694.001/9–2750

Memorandum of Conversation, by Colonel Stanton Babcock of the Department of Defense

secret

Subject: Preliminary consideration of Japanese Peace Treaty

Participants: General Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Delegation1
Mr. Dulles, USA Delegation
Mr. Allison
Colonel Babcock
[Page 1309]
1.
Mr. Dulles opened the discussion by explaining to General Romulo the philosophy underlying the United States attitude towards a Treaty of Peace with Japan. He emphasized the need for genuine and wholehearted support on the part of Japan and its people for the ideals and concepts endorsed by the free peoples of the world. He pointed out that the United States and its Pacific friends have not the power to continue indefinitely to exert the necessary force to keep Japan restrained under the terms of a punitive or restrictive treaty. Our aim, therefore, must be to take a calculated risk and produce such a treaty as will encourage Japan of her own free will to cast her lot with us and not seek revenge through association with the Communist bloc.
2.
General Romulo emphasized certain points during his remarks:
a.
That the Treaty should be a multilateral one to include all Far Eastern Commission nations that are willing to come to an agreement with respect to a Treaty, and not a series of bilateral treaties with Japan.
b.
That all agreements should be a two-thirds majority vote with no veto.
c.
That the United States give due consideration to the reasonable claims of other states (reparations) and proper weight to their fears of Japanese aggression.
d.
That the work already accomplished by the Far Eastern Commission in regard to the democratization of Japan, etc. be carried forward, in so far as possible, by the terms of the Treaty. (See General Romulo’s “Memorandum on the Japanese Treaty” attached.)
3.
During later discussion of the security points, which seemed uppermost in Romulo’s mind, it was pointed out that the security of the Philippines rested primarily on the willingness of the United States to stand by a long-time friend, on the presence of American forces in Japan and on the fact that it was militarily infeasible for Japan to commit an act of aggression against the Philippines without jeopardizing the security interests of the United States. On the other hand a restrictive treaty would be effective only so long as the victorious powers were willing to provide sufficient force to enforce it and would have the additional disadvantage of producing in Japan a body of opinion which would have as its primary aim the eradication of those restrictive provisions.
4.
Towards the end of the conversations Romulo seemed to concede that there was some merit to the above point of view, but made it clear that serious difficulties would be encountered in convincing the Philippine Government and people.
[Page 1310]
[Attachment]

Memorandum on the Japanese Peace Treaty

confidential

I. There are three alternatives:

a.
A multilateral treaty between Japan and all the victorious Powers, including the USSR.
b.
A multilateral treaty between Japan and the victorious Powers who agree to such a treaty, and therefore most likely to exclude the USSR.
c.
A series of bilateral treaties between Japan and each of the victorious Powers.

From an overall point of view, considering the present world situation, the first of these alternatives must be ruled out. We want to conclude a peace treaty as speedily as possible, and the presence of the USSR at this time would almost certainly prolong, delay and exacerbate the negotiations.

Our choice is therefore between the two latter alternatives.

II. The Philippine position:

The conclusion of any treaty is a supreme act of sovereignty. The conclusion of a peace treaty on the part of a victorious Power is doubly so, for the reason that the State sovereignty which was threatened and has emerged triumphant by force of arms would have the duty and opportunity to ensure its survival and possible advantage vis-à-vis the defeated State.

Let us consider, first, the proposal for a series of bilateral treaties. The proposal is open to several objections, from the Philippine point of view:

1.
The objection that the Philippines, being of itself a smaller and weaker nation than Japan, would suffer a certain disadvantage in the course of the negotiations. This disadvantage would be magnified by the feeling which has developed among the Japanese that they have the support of the United States in many of their objectives of industrial and economic revival and even of potential military rebirth.
2.
There would arise the possibility of each victorious Power securing the best terms it could get from Japan to the probable detriment of the other Powers. A certain spirit of rivalry and competition among the victorious Powers might ensue, and thus unduly strengthen the hand of Japan during the separate negotiations.
3.
The separate Powers, especially the smaller ones, would find it harder to compel observance of the individual treaties by their own separate means instead of by their combined forces.
Therefore, the Philippines must support the proposal to conclude a multilateral treaty between Japan and the victorious Powers that are [Page 1311] ready to come to agreement, which is to say, all the members of the Far Eastern Commission, with the exception of the USSR.

III. Points to be previously agreed upon:

1.
There should be no veto, and all agreements should be by a two-thirds majority of all the participating States.
2.
That the United States give a pledge to give due consideration to the reasonable claims of the other States, and the proper weight to their natural apprehensions arising from the re-emergence of Japan as an industrial and military power in the region.
3.
That the Peace Conference carry forward as much as possible the important work that has been accomplished by the Far Eastern Commission, in particular, its policy decisions on the democratization of Japanese institutions, the break-up of the great monopolies, and the strict limitation of its industrial war potential.

IV. The Philippine Government reiterates its invitation to hold the Peace Conference in Baguio City, Philippines.

  1. General Romulo was Foreign Minister of the Philippines as well as Chief of the Philippine Delegation to the United Nations.