794A.00/8–1150: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom
priority
800. Personal for the Ambassador from Rusk. Reurtel 8441 Jessup and I saw Oliver Franks on Aug. 10 and discussed contents Deptel 522.2 Franks was without instructions and we agreed to take up the matter again as soon as he was ready.
Speaking personally, Franks said that he thought that President’s June 27 statement on Korea had been well received by Brit Cabinet but that their first reaction was that the Formosa part of that statement would lead to many complications. After their first reaction, they began to understand the importance of military neutralization, on which the Brit Chiefs had expressed agreement with the US action. Their later anxiety had been caused by MacArthur’s visit and by reports of Chi Nationalist bombings of mainland concentrations.
Franks went on to speculate whether there might be some possibility of reducing gap between us on Formosa by finding proper UN formula along with some common understanding on the longer-range development of the Chi question. We pointed out to him that we ourselves were interested in separating the Formosa and Chi questions since we did not wish the disposition of Formosa to be settled simply by deciding the question as to who is Chi. As far as the long-range Chi problem is concerned, we said that our own attitude would be very [Page 432] greatly affected by Peiping’s behavior. In the interim, if Chi supports the aggression in Korea (even more so than at present) or acts aggressively against Hong Kong, Indochina or Burma, we did not see how we could establish normal relations with Peiping or favor their admission to the UN. Franks recognized this problem and said that his personal view was that if Communist Chi actively intervened in Korea the UK would “derecognize” Peiping.
During course of conversation Franks asked very directly whether our policy on Formosa was firmly based on President’s statements of June 27 and July 19 and whether the UK could accept that with confidence. We told him that two statements referred to were basic policy and that there was no intention to depart from them. I pointed out the difficult problem of applying those two statements to certain borderline questions like reconnaissance, the treatment of Nationalist-held islands along Chi mainland, Nationalist seizure of former Nationalist vessels which had defected to Communists, etc. He said he recognized that the edges would appear blurred at times but that if the mainlines of policy were secure and constant, it might be possible to work something out.
On the question of arms to Nationalists, I pointed out that since Chi Communist authorities had not accepted neutralization concept, had publicly announced that they would attack Formosa and had disposed of their forces on the mainland with that in view, the ability of Formosa to defend itself had a direct bearing upon the possibility of neutralization. Franks stated he could see that certain arms supply might not be a serious problem unless it should assume the nature of preparations for Chiang’s return to the mainland, a course of action which would cause deep misgivings in London. I stated categorically that the President’s recent action re Formosa was not a stepping stone for US entry into the mainland nor preparation to put Chang Kai-shek back on the mainland with Amer support. I stated that obviously if the Chi Communists attack Korea, Hong Kong or Burma, that whole question would have to be reexamined, to which he agreed.
FYI MacArthur told Harriman he did not believe the Chi Communists will attack Formosa on the basis of their present capabilities. In fact, aerial reconnaissance along the Chi coast has not yet disclosed such concentrations of shipping, junks or other crafts as would indicate that an attack on Formosa is imminent.
If President’s action does in fact prevent or postpone Communist attack on Formosa, we believe the effort made to effect a military, neutralization and a political freeze, was the reasonable line to take, despite the obvious risks. If the UK and India are unwilling to accept a postponement of political issues re Formosa, then we shall be projected into sharp differences which, in the light of the situation on the spot, are quite unnecessary.
[Page 433]We are examining urgently whether there is any basis on which we, the UK and India could get together on Formosa policy remainder this year. For example, (1) military neutralization, (2) determination of ultimate status of Formosa through Jap peace treaty discussions (see London’s A–504, July 28)3 or UN or both, (3) initial determination by GA of the procedures and standards by which it decides between the govts competing for the same seat, (4) application to Chi seating problem of procedure and standards determined upon under (3). This would not involve any question of US recognition of Peiping, would permit the UN to deal with this particular issue on principles which shld apply to all similar cases in the future, wld not turn Formosa over to Communist Chi and wld meet our present essential mil requirements. From gen trend of Franks’ remarks, there may be some possibility along this line. Also, Bajpai left impression with Henderson that he might be able to consider some disposition of Formosa other than to Peiping.
Factor of greatest importance in US or, for that matter, UN attitude toward Chi Commies will be conduct of Peiping toward its neighbors and toward internatl obligations. Peiping is at present time coconspirator with Kremlin on Korean aggression and is actively engaged in plot against Indo-China. If internatl Commie orbit has in fact decided to wage war by all convenient means against non-Commie world, our problem is to alert non-Commie world to nature of danger and not of trying to buy off Commies by token appeasements which cld only increase their prestige without reducing their appetites in slightest degree.
It wld be unfortunate if, at a time when situation as between Formosa and mainland itself appears to be reasonably stabilized, public clamor and political controversy in the West shld force the pace of dealing with present disagreements among friendly govts and create unnecessary dissension at time when solidarity is urgently required. I recognize there are real differences of tactics between UK and India who are attempting to establish normal relations with Peiping and US which carries heavy burden responsibility for meeting Commie threat to security of the Pacific. We accept that it is of utmost importance that we try to find a common policy but we consider that while this attempt proceeds every possible effort must be made by all concerned to prevent this particular virus from affecting our gen relations any more than necessary.
We hope to have something officially approved topside for you on this early next week. [Rusk.]