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Memorandum Regarding the Question of the Turkish Straits

This Government hopes that no question regarding the Turkish Straits will be raised because:

(a)
The Montreux Convention (signed July 20, 1936; signatories: Belgium, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, U. S. S. R., Yugoslavia)1 has worked well, and the Soviet Government so declared to the Turks jointly with Great Britain on August 10, 1941. Non-use of the Straits as an avenue of supply to Russia during this war was due to Axis command of Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Aegean, not to the Montreux Convention.
(b)
Any major changes in the regime of the Straits probably would violate Turkish sovereignty and affect adversely the strategic and political balance in the Balkans and the Near East. By and large Turkey has been a good custodian of the Straits.
(c)
The Convention was drafted to fit into the League of Nations’ collective security system and consequently can be adapted to the Dumbarton Oaks pattern.

This Government might not object if minor changes in the Convention are suggested by the U. S. S. R. (the Great Power primarily at interest), or Great Britain. Such proposals should, of course, be carefully considered by the Navy and War Departments.

No valid claim can be made for altering the Convention so far as merchant vessels are concerned, because, under its provisions, defensively armed merchant vessels of any flag, with any cargo, are free to transit the Straits subject to certain Turkish security provisions.

Under its terms the Montreux Convention can be reconsidered in 1946—it would be preferable to leave all changes until then and to have them made within the framework of the Convention itself.

“Internationalization” of the Straits is not a practical solution at this time because, if that is done, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal logically should receive the same treatment. Turkey would strongly resist such a proposal.

If asked whether the United States would be willing to participate in a revised Montreux Convention in 1946 or some other future regime of the Straits, the reply might be that we, having in mind Dumbarton Oaks, would be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the idea.

Note: Navy and War Departments concur with the above.

  1. For the text in French, together with an English translation, of this convention regarding the regime of the Straits, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, pp. 213–241.↩