Office of the Historian

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners
top secret
(special distribution)
7 February 1945.

J. C. S. 1227/4

( Argonaut )

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting

References:

a.
J. C. S. 1176 Series1
b.
J. C. S. Memo for Information No. 3602

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners

1. In the following paragraphs the Joint Staff Planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting each subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.

2. The President asked Marshal Stalin two questions, saying he would appreciate an early reply at this conference.3 The first was:

[Page 764]

“Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?”

The second was:

“Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?”

If the Red Army Staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the strategic air forces, suggest they be asked for agreement to entry of a U. S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the Mission.

3. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war against Japan three months after the end of the German war as indicated by Marshal Stalin in October, how would the weather and season of the year affect the beginning operations in Eastern Siberia?

4. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U. S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan?

Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan?

In connnection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka survey party. We consider it most important that this survey party get under way in the very near future. Will you give us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix “A” for copy of memorandum.)4

5. In connection with your plan of operations in Eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin?

If so, do you think you will be able to open the La Perouse Strait to shipping?

6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a memorandum (see Appendix”B”)4 in which we state our feeling as to the importance of combined planning in Moscow between your representatives and our planning group. We hope you will agree with our views and would like to hear any comments or suggestions you have.

7. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States Chiefs feel it important that they obtain weather information from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.

[Page 765]

8. Providing the Red Staff elects to discuss Milepost requirements, it is suggested that the substance of J. C. S. Memo for Information No. 360 be given the Red General Staff verbally.

9. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that in the discussion of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff make clear to the Russians that:

a.
Amphibious operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.
b.
If the Russians indicate a desire for a supply route across the North Pacific, the United States Chiefs indicate they expect facilities for basing U. S. strategic air forces in Eastern Siberia in connection with the opening of any such route.

Appendix “A”

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet General Staff

In order that there be complete understanding on the arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the United States Reconnaissance Party, the composition of which by name has already been furnished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the following:

a.
the reconnaissance party will have access to any part of the area.
b.
Transportation to, from, and within the area will be furnished by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
c.
Full information and assistance will be furnished by local Soviet authorities.
d.
Free and rapid communication between the party and U. S. military authorities will be permitted and arranged for by the Soviets.

It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.

Appendix “B”

Memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet General Staff

The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.

The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special effort should be made on both sides to expedite this combined planning by a full, free and frank exchange of information, data and ideas between [Page 766] members of the combined group. Preparation of combined studies and estimates for presentation to the respective Chiefs of Staff should be pushed forward without delay.

The United States Chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.

  1. For J. C. S. 1176/1, 1176/2, and 1176/6, see ante, pp. 375–378, 388–394.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Ante, p. 594.↩
  4. The memorandum had been sent to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff on February 5, 1945. See ante, p. 594.↩
  5. The memorandum had been sent to the representatives of the Soviet General Staff on February 5, 1945. See ante, p. 594.↩