694.001/7–2450
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
In our talks with the U.K.,1 Bradley stated that he thought we were very close to a U.S. national position on the Japanese Peace Treaty and that we would have already firmed it up had it not been for the preoccupation caused by the Korean aggression. He agreed with me privately that it ought to be possible to have an agreement in principle very shortly which would enable us to make some public announcement about plans for a Peace Conference even before an exact text was agreed upon. I told the British that we would want to be in touch with them again as soon as we were prepared to move. The important [Page 1255] thing is the apparent readiness of Bradley to move forward on the first steps without delay.2
- Staff conversations between the two governments are scheduled for publication in volume iii.↩
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In a memorandum of a conversation held with General Bradley July 12, Ambassador Jessup had reported in part:
“In connection with the discussion of a Pacific Pact, General Bradley touched on the question of a Japanese Peace Treaty. He said that General MacArthur’s written memorandum cleared up a misunderstanding about his views and showed that there was no real difference of opinion on what was meant by the maintenance of ‘bases.’ He thought the views of State and Defense were not now very far apart. He noted that the maintenance of American forces in Japan by agreement with the Japanese would be very different from a continuation of the occupation on the present basis. He doubted whether we could indefinitely refuse to permit the Japanese to get in a position to defend themselves, but this problem could not be settled for some time because of the strength of the feeling of Australians and others about Japanese rearmament.” (Council of Foreign Ministers Files: Lot M–88)
Full text of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
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