756C.00/12–2950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 1

top secret   priority
niact

662. Urtel 857, Dec 29. We are uncertain whether position taken by Sukarno in letter of which Pringgodigdo informed you is simply effort obtain US support or whether it represents views Sukarno believes he must put forth to preserve his prestige in view his oft repeated statements re NNG. Inasmuch as we believe ur recommendations contained final para urtel 853, Dec 28, 9 p m2 are sound, we do not think we can offer Indos advice this juncture.

However, we think that, should Sukarno recommend dissolution Dutch-Indo Union in public manner, such action will have effect of solidifying Dutch parliamentary and public opposition against accommodation Indonesia on NNG question. In particular, we suspect [Page 1106] that public recommendation by Sukarno on dissolution might tend to heal what appears to be split in Dutch Labor (Socialist) party. In effect it most difficult to see how dissolution Union would solve NNG question to Indos’ satisfaction.

We of course desire continuation Union which we believe has been and will continue to be of benefit to both Indonesia and Netherlands. We would not dispute that Dutch may have made series of mistakes in matters such as Westerling, Makassar and Ambon. On the other hand, we have been greatly encouraged that there have not been many more difficulties of this type under the exceedingly troublesome conditions inevitable in the establishment of full Indonesian sovereignty. That Dutch and Indos have traversed this dangerous period without even more friction is evidence of high utility of Union concept.

You may in ur discretion use views contained in two preceding paras in any manner you deem appropriate. Dept hopes that Roem, whose views are reported as much less extreme than Sukarno’s (re The Hague tel to Dept 934, rptd Djakarta 913) will act as moderating influence on President after FonMin returns Djakarta.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to The Hague for information as 775.
  2. Not printed, but see memorandum supra, and footnote 6 thereto.
  3. Not printed; it reported Roem’s views at the end of the conference that restraint and discipline were needed by the Indonesians and that some weeks of nonaction were strategically desirable. Roem felt that the Dutch people were not interested in the retention of New Guinea and would bring pressure to bear on their leaders. (756C.00/12–2850)