Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/5–1954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State ¹

top secret
priority

Paris, May 19, 1954—4 p.m.

4440. Eyes only Under Secretary. Department limit distribution. Be Deptel 4130.² I have been much concerned about EDC situation for some time. Two things are perfectly clear.

1. That as long as present state of acute crisis exists regarding Indochina there is no hope of a sucessful debate on EDC. The single-minded effort for a period of at least two weeks of all pro-EDC elements in government will be necessary in order to have chance of ratification of EDC by French Parliament.

2. Any attempt to force EDC to a vote before Indochina crisis has been further clarified would lead to indefinite postponement or defeat of EDC.

While pro-EDC members of French Government originally saw no connection between EDC and Geneva,³ the fall of Dien Bien Phu and present military crisis in Indochina has drastically changed situation. EDC is for the moment inextricably intertwined with both Geneva and Franco-US negotiations regarding united action in Indochina. While there is no direct logical connection between the two, the way in which we handle present Indochina negotiations with French is bound to have great effect on our friends in French Government who are supporting EDC. The two key elements in this situation are (1) the finding of a solution to the clarification of the independence of Associated States that will not require France to publicly proclaim right of withdrawal from French union and (2) the question of Marines for Indochina as raised by Schumann and Embtel 4416.⁴ Unless we can satisfy this request for Marines, I am very much afraid that the emotional reaction here will be such that there will be no hope of EDC ratification at least for months to come.

Indeed, if we fail to reach agreement with French for joint, effective and hopeful action in Indochina, the Laniel government which is living on borrowed time granted by National Assembly in the hope that, thanks to United States support, an honorable solution can be reached at Geneva, will probably fall. A government pledged to peace in Indochina at any price is then likely and such a government is also likely to bury EDC for good. As regards Geneva, I am sure that Soviets must be well aware of the reaction of Indochina crisis on EDC situation here. Therefore, I would assume that they would, while endeavoring to appear reasonable in public and before world opinion, take action to prevent any agreement in Geneva other than ignominious surrender at least until July when there would no longer be time to debate EDC here prior to summer recess. Therefore, the only way that I can see to push EDC to a vote here with a reasonable chance of success is to bring present United States-French negotiations on Indochina to a successful conclusion in next two or three weeks. Such a result would enable us to give solid support to French at Geneva and would recreate the spirit of alliance between our two countries which has been lacking since Dien Bien Phu.

Meanwhile, technical progress on EDC has continued. I do not consider that French have failed to live up to agreement regarding setting date for debate as Saar precondition has not yet been met. Delay on this is clearly a joint Franco-German responsibility and cannot by any stretch of the imagination be imputed solely to French. There has been real progress in these negotiations which as reported are now concerned almost entirely with the two words “corresponding relations” in Article 12 of Naters’ report.⁵ Schumann told me that if Teitgen and Adenauer could not reach complete agreement at Strasbourg he expected another meeting with Hallstein. He also told me that if no new points were brought up by Hallstein, it should be possible to reach complete agreement at this next meeting. There has also been real progress on protocol signature problem as has recently been reported by Bruce mission. If Socialist Party Congress should live up to Mollet’s expectations, Laniel’s position regarding EDC will be greatly strengthened, not only in Parliament, but also in committees and, in particular, in Steering Committee where first test of strength will take place. MRP Congress due May 27 and 28 also expected take strong pro-EDC position.

In view of above, I feel that present is not quite the time for letter such as described in reference telegram. I feel we should concentrate our immediate efforts on conclusion of Indochina negotiations with France and on bringing about a Saar settlement and agreement on signature of the protocols, all prior to June 1.

Delivery of letter of type indicated in reference telegram at this time, in the midst of crucial Franco-US negotiations on Indochina, would in my opinion not have effect of exerting pressure on French, but would simply ensure defeat or indefinite postponement of EDC and would greatly strengthen group in French Government favoring peace at any price in Indochina.

By June 1 situation should be much clearer and then if, after further conversations with Laniel, there still should be no progress on EDC I feel that the time would be ripe to consider seriously the delivery of a formal letter regarding intentions to the French. Status of Indochina crisis will, however, still have to be taken into consideration in reaching our final decision. Meanwhile I suggest that our action be limited to oral communications by me regarding importance of EDC to Schumann or Laniel or both the next time I see them regarding Indochina.⁶

Dillon

1. Repeated to Geneva.
2. Dated May 18, p. 955.
3. Reference is to the Four-Power Conference on Korea and Indochina held at Geneva, Apr. 26–July 21, documentation on which is presented in volume xvi .
4. No copy of this top secret telegram, dated May 17, has been found in Department of State files.
5. Regarding Van der Goes van Naters’ report on the Saar, see the editorial note, p. 803.
6. In telegram 4184, May 20, the Embassy in France was informed of the decision that delivery of the note to the French Government concerning the “German occupation status and also communication re fixing date EDC debate” should “not be taken until after Socialist Party Congress and further consideration situation Geneva.” Meanwhile, however, the Embassy was instructed “orally make vigorous effort achieve signature Protocols and Saar Agreement”. (740.5/5–2054)