Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

693.93B/10–3150: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

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New Delhi, October 31, 1950—9 a. m.

1030. 1. I discussed with Bajpai yesterday afternoon current situation re Tibet, and Tibet, China, and India.

2. Following is summary of some of information which Bajpai gave me re Communist China.

(a) On October 26 telegram drafted by Bajpai was sent to Panikkar in which was contained note for him to deliver to Communist Chinese Government.¹ This note, which Bajpai read aloud to me, was quite strongly worded. It intimated by contrasting statements made by Chinese to Indians re Tibet with present actions of Communist Chinese that latter had acted with certain amount deceit; that Communist Chinese had ignored Indian feelings and friendly suggestions re Tibet; that decision of Communist Chinese to use force in order solve Tibetan problem at time when Tibetan mission was starting for Peiping was “deplorable” and not in interest of China or of world peace. Note further dismissed as without foundation Chinese allegations that an unliberated Tibet presented danger to Communist Chinese security in view of ambitions of great powers in that region.

(b) GOI had made no decision as yet to extent to which Communist Chinese attack upon Tibet would change basic Indian policies. Bajpai intimated that he personally had lost confidence in Communist China but that Nehru would make final decision. My impression is if Peiping should write mollifying reply to GOI note, GOI, although more cautious, would continue endeavor maintain friendly relations.

3. Following is summary of information received re India and Tibet:

(a) Indian representative in Tibet had sent telegram suggesting that his mission be withdrawn since it would appear it could no longer serve any useful purpose in Lhasa. Bajpai’s reply, approved by Nehru, instructed India mission regardless of danger to stay in Lhasa. Similarly, instructions to Indian officers giving military training to Tibetan officers in Tibet near India–Tibet frontier were for them to continue their work. Bajpai’s comment was “we do not intend to withdraw as though we have no further interest in Tibet”.

(b) GOI had instructed its representative in Lhasa to suggest to Tibetans that if they wished to appeal for foreign aid they might care to send message to UN. Bajpai remarked that it would be preferable for a Tibetan to take this matter up direct with UN rather than through India since if India took lead Communist China and Russia would probably drag out old skeleton of Hyderabad.

(c) GOI had also suggested that Tibet order its mission not to proceed Peiping since in light new developments such mission would clearly be working under duress.

(d) India was planning continue to send to Lhasa normal supply arms but doubted that sufficient arms could be sent over road to Lhasa in time to save inner Tibet. I discussed with Bajpai again readiness of US to assist with arms provided GOI would be willing allow them pass in transit across Indian territory. I asked him whether in his opinion such shipment in transit of US arms would embarrass India or would be helpful to Tibet. He said that it was too early yet to venture opinions in this regard. It would be preferable to wait for developments. He thought it would be unwise at this moment for US arms to pass across India to Tibet. Our conversation this connection was extremely informal and should not be considered as request on my part or reply to request on his part.

4. I asked Bajpai what in his opinion US could do at this time that would be most helpful. We wanted to do what we could; on other hand we realized tremendous responsibility which rested on India and did not wish to do anything which might render India’s efforts less likely to succeed. Bajpai said that for time being he thought it would be preferable for US to take no action which might give Communist China chance to renew its charges that great powers were unduly interested in Tibet or which might make it appear to Indian leaders that US was endeavoring use Peiping offensive in Tibet in order create rift between Communist China and India. If rift should come, he pointed out, it should clearly come through force of events and not with help of outside powers.

5. I wish renew recommendations contained in paragraph 4 Embtel 1024, October 30² and emphasize importance of our showing understanding and sympathy for India in its present difficulties with China rather than any degree of satisfaction. We must, in my opinion, also be careful not to give Nehru impression that we are trying to use this occasion to draw him into “alignment with western power bloc”.

Henderson

1. The text of the Indian note, dated October 26, is printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950, p. 550.

2. The text of that paragraph reads as follows:

   “For time being we believe we should be cautious in manner in which we greet invasion of Tibet. For us to take ‘we told you so’ or ‘now will you believe us’ for ‘this should bring India closer towards us’ positions could do much harm. It would be better for us to indicate deep regret that Peiping has decided to resort to force in imposing its will on Tibet and that unfortunately this action tends to confirm our doubts that Peiping intends to live up to principles and purposes of charter. We might add that it gives us no satisfaction that recent events appear to give some justification to our doubts re Peiping’s qualifications for UN membership. We would be much happier if Peiping by its actions would convince us that our doubts with regard to its purposes and intentions had been misplaced.” (693.93B/10–3050)