611.51/4–2553
No. 595
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Public Affairs Adviser of the Bureau of European Affairs (Kirkpatrick)1
Participants:
- René Pleven, French Minister of Defense
- Helen P. Kirkpatrick—EUR/P
The following is a summary of the views expressed by M. Pleven during a long luncheon conversation which ranged over a wide field. Having known M. Pleven well for over twelve years the conversation was personal rather than official and for this reason I would be grateful for the most limited distribution of this memorandum or discussion of its contents.
U.S. Policy: M. Pleven believes the aid policy of the new administration is a sound one which he finds entirely compatible with the interests of his country. He is, however, greatly disturbed by the manner in which it may be presented. To present it as a budget cut, the end of economic assistance, and reduction in defense expenditures is to create a serious psychological problem for all European countries and notably for France. Already the neutralists have seized upon this presentation as an argument for the reduction of French military expenditures. Edgar Faure has been writing that drastic American economy makes French expenditures illogical and unnecessary. M. Pleven feels that he will be under extreme [Page 1350] pressure to reduce the present military budget unless the U.S. economies are presented in a different light.
He hopes very much that the administration can explain the American cutbacks by pointing out that vast sums have already been invested and have resulted in such important stockpiling of materiel and the creation of reserves that economy is now possible; by pointing out that waste and extravagance is being eliminated, and by emphasizing Secretary Dulles’ description of the policy as “more security for less money.” This presentation, he believes, would be understood, widely supported, and would eliminate possible attacks which are otherwise bound to be made by the European governments.
M. Pleven said that he was much impressed by Secretary Wilson’s approach to the defense problems and felt that he would be able to work far more easily with him than he had been able to with Mr. Lovett, whose legalistic approach he found very trying. The fact that Mr. Wilson approaches problems from a common sense and a business point of view appeals greatly to M. Pleven. Mr. Wilson, he feels, has the approach of “big business” which means that he understands the limitations of small business and hence the limitations under which France is working. He was also very complimentary about Secretary Dulles’ speech in the Council2 and his general approach to all of the problems which have been discussed between the French and the United States since the new administration assumed office.
EDC: Discussing M. Bidault’s speech of April 23d,3 M. Pleven said that he felt Bidault would regret certain portions of it, notably that section suggesting that haste in the ratification of the EDC is not necessary. Pleven pointed out to Bidault afterwards that this would make it difficult when Bidault presents the protocols and the EDC for ratification. He also feels that the failure of the Bundesrat to ratify the treaty will play into the hands of the French who are opposed to it.
Political Notes: M. Pleven doubts whether the present government can last more than another three months and assumes that Pinay will attempt to form a new government. Pleven is, however, very discouraged by the general political situation in France and the lack of clear cut leadership, which he feels will be a continuing lack until the Constitution is revised. He does not regard the RPF [Page 1351] as a serious political factor but rather an irritant in the body politic. He says that he has not seen deGaulle for some years.
He predicts a battle to the death between Bidault and Pinay for the Presidency and did not venture an opinion on the winner of the battle.
Indochina: We discussed Indochina at length and in the broad context of the position of the West vis-à-vis the East. M. Pleven felt that from the moment the U.S. had pulled out of China the Far East became untenable for Westerners; that we cannot indefinitely hold on to any territory east of Suez, nor expect any positive assistance from any Asiatic country in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
He was most pessimistic about Indochina and especially the attack on Laos. He described the terrain, the character of the Laotians, and the logistic problems of the French in that area. He stated that the French were negotiating with Thailand for the use of Thai routes and communications to get supplies into Laos and to evacuate personnel in the event that became essential.
M. Pleven stated categorically that a Korean armistice—the cessation of fighting in Korea—would make inevitable French withdrawal from Indochina. He did not go into detail as to how and when such a withdrawal would take place nor did he speak of it in relation to any possible condition, such as a linking of the Korean and Indochinese wars in a settlement of the latter. I believe from previous conversations with him, however, that he does not believe that Messrs. Mayer and Bidault were precise enough in their discussions in Washington on the interrelation between the two wars. He thought that the final communiqué of the Washington talks gave France a great advantage which Mayer and Bidault failed to follow up. Nor did he seem to feel that it would be possible, in the present circumstances, to reach an overall settlement in the Far East which would permit the French to extricate themselves from Indochina. He spoke with considerable emotion, as he always does, of the heavy losses in Indochina and of his conversation of the day before with the head of the French Foreign Legion, which he said has lost more officers in Indochina since 1946 than its total number of officers since it was founded over a hundred years ago.
- Copies of this memorandum were sent to Bonbright, MacArthur, and Knight.↩
- Regarding Dulles’ speech during the North Atlantic Council meeting of Apr. 23, see telegram Secto 6, Apr. 24, vol. v, Part 1, p. 373.↩
- Regarding Bidault’s speech on the EDC, see telegram Secto 7, Apr. 24, vol. v, Part 1, p. 378.↩