Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

611.94A/8–1450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China

top secret

Washington, August 14, 1950—3 p. m.

144. Eyes only for Rankin from Rusk. Fol is preliminary draft instrs on US policy toward Formosa and China being furnished for your info study and comment pending topside consideration here. Dept recognizes complexity and difficulty your assignment and desires to be maximum assistance. Highly restricted distribution this tel essential.

Present draft consists of three parts, (1) Interim policy during crisis created by Korean aggression (2) Long-Range policy applicable when Korean aggression resolved and present internatl tension reduced or at least clarified (3) responsibilities US reps re Formosa.

Part I—Interim Policy

A. See relevant portions President’s statement of June 27, 1950.

B. See relevant portions President’s Msg to Congress of July 19, 1950.

C. Excerpt from NSC 37/10 dated August 3, 1950:

• “1. Without prejudicing US initiative and freedom of action as to possible future courses of action with respect to Formosa, the US shld continue the present policy of denying Formosa to communist forces.
• 2. The US shld take steps (a) to assess the capabilities of the Chi Nationalist forces; (b) to insure that such Chi Nationalist military equipment as requires maintenance be rendered usable: (c) to meet deficiencies, now known to US mil auths, of Chi Nationalist mil supplies and material; and (d) in connection with (c) to give certain mil grant aid to the Chi Nationalist forces.
• 3. The US Govt shld make the necessary polit arrangements with the Chi Govt and shld direct the Commander in Chief, Far East to undertake forthwith a comprehensive mil survey of the resources and needs of the Chi Nationalist forces.”

D. It is clear from the excerpts quoted above that the mil neutralization of Formosa is basic to US policy during the present crisis. Action of Pres announced June 27 was for purpose of eliminating or reducing risk of Commie occupation and mil exploitation of this strategically located island in crisis created by Korean attack, to safeguard sea and air flank of UN forces operating in Ryukyus–Japan–Korea area, and to prevent if possible gen extension hostilities into wider areas of Pacific and Far East. Demonstration given on June 25 that Sov orbit is now prepared to use organized aggresion in pursuit of its objectives raised immed the problem of other areas likely to be attacked as well as problem as to whether USSR was intent upon gen war. Our action to neutralize Formosa was attempt to upset if possible any prearranged Commie time tables and to limit fighting to Korea until gen security situation cld be assessed.

From the mil point of view, western strategic frontier for the essential defense of areas vital to the US rests generally along islands extending from Aleutians through Japan to Phil archipelago. With Kuriles already in hostile hands, Formosa’s location is such that, in hands of power hostile to the US, it wld constitute dangerous enemy salient in the center of that part of our position now keyed to Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines. In the event Formosa came into hands of Chi Commies and latter made it available for hostile purposes to Sov forces at time US forces are heavily engaged in Korea, grave danger wld result for entire US position in the western Pacific. Further, seizure of Formosa by Chi Commies at hour when UN forces are resisting aggression in Korea wld be considerable stimulus to morale of destructive forces in Asia and thus work to detriment of US and other friendly states located in or having interests in west and southwest Pacific. The denial of Formosa to Chi Commies is, under present circumstances, an attempt which we must make as a matter of elementary precaution at a time of grave uncertainty.

On specific points arising from our effort to neutralize Formosa military, the fol instrs are called to your attn:

(1) Telcan June 27 containing text msg to CKS re: mission of Seventh Fleet.

(2) Deptels 30 and 55 re: bombing of Communist airfields and troop and ship concentrations by Chi Nationalist forces.

(3) Deptel 61 re: Nationalist held islands along China mainland.

(4) Deptel 64 re: air and naval reconnaissance by Chi Gov.

E. Also clear from the excerpts quoted above is the desire to suspend during the present crisis the complicated polit questions which arise in connection with Formosa. The directive to the Seventh Fleet did not represent a desire on our part to force an answer to such questions. On the contrary, it was hoped that these polit problems, on which the principal govts have widely divergent views, cld be frozen until the security situation cld be clarified. We consider it of the highest importance that differences as to Formosa not divide the solid world community in dealing with the Korean problem and that the necessity for a mil standstill on Formosa can be widely recognized and supported.

As indicated in the President’s msg to Congress, July 19, above, US has no designs on Formosa and specifically has no intention of seizing Formosa unilaterally for US mil exploitation. Our action of June 27 was not designed as a step in any US offensive against mainland nor as step to place auths in Formosa in position to mount gen offensive against mainland with US support. If Chi Commies intervene in Korea or attack Formosa, Hong Kong, Indochina, or Burma, our desire not to take action against Chi mainland wld have to be reviewed. However, we do not wish to become involved in any way with gen operations against Chi and wld seek to limit mil action to minimum requirements of situation created by Chi aggressive action.

Failure of US either to reaffirm or to modify its attitude toward Cairo Declaration derives from desire to leave polit questions re Formosa for the future to the maximum extent possible. The absence of policy declarations on such questions shld not be given polit significance.

F. Our interim policy permits mil and econ assistance to Formosa. In the face of a very great Chi Commie build-up along the mainland coast, the Seventh Fleet may not be able to guarantee Formosa against hostile landing. In this event, forces on the island wld have an important role to play in resisting the attack. In addition, it wld not be in US interests for Formosa to fall by subversion or collapse on the island itself. Under the circumstances, it is our desire to furnish, within a prudent use of available appropriations, certain types of econ and mil assistance to the auths on Formosa. This assistance shld be based upon critical needs known to and accepted by competent US mil auths; it shld be supervised to the extent necessary to insure proper use. Although the situation on the island is such that a considerable margin of error may have to be accepted, every effort will be required to insure that US aid is employed for the purposes for which it is given. So long as the Seventh Fleet has its present mission, it is in our interest to insure insofar as possible that the island is in good order, that admin is reasonably effective, that full attn is paid to the lot and well-being of the Formosans themselves and that US aid not become subj to racketeering. If the Seventh Fleet is withdrawn at some point in the future from its present mission, it is desired that the island be in a substantially better position than it was on June 25.

In conducting US aid programs on Formosa, it is not desired to establish enlarged US participation in and assumption of responsibility for the admin of the island. For example, it wld be unwise for ECA to become involved in any formal joint responsibility with the Chi Govt which might symbolize a US commitment to underwrite the economy of the island. This does not mean that ECA should not be actively concerned with and press upon the Chi such econ measures as are necessary to improve the econ situation on Formosa. ECA shld continue to act vigorously, of course, on all matters directly related to the operation of the ECA aid program itself and apply the gen principle used elsewhere that US aid is contingent upon effective performance and honest effort on the part of the recipient.

G. It is our present intention to continue to maintain dipl relations with the Chi Govt on Formosa and to accord to that Govt and its reps the benefits of that relationship. We do not wish to make any commitment to Chi auths as to how long this relationship will extend into the future. On the other hand, US reps on the island are accredited to the Chi Govt and shld conduct their activities accordingly. Conversely, US reps on Formosa shld insist upon full and proper treatment as such by all Chi auths and should report at once any indication of any tendency on the part of the Chi not to maintain relations on an acceptable basis.

H. The US opposes the seating of Chi Commie reps in the UN or other internatl bodies. This is a matter of US policy and is not to be made the subj of any commitment to the Chi Govt on Formosa. The US will accept the normal parliamentary majorities in internatl bodies on this matter and will accept the result if a majority decides to seat the reps of Peiping. We do not consider that we have a veto on this question in the SC. Our view is that if the permanent members of the SC shld be allowed to exercise a veto on this issue, the SC wld find itself in an absurd position and cld be easily wrecked by a recalcitrant member.

I. Insofar as mil operations are concerned, Formosa is within the area of responsibility of CINCFE, who receives directives on such matters through mil channels. It is expected that CINCFE will designate a senior officer as his rep on Formosa. If at any time this officer requires your assistance in connection with his own duties, you will, of course, afford him all possible cooperation. The success of US policy in Formosa will depend to a considerable extent upon cooperation and mutual confidence among the chief of the dipl mission, the chief of the ECA mission and CINCFE’s rep.

J. In addition to the mil advice to be furnished by CINCFE’s rep and the econ and financial advice to be furnished by ECA, the Chargé d’Affaires will wish to consider what recommendations and advice the US shld offer on other matters of a polit and administrative nature. In the normal case, you shld consult the Dept on such matters, where time permits, before approaching Chi auths.

Part II—Long-Range Policy

A. It is not possible under present circumstances to provide detailed instrs regarding our long-range policy toward Formosa. It is anticipated that the interim policy outlined above will obtain for a considerable period and that events in the broader world scene will have an important bearing on the Formosa situation.

B. It is US policy to employ polit and econ means to present [prevent] Formosa’s falling into Commie hands. At the present time, polit and econ means have been reinforced by the mission assigned to the Seventh Fleet. It will be in the interest of the US, therefore, for Formosa to become politically stable, economically self-sustaining and militarily secure. The achievement of this result will require a more enlightened statesmanship from Chi leaders than has thus far shown itself on Formosa. Chi auths will need a reasonably efficient admin acting under legal processes, the confidence and respect of the Formosan people, the loyal support of disciplined and effective armed forces and internatl approval of conditions on the island.

C. It is not in the interest of the US to restrict its freedom of action by indefinite commitments to the Chi auths on Formosa as to our future policy. Specifically, we shld make no long-range commitments about continued recognition of the Nationalist Govt as the Govt of China, about the Chi seat in the UN, or, particularly, about US support for attempts by the Nationalist Govt to return to the mainland. This does not mean that we may not continue to recognize the Nationalist Govt and support it in the UN; it does mean that our policy shld be based solely on overall US interests and not upon commitments to the Chi Nationalist Govt impairing our freedom of action.

Part III—Responsibilities of US Officials on Formosa

The US Chargé d’Affaires, as ranking US rep on Formosa, is responsible for assuring that all US activities on Formosa (other than CINCFE’s mil responsibilities) are coordinated toward the achievement of the fon policy objectives of the US.

In order to carry out his mission with respect to Formosa, CINCFE will maintain on Formosa for purposes of liaison with the Chi Natl mil auths a liaison group under a senior officer with direct responsibility to and channels of communication with CINCFE and such other mil auths as the latter may direct. Such senior officer shld at all times keep the US Chargé d’Affaires generally informed on all matters except those concerning details of mil operation and admin.

The Chief of the ECA mission on Formosa will work in close cooperation with and under the gen policy guidance of the US Chargé d’Affaires. The Chief of the ECA Mission will continue to receive operating supervision from the ECA Administrator and will use his own communication series for that purpose. [Rusk.]

Acheson