661.00/8–1550
Minutes of a Meeting by Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Paris on August 3, 19501
[For the minutes of the first portion of this meeting dealing with Korea, along with background material relating to these tripartite discussions which took place following a French request for consultations on problems stemming from the Korean crisis, see volume VII, pages 519 ff.]
M. Parodi2 then turned to the question of Formosa and expressed the view that perhaps the greatest present danger lay in the possibility of the Peking Government entering the conflict over this issue.
Mr. Bohlen3 presented the United States position on Formosa, pointing out that our action was taken exclusively for security reasons. [Page 408] The Peking Government had declared its full support of the North Koreans. The President had therefore issued his proclamation on Formosa as a purely military measure to prevent the spread of the Korean conflict to Formosa and if necessary to prevent the island’s capture. The President has publicly asserted that we have no interest in Formosa other than to deny it to a hostile force. Accordingly, our action is a matter of elementary precaution. If the Chinese Communists make no aggressive move, the Seventh Fleet will never be used. Mr. Bohlen recognized that because our action was unilateral and not on a United Nations basis, it raises some rather delicate problems, and he invited questions.
M. Parodi expressed the view that while our action was fully understandable from a strategic standpoint, because of its unilateral character it could not be said to be based on the same principles as the Korean action which had the collective support of the United Nations.
Mr. Dening4 stated that so far the United Kingdom has formulated no position on the question of Formosa.
M. Parodi said that the French have also taken no position.
Mr. Dening said that the United Kingdom does not know what action it would take in the event of an attack on Formosa by the Peking Government. He believes that the Peking Government will not attack Formosa unless instructed to do so by the Soviet Union. He admitted, however, that if it had adequate forces at his command it might be tempted to do so. In his view the question hangs on whether the Peking Government may expect sufficient assistance (for example, planes and submarines) from the Soviet Union to carry out an effective attack.
M. Parodi inquired as to the attitude of Chiang Kai-Shek.
Mr. Bohlen said that Chiang has assured President Truman he will take no aggressive action against the mainland. He has kept his word, although he has been compelled to resist a Chinese Communist attack on the Island of Quemoy. Mr. Bohlen added that in the event that the Peking Government attacked Formosa, the United States would limit itself to action required to defend the island and had no intention of generalizing the conflict to the mainland in the nature of general war with Communist China.
M. Parodi asked whether our position on Formosa was coterminous with the duration of the Korean conflict.
Mr. Bohlen replied that such is the case. Our intention is to neutralize Formosa and to this end our fleet will continue to patrol the Straits of Formosa so long as the Korean conflict continues. Although the future of Formosa raises problems to be decided later, so long as hostilities exist in Korea we will resist any attack on Formosa by force.
[Page 409]M. Parodi inquired as to the purpose of General Mac Arthur’s recent visit to Formosa.
Mr. Bohlen replied that MacArthur’s purpose was first to determine the military disposition of forces on the island and the status of the island’s military defenses, and second to inform Chiang, in connection with the latter’s offer of Chinese Nationalist troops for use in Korea, that the United States would prefer to see them retained on Formosa for the island’s defense. His visit had no political character.
M. Parodi referred to the danger of a Chinese attack on Indochina and asked Mr. Dening if he would care to discuss the question of Malaya before that of Indochina.
Mr. Dening said that there had been great progress in the situation in Malaya but that the United Kingdom did not foresee the possibility of reducing its military commitments there for at least twelve months.
M. Baeyens5 discussed the question of Indochina. He said that Chinese Communist troops numbering from 150 to 200 thousand men and composed largely of infantry were deployed on the frontier of Indochina. He referred to the training of Viet-Minh troops on Chinese territory where they are periodically re-equipped and re-armed. The French High Commissioner6 believes that an offensive may soon be launched by Viet-Minh troops supplied from China. The offensive is envisaged for September after the monsoon period. The High Commismisioner is eager to obtain American air support. So far as any Chinese Communist contribution to Viet-Minh air power is concerned, while Viet-Minh propaganda had talked of twelve pursuit planes, these had not been identified on Chinese territory. The Viet-Minh has no planes in Indochina.
Mr. Dening said that it is entirely probable that China would continue within its own borders to support the Viet-Minh and that this was but another manifestation of the technique of aggression by proxy. He expressed the hope that the French would keep him informed as to the prospects of a Viet-Minh offensive.
M. Parodi indicated that French estimates of a forthcoming offensive are based to a large degree on intelligence reports received from Chinese Nationalist sources.
Mr. Dening commented that we suffer too much from intelligence from such sources.
M. Parodi turned to the question of Burma.
Mr. Dening said that there was no indication of an immediate offensive action by the Peking Government against Burma. He was pleased to note this because any such action would have a serious effect on rice exports from Burma which in turn are of vital concern to Southeast Asia as a whole.
[Page 410]M. Parodi raised the question of Tibet.
Mr. Dening said that the Peking Government unquestionably seeks to strengthen its grip on Tibet. He referred to rumors of a Chinese Communist offensive to be launched there in September or October, but he somewhat discounted these rumors because the oncoming of winter would seem to be an inappropriate time for launching an attack. The Tibetans are receiving some arms from India, but it is doubtful whether they would know how to use them. It is also doubtful that India would intervene on Tibet’s behalf beyond rendering her small supplies of arms. India and Nepal are preoccupied by the situation but could offer little effective assistance.
M. Parodi raised the question of the Philippines.
Mr. Bohlen said he was not briefed to speak in detail on this subject. He expressed his general understanding that the internal situation in the Philippines while difficult was less acute than it had been and presented no immediate threat. So far as the possibility of external aggression is concerned, we have formal commitments which would be implemented immediately in the event of an emergency. Our present agreements with the Philippines provide us with bases and training areas. Our present position re Formosa would not seem to necessitate the negotiation of additional agreements with the Philippines at this time.
M. Parodi expressed his satisfaction with the information elicited from the discussions. He called the next meeting for August 4, 4 p. m.
- The minutes were transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch No. 373, August 15, from Paris, not printed. They represented an informal record of the talks prepared by an officer of the American Embassy.↩
- Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.↩
- Charles E. Bohlen, Minister in the Embassy in Paris.↩
- Sir Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.↩
- Jacques Baeyens, French Director for Asian-Oceanian Affairs.↩
- Léon Pignon, French High Commissioner for Indochina.↩