J. C. S. Files
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes2
1. Approval of Minutes of the C. C. S. 182d Meeting3
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of the Conclusions of the C. C. S. 182d Meeting and approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
2. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)4
General Marshall said that the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 761/4 had been presented at the 182d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (30 January 1945) and discussed at that time. He called on General Bull for any additional comments he might wish to make at this time.
General Bull said that immediately following the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Smith had dispatched a telegram to General Eisenhower outlining certain changes that had been recommended in his plan, and that General Eisenhower’s reply was expected [Page 482] to arrive shortly. There was nothing that he could add until General Eisenhower’s views had been received.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of the foregoing statement.
3. Planning Date for End of
War With Germany
(C. C. S. 7725 and J.
C. S. 12396)
General Marshall said that C. C. S. 772, the British memorandum on this subject, had been presented at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 182d Meeting (30 January 1945). Action had been deferred pending consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Staff Planners had studied the British proposals and now recommend in J. C. S. 1239 that action on C. C. S. 772 relative to the planning date for the end of the war with Germany be deferred until the end of the tripartite conversations at Argonaut .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff defer action on C. C. S. 772 until the conclusion of Argonaut .
4. Strategy in the
Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 762; J. C. S. 1236 and J. C. S. 1236/1; C. C. S.
773)7
General Marshall said that J. C. S. 1236 contains an examination and discussion by the Joint Staff Planners of Allied strategy in Italy in the light of recent developments, and of the issues raised by the Supreme Allied Commander in C. C. S. 762, with a view to establishing the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff as to operations in Italy. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions and the proposed directive in J. C. S. 1236 as the basis for discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this point considered an advance copy of a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing a draft directive to SACMED, later circulated as C. C. S. 773.
General Marshall drew attention to the proposal to withdraw 6 British, Canadian and American divisions from Italy for use in France. It was his opinion that only British and Canadian divisions should be withdrawn, and that the number should be reduced to five.
Admiral King concurred with General Marshall. He felt that, in the event of a flare-up in the Balkans, the British would undoubtedly desire to withdraw additional British divisions for use in that area and that this contingency should not be overlooked.
General Kuter pointed out that the draft directive proposed by the British stated specifically that no tactical air forces were to be [Page 483] withdrawn. He considered it essential that a suitable proportion of the 12th Air Force should accompany the ground divisions to France.
General Marshall felt that before a decision was taken on the proposed directive, General McNarney’s views should be sought. He proposed a telegram for this purpose.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed and agreed upon certain amendments to the British directive.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved the message to General McNarney proposed by General Marshall.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft a memorandum embodying the agreed amendments to the British directive with a view to its circulation after the receipt of General McNarney’s views.
5. a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35)8
b. Allocation of
Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
(J. C. S. 1238)8
General Marshall said that the British Chiefs of Staff had presented a memorandum on operations in Southeast Asia Command in C. C. S. 452/35, which contained a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
In J. C. S. 1238 the Joint Staff Planners had examined strategy in the Southeast Asia Command, India-Burma and China theaters in the light of recent developments and the recommendations of General Sultan and General Wedemeyer with a view to the formulation of a policy for guidance of this Conference.
After discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1238, subject to the amendment of the memorandum in Appendix “A” as agreed during the discussion. (Appendix “A” subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 452/36).8
6. Estimate of the Enemy
Situation—Europe
(C. C. S. 660/3)8
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 660/3.
[Page 484]7. Bombing of U-Boat Assembly
Yards and Operating Bases
(J. C. S. 1219/1)9
General Marshall said that J. C. S. 1219/1 contained a study by the Joint Staff Planners of the possible resurgence of U-boat activity against North Atlantic shipping.
Admiral King felt that the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz was satisfactory but appeared to be drawn up on rather general lines.
Admiral Duncan explained that the directive had been purposely prepared in this manner after a discussion of the present air directive under which the bomber forces were operating.
General Anderson explained that the present bombing directive had been drawn up to indicate certain priorities which included petroleum reserves and the installations of the German air force. Bombing of these objectives had definite bearing on the over-all effort. The destruction of petroleum reserves had the effect of cutting down the activities of the German air force, and slowing down the submarine and training programs. Certain areas were selected for each operation and at daily meetings targets were selected to take advantage of current opportunities. The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1219/1. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 774).9