756C.00/12–2950

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

Subject: Netherlands New Guinea

Discussion

The Round Table Conference agreements between the Netherlands and Indonesia provided that the future status of Netherlands New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia within a year from December 27, 1949, the date upon which the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to Indonesia. Negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians on this problem have culminated in an impasse at a recent conference in The Hague.

During the conference the Indonesians proposed that the Dutch transfer sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia during the year 1951 and upon the completion of a series of agreements designed to protect a special Dutch position in social, economic and cultural fields. In rejecting the Indonesian offer the Dutch made a counter-offer proposing that sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea be transferred to the Netherlands Indonesian Union; that if this were unacceptable the United Nations Committee on Indonesia be called upon to assist the parties in reaching a solution; or that, should the Indonesians not desire to use UNCI, a new commission be established, with perhaps India representing Indonesia, Belgium representing the Netherlands, and the two so selected to name the third nation member. [Page 1101] The Indonesians have rejected the Dutch proposal to transfer sovereignty to the Netherlands Indonesian Union and have indicated to us that, in view of UNCI’s membership, which includes Australia and Belgium, they will not consider its use in connection with the New Guinea problem. The Indonesian reaction to the Dutch suggestion establishing a new commission is unclear.2

Australia, the Netherlands and Indonesia are all concerned in the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea. Their positions are as follows:

Australia

Australia has insisted that it has a vital national interest in any settlement of the future political status of Netherlands New Guinea. The eastern half of the island of New Guinea is held by Australia under trusteeship and in the case of Papua, as a non-self-governing territory. Australia considers that all of New Guinea forms a part of the Australian inner defense system and believes that this contention was proved to be correct by the events of the last war. Because it regards Indonesia as politically unstable and incapable of providing proper security for Netherlands New Guinea, Australia has been adamantly opposed to Indonesian control being extended to New Guinea in any form whatsoever. The Australian Government has rejected in advance any solution of the question of Netherlands New Guinea which permits the Indonesians even a share in the administration of the territory. Because of its strong feeling that vital Australian security interests are involved in this matter, Australia has gone so far as to threaten to use force if necessary to prevent Indonesia from gaining control of the territory. The Counselor of our Embassy at Canberra,3 who is now in the United States, believes that there is a better than even chance that Australia would carry out this threat.

In April of this year, the Department informed the Australian Government that, while adhering to the RTC formula for settling the question of the future status of Netherlands New Guinea, we favored continued Dutch control of the territory, preferably in the form of a trusteeship, and had so informed the Netherlands. Since that time we have given no further indication of our attitude toward the substance of this question. Any alteration in our position would result in serious repercussions in Australia affecting adversely our relations with that country.

The Netherlands

Until quite recently, the Dutch Government has shown firmness in its opposition to a transfer of sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. The last word we have had from the Dutch in [Page 1102] writing on this was presented to us last May 4 in a note4 in which they said, “The Netherlands Cabinet, having once more thoroughly examined this problem, has reached the conclusion that Western New Guinea should remain under Netherlands authority”. More recently, our Embassy at The Hague was informed that the Dutch Government considered that neither it nor any foreseeable Dutch Government which might replace it could pass sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia because of the impossibility of obtaining the requisite two-thirds majority in the States General. In the last week or so, however, there appears to have, been some weakening within the ranks of the Labor (Socialist) Party with respect to the Government’s position. The Embassy at The Hague has reported during the last day or so that although the Socialist Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, still refuses to make further concession to Indonesia, the Socialist Party itself appears to be badly split between those who urge conciliatory attitude and those who follow the Prime Minister. It maybe that the failure to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Indonesians at the conference which has just ended will precipitate a cabinet crisis at The Hague. At this writing, our Embassy there is not ready to attempt to evaluate this possibility until there are further indications of public reaction to the failure of, the conference.

In addition to the elements in the Socialist Party referred to above as being in favor, of a compromise on the New Guinea issue, there are a number of Dutch business interests which definitely favor The Hague’s giving in on this issue in the hope of preserving the present satisfactory status of their investments in Indonesia itself.

Until recently, it was assumed that a transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea to the Indonesians would require a majority of two-thirds of Netherlands Parliament to enact the necessary legislation. There now appears to be some doubt as to the constitutional requirements on this issue, it being held by some that the legislation could be passed by a simple majority.

Over against the factors mentioned above which be expected to operate in favor of the Dutch Cabinet’s ultimately accommodating itself to Indonesian demands for sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea, there remain important arguments in favor of their maintaining their present position. Prominent among these are external considerations, principally the attitudes of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. It is thus very doubtful that the Netherlands Government will seriously modify its position on New Guinea until it has an opportunity to study the considered views of these three Governments in light of the present circumstances. Specifically, it is probable that the Netherlands Cabinet will await word from [Page 1103] us in response to Dr. Stikker’s request to the Secretary regarding the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic considerations involved before basically altering the present Dutch determination to maintain responsibility for Western New Guinea.

Indonesia

The Indonesians have been persistent, since they became independent on December 27, 1949, in demanding sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea. This attitude on the part of the Indonesians has been encouraged by statements of Indonesian Government officials, particularly President Sukarno. Indonesian opinion has developed to the point that there is a real threat of a boycott of Dutch interests in Indonesia, in the event that Indonesian demands of sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea remain unfulfilled. While such a boycott is being opposed by the Natsir Government, there is some doubt that its influence will be effective in stopping such a move. A boycott of Dutch interests will, of course, harm Indonesia’s production and may well lead to increasing instability within Indonesia, of which no doubt the Communists will take advantage. The position of Dutch nationals in Indonesia, if a boycott develops, will be most difficult. Moreover, the anti-Dutch feeling might extend to all Westerners. In its communiqué issued at the termination of the recent Hague Conference, the Indonesian Delegation stated its position with regard to Netherlands New Guinea as follows:

  • “A. The Republic of Indonesia maintains its claim on Western Irian as constituting part of the territory of Indonesia.
  • B. The status quo in Western Irian, which would, according to the R.T.C. agreement, only continue with the consent of Indonesia will continue as from this day without the said consent of the Republic of Indonesia.”

The Natsir Government may fall because of its failure to obtain sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea. This government is about as good a government as we can expect in Indonesia and, if it falls, its replacement may be expected to be less well disposed to the United States and the West. The Indonesians believe that Netherlands New Guinea was used as a base to support the recent revolt in Ambon and that the control of Western New Guinea by the Netherlands may lead to further attacks against Indonesian authority. We expect a virulent form of irredentism in time to dominate Indonesian polities if the Indonesian demand for Western New Guinea is not fulfilled. We believe that if Indonesia were permanently denied sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea, it would become anti-Dutch and eventually anti-Western. Such a development would make it most difficult to ensure the benevolent neutrality of Indonesia in the event of a US–USSR war although it is recognized that other factors would also [Page 1104] have an important bearing on this question (see recommendation in Secretary Marshall’s letter of November 7 to the Secretary).

Trusteeship Under the United Nations

The population of Netherlands New Guinea is not ready for independence at this time. It has no ethnical ties with Indonesia, Australia or the Netherlands. Thus, from the point of view of the objectives of the United Nations with respect to non-self-governing peoples, a trusteeship within the United Nations trusteeship system would appear appropriate and may be acceptable to the majority of the Members of the United Nations. Trusteeship under the United Nations, however, with Indonesia as the administering authority, would be unacceptable to the Australians; a trusteeship with the Dutch as administering authority would be unacceptable to the Indonesians, as would the United Nations as the administering authority. Neither Indonesia nor the Netherlands would be willing to see Australia become the administering authority under a trusteeship.

U.S. Strategic Considerations

The Department was informed on October 2, 1950, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no major U.S. strategic interest at this time in the disposition of Netherlands New Guinea so long as it remains in the hands of a nation friendly to the United States.

On December 21, the Department addressed a letter to General Burns (Attachment A5) outlining the views of the Indonesians, the Australians and the Dutch in some detail and asking the current views of the Department of Defense in our strategic interest in Western New Guinea. A letter of November 7 (Attachment B) from the Secretary of Defense gives the Joint Chiefs’ views on Indonesia as of that date.

U.S. Policy

During the RTC meeting last year we informed the Dutch that we favored their proposal for a UN Trusteeship with the Dutch as administering authority. We informed the Dutch in March of this year that our views had not changed. We informed the Australians in April that we favored Dutch control of Netherlands New Guinea. Since that time we have refrained from expressing any substantive views on this question and have reiterated the view that the problem was one for settlement between the parties concerned as provided by the RTC.

Early this week we decided that the Department would not ask the parties to adjourn their negotiations to a later date as we felt that we could not assume the responsibility for encouraging the Natsir Government to adopt a course of action which might lead to its downfall with [Page 1105] all the unpleasant consequences entailed in the collapse of the moderate government of Indonesia.

Recommendations

1.
That we maintain our present position of impartiality regarding the substance of the issue unless and until some new factor can be shown to tip the balance, and that, as Ambassador Cochran recommends, we make no statements nor offer any advice at this juncture on the New Guinea problem. (See Attachment C.6)
2.
That, if it can be done without jeopardizing the present Dutch and Indonesian Governments, we advise both parties at an appropriate time and in an effective manner that (a) we expect them to continue their efforts to find a solution by pacific means of their own choice in accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter and (b) we do not regard the failure to reach a mutually acceptable solution of the New Guinea problem as a justification for boycotts or violence.
3.
That as soon as we have received a reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to our letter of December 21, 1950, we address ourselves to the substance of the issue again in the light of circumstances then prevailing.7

  1. The memorandum was initialed by Secretary Acheson.
  2. More detailed documentation on the New Guinea conference at The Hague, December 4–18 and 23–27, is in file 756C.00.
  3. Andrew B. Foster.
  4. Not printed, but see footnote 1 to the memorandum of the same date, p. 1017.
  5. None of the attachments listed here was attached to the source text. A copy of the letter to Major General Burns, not printed, is in file 756C.00/12–2150.
  6. Probably a reference to telegram 853, December 28, from Djakarta, not printed, in which Cochran reported on a conference with Prime Minister Natsir concerning the outcome of the New Guinea conference. (656.56D/12–2850)
  7. On January 4, 1951, Major General Burns replied that the estimate given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the letter to Secretary Acheson on October 2, 1950 (p. 1074), after giving full consideration to the recent developments, remained unchanged. (756C.00/1–451)