Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/5–2054: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

confidential

Washington, May 20, 1954.

CA–6753. Subject: U.S. Assurances on EDC. Paris pass Bruce Mission and USRO. Since there will be public discussion of U.S. assurances to the EDC during forthcoming debates on the EDC, U.S. officials, both in France and in other EDC countries, are likely to be asked for interpretations of the assurances and may be called upon to answer criticisms. The present despatch is designed to provide U.S. representatives with background information for appropriate use in this connection.

There have been three principal criticisms of the assurances from opponents of the EDC: (1) that the assurances contain nothing new; (2) that the old assurances are now made conditional on EDC ratification, which constitutes a threat that we will not live up to our NATO obligations unless EDC is ratified; (3) that the assurances represent a policy declaration by the President only and in no sense are binding on the Congress.

The following general points can be made in answer to these criticisms:

In the first place, as indicated in the detailed commentary below, there are a number of important new elements in the assurances. Although some of the points have been made before in various contexts and at various times over the past five years, either separately by the Congress or by the Executive, they have never been brought together in a single clear statement of U.S. policy.

In the second place, it is important to bear in mind the basic purpose of the assurances. They were not intended to be a new commitment or “concession” to the French; their real purpose was to clarify U.S. policy because of doubts as to U.S. intentions which had been fostered by critics of the EDC. Through erroneous press stories and rumors concerning U.S. troop withdrawals and the “New Look”, EDC critics in France and elsewhere sought to create the false impression that the U.S. was advocating the EDC as a substitute for U.S. participation in NATO defense. The impression had been created that we wanted German forces in the EDC to replace U.S. forces. The basic purpose of the assurances was to show that the best way to assure continued U.S. participation in the defense of Western Europe was to strengthen NATO through establishment of the EDC as its core of strength on the Continent.

Third, it is erroneous to charge that the assurances represent a retraction of, or a placing of a condition on, our NATO obligations, with a threat that we will withdraw from them if the EDC is not ratified. As the statement itself makes plain, our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty “will be honored”. The significant fact is that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which obligates the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, does not obligate the U.S. to do any of six things listed under the numbered headings. The six numbered items are undertakings we are prepared to take in addition to our minimum obligations under the NAT, provided NATO is strengthened through the EDC.

Finally, in answer to the charge that the statement is only a unilateral statement by the President not representing full U.S. Government policy and not in any way binding the Congress, it can be pointed out that the message is a statement of full U.S. Government policy for the following reasons. The purpose of the statement, as indicated above, was to provide a single clear statement of basic U.S. policy toward NATO and the EDC to remove doubts as to U.S. intentions which had been fostered by critics of the EDC. Although the message was not by its nature the type of document which could or should receive full formal Congressional approval, it nevertheless was discussed fully in advance with the Congressional leaders of both political parties in order to assure that the President’s message would reflect U.S. Government policy. The Congressional leaders concurred in its issuance after certain changes were made in the text to meet points raised by them. Finally, it should be noted that two of the most important items are based on policies which have already been formally approved by the Senate or the Foreign Relations Committee. Item (1) on maintaining our “fair share” of forces is based on the Senate’s “Troops for Europe”² resolution and item (6) on indefinite duration of the North Atlantic Treaty is based on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s unanimous report on the Treaty.³

There follows a more detailed commentary on the text of the assurances.

“As the time approaches for historic decision on the remaining measures required to put into effect the European Defense Community Treaty, it is appropriate for me to state clearly the United States position on the relationship between the European Army and the European Community on the one hand, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the broader Atlantic Community on the other hand. The essential elements of this position, which have been discussed with leaders of both political parties in the Congress, may be simply stated.”

[Comment: As indicated above, the text was discussed well in advance of issuance with the Congressional leaders of both political parties and textual changes were made to incorporate the views.]⁴

“The United States is firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty is in accordance with the basic security interests of the United States and will steadfastly serve these interests regardless of the fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country. The obligations which the United States has assumed under the Treaty will be honored.”

[Comment: The second and third sentences of this paragraph have been adapted from the language of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s June 6, 1949 report on the North Atlantic Treaty. The Committee’s report reads as follows: “The Treaty is in accordance with the basic interests of the United States, which should be steadfastly served regardless of fluctuations in the international situation.”]

“The North Atlantic Treaty has a significance which transcends the mutual obligations assumed. It has engendered an active practical working relationship among the Atlantic nations. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without the devastation or occupation of any NATO country. These nations are also seeking to make the Atlantic alliance an enduring association of free peoples, within which all members can concert their efforts toward peace, prosperity and freedom.”

“The European Defense Community will form an integral part of the Atlantic Community and, within this framework, will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United States forces and the forces of the European Defense Community on the Continent of Europe. I am convinced that the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty will provide a realistic basis for consolidating western defenses and will lead to an ever-developing community of nations in Europe.”

[Comment: These paragraphs emphasize the desire of the U.S. not only to support, but to develop further, obligations assumed under the original NAT. In the first of these two paragraphs, emphasis is laid on two NATO objectives, both very important to the Europeans: (a) the need for strength which will enable NATO to halt aggression, if it occurs, without devastation or occupation of any NATO country; and (b) the importance of making NATO an enduring association of free peoples concerned with non-military strength. The purpose of the second paragraph is to point out that the EDC, when it comes into being, will be an integral part of the Atlantic Community and will play a very important role in enabling NATO to attain the two highly desirable objectives listed in the preceding paragraph.]

“The United States is confident that, with these principles in mind, the Western European nations concerned will proceed promptly further to develop the European Community through ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. When that Treaty comes into force the United States, acting in accordance with its rights and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty will conform its actions to the following policies and undertakings:”

[Comment: This paragraph is a logical extension of the argument in the preceding paragraph. It first expresses our confidence that the European countries will do their part to develop the European Community because of what this means toward making NATO a stronger and more effective organization. It then goes on to point out the specific steps which the U.S. will be prepared to take toward a NATO thus made stronger and more effective. These steps are listed in the numbered paragraphs which follow.]

• “(1) The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area.”

  [Comment: There are two commitments here:

  (a) A commitment by the U.S. Government if EDC is ratified to maintain our “fair share” of forces in Europe as long as a threat to Europe exists. Hitherto the United States has given no formal commitment on this subject. The actual language used here is adopted from that of Senate Resolution 99 of April 4, 1951 which concluded the “Troops for Europe” debate. The text of that Resolution reads: “It is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the U.S. to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area.”

  (b) A commitment to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy, i.e., the “forward strategy.” Although we have agreed to this in connection with NATO planning, we have up to now given no explicit public commitment of this sort. This is an important commitment to the Western European countries because the “forward strategy” is the key to the effective defense of their national territories.]

• “(2) The United States will consult with its fellow signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and with the European Defense Community on questions of mutual concern, including the levels of the respective armed forces of the European Defense Community, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty countries to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander in Europe.”

  [Comment: Consultations currently take place with NATO in connection with the Annual Review. However, there has never been an explicit public commitment to hold these consultations and there has never been a commitment to consult with the EDC after it comes into being. It should also be noted that this paragraph singles out consultations on the levels of armed forces in Europe, which is obviously tied in with the reference in the preceding paragraph to the maintenance of our “fair share” of forces.]

• “(3) The United States will encourage the closest possible integration between the European Defense Community forces on the one hand, and United States and other North Atlantic Treaty forces on the other, in accordance with approved plans with respect to their command, training, tactical support, and logistical organization developed by the military agencies and the Supreme Commanders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.”

  [Comment: Again, although what is described here has been our general policy, the new element is the public declaration of our intention to support these measures for military integration between US, EDC, and other NATO forces.]

• “(4) The United States will continue, in conformity with my recommendations to the Congress, to seek means of extending to the Atlantic Community increased security by sharing in greater measure information with respect to the military utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense.”

  [Comment: The Administration declares its intention, to seek greater sharing among the NATO countries of information concerning the military application of atomic and other new weapons and techniques. This is confirmed by the announcement of the Secretary of Defense at the North Atlantic Council meeting in December of 1953,⁵ by the President’s State of the Union message in January of 1954,⁶ and by the President’s subsequent transmittal to the Congress of his recommendations for revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,⁷ which are currently being considered by the Congress.]

• “(5) In consonance with its policy of full and continuing support for the maintenance of the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens that integrity or unity as a threat to the security of the United States. In such event, the United States will consult in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.”

  [Comment: Although this is similar to the Tripartite Declaration of the US–UK French Foreign Ministers on May 27, 1952, it is significant that it is reaffirmed at this time by President Eisenhower and that, along with the rest of the statement, it was discussed with Congressional leaders.]

• “(6) In accordance with the basic interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed at the time of ratification, the Treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide.”

  [Comment: The concept of the indefinite duration of the North Atlantic Treaty was incorporated in the Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty, but it has never been explicitly and officially stated to be the policy of the U.S. Government. Hence this statement also is an important new element. It is particularly significant when read in conjunction with the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the preamble.]

Dulles

1. Drafted by Fessenden, cleared by Tyler of WE, Moore, and Colonel Gerhardt of Defense. Sent also to Bonn, Brussels, London, The Hague, Rome, and Luxembourg.
2. Regarding the “Great Debate” in Congress regarding troop levels in Europe during early 1951 which culminated in the adoption of Senate Resolution 99 of Apr. 4, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, p. 14.
3. Documentation on Senate approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is presented ibid., 1949, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.
4. Brackets throughout the document appear in the source text.
5. For documentation on the North Atlantic Council meeting, at Paris, December 1953, see pp. 454 ff.
6. For the text of President Eisenhower’s Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, Jan. 7, 1954, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 6–23.
7. For the text of President Eisenhower’s Special Message to the Congress Recommending Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act, Feb. 17, 1954, see ibid., pp. 260–269.