694.001/9–2750
Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense
secret
[New
York,] September 27, 1950.
Subject: Preliminary consideration of Japanese Peace Treaty
Participants: | General Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Delegation1 |
Mr. Dulles, USA Delegation | |
Mr. Allison | |
Colonel Babcock |
- 1.
- Mr. Dulles opened the discussion by explaining to General Romulo the philosophy underlying the United States attitude towards a Treaty of Peace with Japan. He emphasized the need for genuine and wholehearted support on the part of Japan and its people for the ideals and concepts endorsed by the free peoples of the world. He pointed out that the United States and its Pacific friends have not the power to continue indefinitely to exert the necessary force to keep Japan restrained under the terms of a punitive or restrictive treaty. Our aim, therefore, must be to take a calculated risk and produce such a treaty as will encourage Japan of her own free will to cast her lot with us and not seek revenge through association with the Communist bloc.
- 2.
- General Romulo emphasized certain points during his remarks:
- a.
- That the Treaty should be a multilateral one to include all Far Eastern Commission nations that are willing to come to an agreement with respect to a Treaty, and not a series of bilateral treaties with Japan.
- b.
- That all agreements should be a two-thirds majority vote with no veto.
- c.
- That the United States give due consideration to the reasonable claims of other states (reparations) and proper weight to their fears of Japanese aggression.
- d.
- That the work already accomplished by the Far Eastern Commission in regard to the democratization of Japan, etc. be carried forward, in so far as possible, by the terms of the Treaty. (See General Romulo’s “Memorandum on the Japanese Treaty” attached.)
- 3.
- During later discussion of the security points, which seemed uppermost in Romulo’s mind, it was pointed out that the security of the Philippines rested primarily on the willingness of the United States to stand by a long-time friend, on the presence of American forces in Japan and on the fact that it was militarily infeasible for Japan to commit an act of aggression against the Philippines without jeopardizing the security interests of the United States. On the other hand a restrictive treaty would be effective only so long as the victorious powers were willing to provide sufficient force to enforce it and would have the additional disadvantage of producing in Japan a body of opinion which would have as its primary aim the eradication of those restrictive provisions.
- 4.
- Towards the end of the conversations Romulo seemed to concede that there was some merit to the above point of view, but made it clear that serious difficulties would be encountered in convincing the Philippine Government and people.
- General Romulo was Foreign Minister of the Philippines as well as Chief of the Philippine Delegation to the United Nations.↩