862.50/9–2844
The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)
Developments in the Formulation of American Policy for the Post-War Treatment of Germany
On September 1, 1944, Mr. Harry Hopkins informed the Secretary of the President’s desire to establish a Cabinet Committee on Germany and, with the Secretary’s permission, arranged for a meeting in his office on September 2 of officials of State, War and Treasury Departments. At this meeting Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring of the War Department, Dr. Harry White from the Treasury, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger from the State Department, and Mr. Harry Hopkins were present.
It was at this meeting that Dr. White produced the Treasury plan for Germany and gave a lengthy interpretation of this plan which, in its general tenor, was more extreme than the memorandum itself. The plan contemplated the internationalization of the Rhineland together with a strip of German territory extending through Westphalia, Hannover and Holstein to and including the Kiel Canal. Poland would receive East Prussia and Upper Silesia; France would receive the Saar and German territory bounded by the Rhine and Moselle rivers. The remainder of the Reich would be divided into two independent states. In explaining this plan, Dr. White insisted that no trade would be permitted between the proposed international zone and the rest of the Reich, and he emphasized that the productivity [Page 161] of this zone should not in any way contribute to German economy. No recurrent reparations deliveries would be demanded and reparations would be dealt with by transfer of territory, equipment and labor service.
A lengthy discussion followed, in which Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger presented a State Department memorandum1 and explained at some length how our views fitted into the British and Russian ideas to the extent which we were aware of them. After a lengthy discussion in which Mr. McCloy pointed out the difficulties which would arise for the military authorities under the Treasury plan, he stated that on many subjects there was a large area of agreement and he suggested that Mr. Riddleberger draft a memorandum for the Cabinet Committee which would include all points on which there was obvious agreement. These points related primarily to the dissolution of the Nazi Party; the demilitarization of Germany; controls over communications, press and propaganda; and reparations. Mr. Riddleberger accordingly drafted this memorandum, which was discussed by the three Secretaries on September 5.
At this meeting of the three Secretaries, Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull were in general agreement on the paper and Mr. Morgenthau seemed to acquiesce in most of it. The next day the three Secretaries met with the President, at which time the Secretary of State presented the memorandum, dated September 6, which had been drafted by Mr. Riddleberger.1 The Secretary of War presented a memorandum of his own,2 which was largely in line with the State Department’s, and the Secretary of the Treasury submitted the same memorandum which Dr. White had originally presented. The discussion was apparently inconclusive and no joint decisions were taken.
There the matter rested until the Quebec Conference to which Mr. Morgenthau was summoned. Shortly thereafter, the President’s memorandum of September 151 was received, which embraced the idea of separating the Ruhr, the Saar, etc. from the Reich, with a program for eliminating their war-making industries and looking forward to converting Germany into a country “primarily agricultural and pastoral”. It was stated that the President and the Prime Minister were in agreement with this program.
In the meantime, a reply to the President’s memorandum of September 15 was prepared in the State Department under date of September 29 and was presented by the Secretary to the President on October 1, 1944.3 This memorandum of September 29 is presumably the basic statement of this Department on the treatment of Germany. [Page 162] This memorandum stated that the Cabinet Committee had not been able to agree on American policy for the post-war treatment of Germany and that the memorandum presented by the Treasury was decidedly at variance with the views developed in the State Department.
After reviewing the status of the negotiations in the European Advisory Commission, this memorandum advocated the following objectives which, it was emphasized, would have to be worked out with the British and Russians if they are to be applied throughout the German Reich. The objectives are: (a) Complete demilitarization of Germany; (b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations; (c) Extensive controls over German communications, press and propaganda, (d) Extensive controls over the German educational system; (e) No decision at present on the possible partition of Germany; and (f) economic objectives which are: (1) to render Germany incapable of waging war, (2) to eliminate permanently German economic domination of Europe; and (3) to require the performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation. (This was regarded as a shorter term objective.)
A memorandum, also under date of September 29, from the President to the Secretary of State was received in the Department on October 3, 1944.4 This memorandum modified appreciably the President’s views as set forth in his memorandum of September 15, and in it the President stated that no one wants “complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar”. The White House replied to the State Department’s memorandum of September 29 by a communication dated October 20, 1944.5 In this memorandum the President approved many of the proposals for the treatment of Germany made by the State Department and approved in principle the economic objectives as described by us. However, the President desires more information on control of German education and on some of the economic questions involved. The Department is preparing to submit another memorandum to him in the near future.
Realizing that the European Advisory Commission might not have agreed directives ready by the time Germany collapsed, both Mr. Hopkins and Mr. McCloy insisted early in September that an interim directive to General Eisenhower should be prepared. On September 22 (?), 1944 a meeting was held in Mr. McCloy’s office in which representatives of State, War and Treasury participated and, after an all day session, a tentative agreement was reached on the provisions of this interim directive.6 A few days later approval was given by the three Departments and the directive has been transmitted to General [Page 163] Eisenhower and to Ambassador Winant. This directive does not cover all the points which have been raised in the European Advisory Commission but does give a basis of American policy as it has developed to date. In the meantime, the State and War Departments are continuing to clear a number of draft directives for presentation to the European Advisory Commission for joint agreement.