694.001/10–250
The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)
Dear John: I have waited in replying to your letter of September 16, 1950,1 until an opportunity might present itself for me informally to discuss the Treaty part of your letter with General MacArthur. I called on the General today’ and raised a number of questions with him regarding the general problem of consultation with the Japanese on the question of the Treaty.
First of all, I asked the General regarding his views as to who would be the best person or persons to come to Japan to discuss the Treaty, presumably in a general way, with the Japanese. Without’ hesitation the General said that he thought Mr. Dulles should come accompanied by you, as you and Mr. Dulles are fully conversant with the entire problem and already have the confidence of the Japanese as well as of General MacArthur and his Headquarters. I entirely agree with the General’s views, and also feel that the preliminary approach and discussions are so important that we should have the best talent available for this purpose. In this connection, when I mentioned Dean Rusk’s name as an alternative, the General thought not, as, in so far as the Japanese are concerned, his name has been connected with the Peace Treaty only in a peripheral manner and, in consequence, a great deal of ice-breaking would be necessary before the Japanese would accept him as an individual with whom they could speak frankly.
On the question of approach to the Japanese, I pointed out to the General various choices, such as limiting the Japanese side to Prime [Page 1312] Minister (and Foreign Minister) Yoshida and such governmental people whom he might select, or, alternatively, dealing with the Prime Minister, leaders of his party, and leaders of the other major (opposition) parties. General MacArthur immediately said that he thought it would be a mistake to attempt to discuss the Treaty with political party leaders, firstly, because there could be no such thing as discussions on a confidential basis; secondly, because Yoshida, as leader of the Liberal Party, would strenuously object; and thirdly, because the opposition party leaders would seize upon the conversations for use as ammunition to embarrass the Government. General MacArthur said that he thought the best method to follow would be to have a first meeting on an informal basis in his office with the Prime Minister. At that meeting subsequent methods of approach would without doubt suggest themselves, and further lines of action could be taken up from there.
In any event, General MacArthur is of the opinion that if you and Mr. Dulles come to Japan, the announced purpose of your visit should be to discuss Peace Treaty matters with General MacArthur and me. He feels that the purpose of discussing the Treaty with the Japanese should not be made public or even suggested, and that such discussions should evolve as a natural course of events after your arrival here.
I fully agree with the General’s views as indicated above.
On the question of Japanese participation in the Peace Conference itself, I told the General that my tentative recommendation to you would be that an effort should be made to have the Japanese Delegation invited to attend the Conference in the capacity of “observers”—to gain their entrance to the Conference—and that it should be understood that the Japanese will be given ample opportunity to present their views and observations on any subject germane to the Treaty negotiations. They would not, of course, be entitled to negotiate in the strict sense of the word, nor would they at any time be entitled to a vote. General MacArthur said that he agreed entirely with this concept, except that he foresaw considerable difficulty in gaining admittance for the Japanese to the Conference during the negotiating stage. He felt, however, that any workable formula should be evolved to gain admittance for the Japanese as a delegation.
On the question of whether any of our Allies should be consulted in Tokyo at such time as you and Mr. Dulles approach the Japanese, the General said that he felt, and I agree, that your discussions should be Unilateral and carried out on behalf of the United States alone. It is my view that by the time you are ready to come to Japan, you will have fully ascertained the attitudes of the various FEC nations, and will know what particularly difficult obstacles must be overcome. Further consultation would therefore appear to be unnecessary.
[Page 1313]I hope it will be possible for you to keep me informed concerning your progress in your preliminary approaches to various Allied Governments. I note a headline in the Nippon Times of today reading “U.S. Officials Hit Snags in Parleys on Japanese Treaty”. I hope the snags are not too troublesome.
Please give my best regards to Mr. Dulles, to whom you may wish to show this letter.
Sincerely yours,
- Not found in State Department files.↩