Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–3152

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

Washington, March 31, 1952.

In response to your request for clarification of (1) the internal EDC security guarantee problem and (2) the US/UK guarantee of the integrity of the EDC, the following is submitted for your information:

1. Internal EDC Security Guarantee

a) Problem:

The German EDC delegation insists that the EDC Treaty must contain an automatic commitment on the part of the EDC members to come to the aid of each other with all their resources, including military force, in the event of an attack on any member of the EDC.

The Dutch delegation has shown great reluctance to accept an internal EDC security guarantee that would be more binding than Article V of NAT.

b) Proposed Solution:

The Dutch have said they might agree to an automatic internal EDC guarantee provided that the Brussels Pact, which has an automatic internal guarantee, extends an automatic guarantee to EDC, which in turn would extend a similar guarantee to Brussels Pact. Effect is to bind UK into automatic guarantee system of EDC. The EDC Juridical Committee has approved two draft protocols reflecting the above reciprocal guarantees, and these have been transmitted to the UK Foreign Office.

c) Present Status:

UK reaction to date has been cautious but “sympathetic consideration” has been promised when the matter is taken up by the Cabinet. This is scheduled for March 31 or April 1.

In view of the appeal to Benelux of closer British association with EDC, the fact that Brussels Pact and EDC commitments will have to be reconciled in any case, and the salutary effects on the French Assembly if the UK were to agree, we have communicated to the UK our favorable attitude towards the Dutch proposal.

We are informed that the UK has misgivings concerning the proposed Brussels Pact-EDC security guarantee solution in that the UK would be binding herself under this proposal to Italy and Germany for a period which might exceed the duration of NAT and might certainly exceed the presence of US troops in Europe. It would appear from a conversation on March 28 between General Eisenhower and the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the British are prepared to go as far as they can to meet the EDC Conference’s desires. However, British acceptance probably would be limited to the duration of NATO, which reaction might not be acceptable to the Dutch and might be used by the Dutch as a pretext to insist again that the EDC Treaty itself be limited to the duration of NATO, rather than 50 years insisted upon by French and Germans.

We have pointed out to our Embassy in London that the UK is already committed to a 50 year automatic guarantee to 4 of the EDC countries by virtue of Articles 4 and 10 of the Brussels Pact.

d) Further Steps:

In view of the importance which both Germany and France attach to UK acceptance of the Brussels Pact solution (Paris 5987)² it is suggested that a personal message from you to Mr. Eden might prove extremely helpful at this juncture.³

If the British come up with a Brussels Pact-EDC security formula which is satisfactory in all respects except that it is for the duration of NATO rather than the EDC Treaty or Brussels Pact, we should press all EDC countries to accept the British proposal.

2. US/UK Guarantee of the Integrity of EDC

a) Problem:

The French have been concerned that Germany, after its forces have been built up, may secede from the EDC. Consequently, they have sought to acquire from the US and the UK as formal a guarantee as possible that the US and the UK will not stand idly by should any country attempt to secede from the EDC.

b) NATO Guarantee:

On February 22, the NAC approved the CD report on relations between EDC and NATO, of which the following is a pertinent passage:

“Whenever any of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or any of the parties to the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community considers that the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them or the continued existence or integrity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Defence Community is threatened, a combined meeting [of the two Councils]⁴ will be summoned at the request of that party in order to consider the measures necessary to meet the situation.”

c) US Position:

At the London meeting with Eden and Schuman, you pointed out in answer to the latter’s attempt to get a more definite US guarantee against German secession from the EDC that you must stay within limits already approved by Congress, but that Congress had given frequent support to Eur integration including the stationing of US troops in Europe for as long as necessary, and that we would attempt to meet the French problem through the President’s message to Congress transmitting the Contractual Arrangements and the NATO–EDC resolution.

d) Proposed UK Declaration:

At the London meeting, Mr. Eden said that the UK might be able to say more than this.

The UK Embassy last week left with the Department the following draft of a proposed British Declaration on the EDC:

“Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been greatly encouraged by the progress made by the Governments of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the German Federal Republic towards agreeing on the establishment of a European Defence Community and they wish once more to make clear after consultation with those governments what their attitude to the Defence Community will be when it is established. Her Majesty’s Government do not consider that the establishment of E.D.C. will relieve them of their present commitments in Europe for the maintenance of peace. The defence of Western Europe is an enterprise in which the United Kingdom is already a partner by virtue of the Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. Her Majesty’s Government believes that the principles laid down in the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty are upheld. They thus have an abiding interest in the strength and continuing integrity of the Community and will afford its institutions their cooperation and support. They declare that they would consider any action which threatened the integrity of the Community as a matter of the gravest concern to them calling for consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty in order to agree on measures to meet the situation thus created.”

e) Present Status:

Meanwhile we have received information that Maurice Schumann is assuming that your London statement of concern re the integrity of the EDC implies the sanction of withdrawal of American aid from a country that secedes. We have replied that such an assumption is unwarranted and that from a practical angle withholding American aid would be a small deterrent.

A far more serious question is raised by Robert Schuman’s recent statement before the Assembly⁵ (Paris 5703)⁶ that the French Government is pressing the US for more concrete reassurances concerning the integrity of the EDC. We have asked Paris to ascertain whether Schuman has committed the French Government to ask the US for a Senate ratified document containing a guarantee that the US would somehow prevent withdrawal of a member state from EDC.

f) Further Steps:

Should Robert Schuman’s statement prove to be more than merely one for the record (we hope that it is nothing more than this), we will have to point out as we did in the case of Maurice Schumann’s assumption re the withdrawal of American aid from an offender that the French would be ill-advised to agitate this concept publicly since Congressional reaction to EDC might be unpalatable to the French, based on the logical query, “Do we now have to protect EDC against itself?”

1. Drafted by Barnard. The source text bears the handwritten notation “Sec[retary of State] saw.”
2. Supra.
3. A handwritten notation in the margin, signed by Perkins, reads: “I do not recommend this at this time. May be desirable after we get clearer view of UK position.”
4. Brackets appear in the source text.
5. A handwritten notation in the margin at this point reads “Foreign Affairs Committee”.
6. Not printed. It transmitted that part of the official French communiqué reporting Schuman’s remarks to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Assembly (740.5/3–1952).