Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–3052: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State ¹

secret
priority

Paris, March 30, 1952—7 p.m.

5987. Subj: EDC.

1. Fr and Ger delegations to EDC conf have been showing increasing worry in past week over absence Brit reply to conf proposal for exchanging mutual def guarantee with EDC. (See Embtel 5798,² rptd London 1604, Bonn 561 and Deptel 4578 to London March 19).³ Both delegations feel that Brit rejection of proposal wld create very serious sitn in conf. Clock wld be turned back to two weeks ago and deadlock between Dutch and Gers on issue of internal EDC def guarantees, for which no acceptable other way out has yet been suggested, wld again exist.

a. Alphand told US observer that unless Brit accept proposal which has been made to them, problems of internal mutual def guarantee and use of forces will become nearly insoluble in any way which cld meet with approval all around in conf and in NATO. He added that if Brit reject proposal, Fr govt wld lose an important talking point with Fr parliament.

b. Ophuls, legal member of Ger del, approached US observer and said that prospect of unfavorable Brit reply to mutual guarantees proposal seemed disastrous from point of view of Ger del. He said it was perfectly clear, as far as he was concerned, that unless UK accepted proposed scheme, Dutch wld not budge from their opposition to automatic internal EDC def guarantee or from their insistence that EDC go into action only by unanimous consent of member states. This, Ophuls said, was unacceptable to Gers and he understood from Alphand that it was considered undesirable in NATO as well. If Brit rejected proposal therefore, there wld again be an impasse in conf on this major issue, from which he cld see no way out.

2. Deadlock in conf on matter of def guarantee, which everyone foresees in case Brit reject proposal, wld be very serious matter. While it is true that everyone but the Gers and possibly the Itals wld be willing to settle for a provision along lines favored by Dutch (EDC goes into action unanimous consent), Ger objection is a fundamental one and wld probably be hard to overcome. Gers will find it difficult to go to Bundestag and say that they have merged their forces with those of countries which are not willing to include Ger in a system of def guarantees such as exists among themselves, (i.e. Brussels pact) or to extend to Gers similar guarantee. Adenauer wld have to go to the Bundestag with a treaty which makes it possible for Germany’s partners to refuse to defend German territory—which makes it possible, indeed, for any single one of Gers partners to endorse such a refusal. Certainly, under the Dutch system, it wld be true that Ger cld also prevent the def of Dutch or Fr territory, but the Gers not unjustifiably feel that they are in the more immed danger on account of their geographical position.

3. It wld appear from Nutting’s conversation with Gen Eisenhower (Embtel 5962, March 28 from MacArthur⁴) that Brit are prepared to go as far as they feel they can to meet conf desires. However, if as Nutting indicated Brit proposals limited to duration of NATO, there is real danger that Dutch will use this occasion as a pretext to return to insisting that EDC treaty itself be limited to duration of existence of NATO. See para 3 Embtel 5798, rptd London 1604, Bonn 561).

When at Paris mins mtg in Dec, Stikker with Van Zeelands support urged limiting duration EDC in this way, he met determined opposition from Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi. (See Embtel 3891, Dec 30, rptd London 1034, Bonn 230⁵). They argued strongly at that time that to limit duration EDC treaty to less than 50-year figure chosen for Schuman plan wld give impression that EDC was in nature of a “temporary expedient” of essentially mil character, and wld thus seriously weaken its psychological value as another step towards Eur federation. Adenauer was particularly vehement on subj, arguing that present opportunities shld be seized to build permanent structure that wld bind future generations.

It is possible, of course, that Franco-German-Ital position on this point wld be modified after Brit answer in sense mentioned by Nutting. But issue of duration of EDC treaty, seems to have important implications, in Ger eyes at least. When matter was discussed in Dec, Adenauer gave impression that he considered his own attitude on this issue, and therefore the attitude of the other govts involved, to represent measure of their trust in each other. In this sense treaty duration is really same kind of issue as automatic internal def guarantee, on which Ger position has been so unshakable.⁶

Dunn

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.
2. Dated Mar. 22, p. 627.
3. Summarized in footnote 3, ibid .
4. Supra.
5. Not printed.
6. On Mar. 20, Porter called upon Barnard at his request to discuss the question of U.S. and U.K. security guarantees to the EDC. Porter left with Barnard a draft of the proposed British Declaration on the European Defense Community which stated, in part, that the establishment of the EDC did not relieve the United Kingdom of current commitments in Europe for the maintenance of peace and that the principles laid down in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty should be upheld. Therefore, the United Kingdom declared that it would consider any action which threatened the integrity of the EDC as a matter of the gravest concern which would call for consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty (memorandum of conversation by Barnard, Mar. 20, 740.5/3–2052). In telegram 5989 from Paris, Mar. 31, MacArthur informed Bruce that “If British come up with Brussels Pact-EDO security guarantee formula which is satisfactory in all respects except that is for duration NATO rather than EDC or Brussels Pact, and if Dutch then use this point as pretext to create difficulties, I believe consensus opinion here is that Dutch shld be pressed very hard indeed to accept British proposal” (740.5/3–3152).