I called on General Magruder on Monday, July 24, and gave him a copy of
the attached memorandum regarding the Japanese Police Establishment. He
promised to get in touch with me after he had had time to go over the
memo, but he did tell me that SCAP had
requested, and the Department of the Army had approved, the arming of
the Japanese police with carbines as well as pistols, and that
arrangements were being made to do this as soon as possible. According
to General Magruder, no action had been taken as far as he knew in
connection with strengthening the organization of the police. I
emphasized that in the Department’s view the structure of the Japanese
police organization would need strengthening, particularly in the
[Page 1251]
direction of greater
centralization, if it was to be capable of carrying on efficiently.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum
The Department of State is more than ever convinced that the time has
come to take positive steps looking toward a real strengthening of
the Japanese police and coast guard organizations. Events in the Far
East, including the diversion of troop strength from Japan to Korea,
underline the necessity for prompt as well as definitive action.
SCAP’s recent authorization1 for the
Japanese Government to establish a National Police Reserve of 75,000
men and to expand the existing strength of the Maritime Safety Board
(coast guard) by an additional 8,000 men is highly welcome, but
further measures are believed to be required if Japan is to have
effective police protection without the present degree of police
dependence on the occupation forces for maintaining internal
security.
Eighteen months ago, the National Security Council, on the
recommendation of the State Department, adopted the following
policy:
[Page 1252]
“The Japanese
police establishment, including the coastal patrol, should be
strengthened by the reenforcing and reequipping of the present
forces and by expanding the present centrally directed police
organization.” (NSC 13/3, paragraph
7).2
This paragraph was supplemented by a State–Army cable to SCAP of November 22, 19483 which set forth the
following principles as basic to the achievement of Japanese
internal security:
- (a)
- Improvement in numbers, equipment and training standards
of the police and coast guard.
- (b)
- Creation of adequate mobile police reserves for handling
disaster or civil violence.
- (c)
- Establishment of an investigative and surveillance agency
(similar to the FBI) for advising the national Government on
the state of internal security.
- (d)
- Provision for broadening the powers and responsibilities
of the National Police (as opposed to the more numerous
autonomous local police) in order that there may be
standardized police enforcement of national laws and
coordination of activities of all police organizations, both
local and national, at all times.
SCAP has implemented the foregoing
principles to the extent that he has equipped almost every policeman
with side arms and ammunition, has turned over surplus US
transportation and communications equipment to the Japanese police
and has now authorized an appreciable increase in the size of the
police force. As far as the Department is aware, however, no effect
has been given by SCAP to the
organizational changes recommended by the State and Army Departments
as expressed in paragraphs (c) and (d) above. It is understood that these
organizational changes have been opposed on the ground that the
principle of, police decentralization must be rigorously observed if
a return to the old Japanese police state is to be averted.
The Department has viewed the degree of Japanese police
decentralization with some apprehension, for it is a disorganized
police structure which invites such hazards as poor cooperation
between police units, exposure of local police to corruption,
infiltration of extremist elements into police units, inadequate
financing, poor training and variable standards. Excessive
decentralization has no geographic justification in a small and
integrated country like Japan. It presents particular dangers in a
country totally disarmed. The possibility of a revival of the old
Japanese police state is not overlooked but it is felt that the best
way to avoid such a revival is to provide Japan
[Page 1253]
with an effective, respected police
force well-grounded in democratic police methods, notably in the
safeguarding of civil liberties. A revival of the old police state
could result from a police system so lacking in effectiveness that
extremist elements proceeded to take the law into their own
hands.
The internal striking potential of the Communists in Japan is not
limited to the 200,000 members of the Party nor to the many
sympathizers of North Korea among the 600,000 Koreans residing in
Japan. The Communist potential in Japan is augmented by the fact
that there are some 200,000 Japanese soldiers unaccounted for in
Siberia, a sizeable percentage of whom may now be under arms and
preparing for infiltration into Japan. A further danger is the
affinity between the Communists and the ultra-rightists whose
mentalities have been so warped that they can easily embrace
Communism with its similar philosophy of violence, terrorism,
chauvinism and conspiracy. In this connection Communism may have a
dangerous appeal to ex-members of the Japanese Army Which was
largely drawn from the underprivileged classes and through which a
communal spirit has pervaded. Parades, demonstrations, martial
songs, flag-waving and other Communist techniques may find an
emotional response among many ex-soldiers.
The preceding factors are not enumerated for purposes of creating
undue alarm but are cited to show the vital need for creating a
Japanese police force which is unified, well-trained and is prepared
to cope with large-scale internal disorders without dependence upon
the Occupation. For the use of Occupation forces against
Japanese—even though they be extremist Japanese—will raise the ugly
prospect of a racial conflict wherein the sympathies of many
Japanese will be naturally drawn to their embattled compatriots.
This, of course, is a Communist objective.
The organizational changes recommended by State and Army are ones
which evidently have the full support of major political forces in
Japan except the leftists. The most significant expression of this
fact is to be found in the Joint Resolution, passed on May 17, 1949
by a large majority of the Diet, recommending immediate improvement
in the coordinating and investigating machinery of the police
establishment.
Top Japanese police officials have long had in mind the introduction
of certain specific modifications in the present Police Law which
would extend the authority of the National Rural Police in various
ways without altering the basic organizational pattern of the
present police system. Heretofore these proposed modifications have
been blocked by SCAP. If SCAP were now to indicate that he has
no objection
[Page 1254]
to Japanese
Government legislation which would provide for better coordination
of police activity while observing basic police reform measures, the
Japanese Government would in all likelihood introduce and pass the
desired legislation without delay. Since the Diet will be meeting in
extraordinary session until the end of July and will then be in
recess until November, immediate measures would appear to be
indicated.
recommended action
It is recommended that the Department of the Army request full
information from Headquarters concerning what measures the latter
has taken, or is taking, to ensure that full effect is given to the
early implementation of NSC 13/3
paragraph 7, including State-Army cable of November 22, 1948,
especially as it relates to the establishment of an investigative
agency and to broadening the responsibilities of the national
police. It is also requested that information be furnished whether
any immediate changes are contemplated in the Japanese police
law.4 Talks with members
of the National Rural Police have made clear that the elimination of
the word “Rural” from their title, would add greatly to their morale
and it is therefore also recommended that this be suggested to
SCAP.
