan would obviously have to be worked out by the French and the Vietnamese. International controls would be an essential feature. Some of the major points to be covered would be the following:

(1) Military

The cease fire should be based on the Laniel proposals of March 5 with provision for international controls, including control of the Chinese frontier. The nature of the international control mechanism, the extent to which it would include Communist and neutral representation would be delicate and difficult problems, especially in view of our Korean experience. Presumably provisions would be made for a return of all prisoners and for a general amnesty for all those on the Vietminh side guilty only of bearing arms in the rebellion. (See separate memorandum for an analysis of the Laniel proposals.)¹

The cease–fire phase should be closely tied to a demobilization phase to be administered by the same apparatus of international controls as the cease fire. The stated purpose here would be to reduce the Vietnamese and the Vietminh armed forces to proportions related to the ability of the country to support them without outside help and to return to peaceful occupations the bulk of the 700,000 natives now under arms. (Taking into account the relative populations of Vietnam and of the United States, these 700,000 men in Vietnam would correspond to over five million in the United States.) The arms recovered might be held by the international control mechanism and be eventually disposed of for the benefit of the new national Vietnamese Government to be constituted at the end of the proposed period of transition. (The U.S. might, however, wish to reclaim some or all of the arms it has furnished under MDAP.)

This disarmament phase would not result in the complete disarmament of the Vietnamese National Army or of the Vietminh. It would be designed, however, to produce a situation readily controllable by the government which we recognize in the event of further Vietminh aggression.

Closely tied in with the disarmament phase would be the gradual withdrawal, under international control, of foreign forces (French expeditionary corps), to specified positions. A gradual reduction of their numbers might also be contemplated. Their definitive status would be at first as set forth in current Franco–Vietnamese agreements although in the long run the new national Government to be formed after the proposed transition period would make a definitive arrangement on this matter. At all times, these troops should continue to be available in numbers and in positions sufficient to guarantee their own safety, that of foreign residents and that of the non–Communist Vietnamese against a renewal of aggression.

(2) Political

Bao Dai’s Government with French Union military help controls the key cities and some other areas of Vietnam including half the population while the other half is controlled by Ho Chi Minh’s Government and its indigenous forces. Ho’s Government is recognized by Peking, Moscow and presumably by a number of the satellites. In view of the present equilibrium of military and political forces in the area, it is hard to conceive of an arrangement under which Ho would straightway relinquish his political control to Bao Dai. In fact, the essence of Ho’s position has been one of willingness to negotiate a cease fire and a withdrawal of foreign forces with the French while at the same time he has completely ignored Bao Dai and his government.

Since the military and political situation of Bao Dai’s Government is inferior, comparatively speaking, to that of Syngman Rhee’s, it is probably not feasible, no matter how desirable it would be, to include, in the proposal to be made by our side (except perhaps as an initial bargaining position), a complete submission to Bao Dai’s regime on the part of Ho and his supporters. In fact, the acceptance of a cease fire in the absence of complete surrender would probably presuppose the continued existence of the Ho regime during the ensuing transitional phase.

It is probable therefore that the relative positions of the two governments, complicated as they are by the absence of any frontiers between their two jurisdictions which in fact overlap and fluctuate, will have to be continued (in the absence of complete victory for our side) with all the attendant disadvantages through a transitional period. This would, however, be preferable to the immediate formation of a single government through elections or a coalition, an eventuality which most observers believe would be highly favorable to the Communists.

While neither government would be required to recognize the other during the transitional period, it is clear that some sort of an arrangement for an allocation of territory, perhaps based roughly on the cease fire disposition, would have to be worked out. As the disarmament and demobilization of native forces as described above was being carried out, it would be desirable, also under international control, to provide for a gradual restoration of freedom of the legal movement of people and goods throughout the country.

The culmination of this period of political reconstruction would be the holding of nation–wide elections to an assembly which would draw up a definitive constitution for Vietnam. A date for such elections (July 1st, 1957) might be announced at the outset of the transitional period. The elections themselves should be under international supervision. They would result in the creation of a single government for the entire country. Even with the safeguards and delays contemplated, an appreciable number of Communists and anti–free world elements would presumably be elected although it is to be hoped they would be a manageable fraction of the total.

(3) Economic

An important part of our proposal would be an economic restoration program designed to have the greatest possible popular impact. France and the U.S., as well as the Government of Vietnam, might effectively announce a willingness to devote a substantial portion of the money they are now spending on fighting the war to the intensive reconstruction of Vietnam. In those parts of the country controlled by Bao Dai’s Government this program could be conducted directly by France and the U.S.; in other areas, provisions for international control and supervision could be worked out. Such a program, which would cover a period of years, perhaps as much as ten years, could if successfully devised and initiated, be a major factor in ensuring that the proposed elections returned a majority favoring a free world, Western orientation rather than one wishing membership in a Communist Chinese satellite system.

The initial purpose of this program would be to restore the roads, railroads and communications as a prerequisite to the reunification of Vietnam after the interruption of eight years of civil war.

1. Not printed.