740.5/4–2353: Telegram

No. 594
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State1

secret
priority

5624. Bipartite meeting held with French April 22, with Bidault (presiding), Pleven, Bourges-Maunoury, Letourneau for French, and Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Draper and Dillon for US plus advisers.

1.
Pleven: Viewed “stagnation” of French ground forces proposed by NATO with concern in view military risk. NATO secretariat proposals will be taken fully into account but recommended expansion French front-line air strength beyond 1953 impossible to implement [Page 1348] without increased budget which not considered possible. Question actually is whether present military budget level can be maintained which Pleven hopes. Uncertainty re post FY 1953 US aid is complicating factor.
2.
Bourges-Maunoury noted no improvement in budgetary situation as unsatisfactory trend continues toward increased deficit which on present outlook for expenditures and receipts would reach 1000 billion francs in CY 1954. Excepted increased in GNP not materializing. Economies inevitable. Possible, however, maintain CY 1953 military budget. In any event, burden in 1954 cannot be larger than 1953.
3.
Bidault: Would view relaxation in NATO with alarm since present situation requires perseverance. Believed NATO military effort should show continued upward trend. Strongly insisted need for longer-range defense planning including some foreknowledge future US aid.
4.
Dulles challenged use word “stagnation” as connoting deterioration and emphasized feasible qualitative improvements. As long as threat of war not predictably imminent, force levels should reflect capacity for sustained economic effort rather than maximum requirements. US does not propose to pressure NATO partners to increase efforts. US also has budgetary problem limiting current economic capabilities with Congress reluctant to authorize large amount economic aid. Secretary added aid next year has best taken form assistance to Indochina on basis of a plan endorsed by our military and promising at least reduction hostilities to small proportions within, say two years. Hence increased effort required to develop indigenous forces and also changed attitude some local officials better to reflect spirit Paris directives. Wilson agreed citing Korean lessons.
5.
Letourneau: Although invasion Laos worsened military situation, plans he outlined in Washington which US military then seemed to find feasible, still valid. Sincerity of political and military officials in Indochina, who realize victory requires full native Vietnamese effort, cannot be questioned. French determined expand native forces. US assistance fully appreciated. Chief difficulties are finances, cadres, training.
6.
Pleven: Sought elucidation Secretary’s remarks re aid. (a) Is present figure of $525 million aid from FY 53 funds in support French CY 53 military budget now to be regarded as final? (b) If France unlikely receive “economic aid” in FY 54 what general order magnitude comparable aid can be expected? Assumed that in addition such aid, end-item assistance will continue.
7.
Dulles: Nothing he said altered commitments of FY 53 aid. Confirmed $525 million as final. Re FY 54, executive branch could [Page 1349] propose figure comparable to $525 million provided IC program exists endorsed by US military. Increase even possible if Congress could be convinced program could shortly reduce IC conflict to manageable proportions. Appreciate French financial difficulties and would understand if French forced make some small cuts. However, any sizeable reductions would mean our assuming impracticably larger proportion IC total.
8.
Pleven: For French budgetary planning purposes vital that 54 aid be determined by October. Stassen and Wilson indicated this feasible. Time lacking to discuss French agenda items, EDC and North Africa. We promised later talks if French wished.2
Dillon
  1. Repeated to London and Bonn.
  2. For a record of the subsequent U.S.–French meeting, which took place on Apr. 26, see Document 596.