Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

793B.00/10–2750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

top secret   priority
niact

Washington, October 27, 1950—7 p. m.

632. Dept wishes GOI know soonest US desire be helpful in Tibet situation. Embtels 997 and 998.¹ You accordingly instrd subject ur discretion see Nehru and say US Govt shares GOI concern over reports CPR incursion into Tibet.

Fate of Tibet is of more direct interest to India than any other country. Moreover, for historical as well as geographic reasons people Tibet look India for help and support in maintaining traditional autonomy. Such help can, of course, only be made available from India.

US Govt wld welcome closest consultation GOI on this difficult problem and wishes cooperate with GOI in every possible way in efforts GOI may make forestall Chinese conquest Tibet which US believes wld be contrary desires and best interests great majority people of Tibet.

FYI, we shld of course avoid “I told you so attitude”. Dept believes Tibetan developments so soon after Chinese Commie duplicity in dealing with GOI re Korea and in assisting Ho in Indochina shld leave no doubt re absence moral principles Peiping regime and its cynicism in conducting internatl relations. At minimum it shld cause GOI reassess its views re character Peiping regime, as it serves confirm our own views. However, we do not wish press GOI take action re Tibet. Course of events Tibet difficult foresee and if GOI took steps at our urging which subsequently left GOI in difficult position US wld be blamed. GOI must make own decision. If it decides act, we shall do what we can to help.

If you act pursuant these instrs, inform ur Brit and Australian colleagues.

Acheson

1. Neither printed. The telegrams, both dated October 26, reported on conversations held by Embassy officers with officials of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in the light of press reports of an incursion into Tibet by armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. The Indian reaction appeared to be one of shock and concern with indications that the Indian Government would register a protest in Peking. (693.93B/10–2650)